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Abstract 
 
        As early as in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche perceived the "sole ground of the world" to be 
characterised by inescapable suffering. For Nietzsche, the "terror and horror of existence" (BT, §3) put 
what he termed a "great question mark over the value of existence" (BT, 'Attempt', §1). Whereas 
Schopenhauer answered this question with the pessimistic assertion that it would be better never to 
have existed, for suffering only detracted from one's wellbeing, Nietzsche eventually came to 
vehemently oppose this conclusion. Later in his philosophical career, Nietzsche held that suffering is 
necessary for the 'highest value' to be realized in life; for great and heroic achievements to occur. As 
he writes in a familiar passage from Beyond Good and Evil, "The discipline of suffering, 
of great suffering" has "created all enhancements of man so far" (BGE, §225). In this thesis I explore 
the kind(s) of value that Nietzsche can be said to attribute to suffering, given the status he gives it as a 
necessary condition of greatness. This question has been largely overlooked in contemporary 
Nietzsche scholarship, which often assumes the relation between suffering and greatness to be merely 
instrumental. However, I draw upon contemporary debates in axiology in order to shed light on this 
issue, with a view to assessing the nature and value of achievement in ethics more broadly. 
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Suffering ennobles a man,  
Enduring the oyster-shell's prison makes a pearl of a water drop. 
- Omar Khayyám  
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Introduction 
 
        As early as in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche perceived the "sole ground of the world" 
to be characterised by inescapable suffering. For Nietzsche, the "terror and horror of 
existence" (BT, §3) put what he termed a "great question mark over the value of 
existence" (BT, 'Attempt', §1). Whereas his 'educator' Schopenhauer answered this question 
with the pessimistic assertion that it would be better never to have existed, for suffering only 
detracted from one's wellbeing, Nietzsche eventually came to significantly distance himself 
from this assessment. Nietzsche took seriously the significance of suffering for the concept of 
a well-lived life, and increasingly as he progressed in his philosophical career, took suffering 
to be necessary for the 'highest value' to be realized; for the cultivation of excellence. In a 
familiar passage from Beyond Good and Evil, he writes that "The discipline of suffering, 
of great suffering" has "created all enhancements of man so far" (BGE, §225). The good life 
does not consist in a tranquil existence free from suffering, rather, it is one of creative 
achievement and successful struggle. However, throughout his corpus, but explicitly from his 
Untimely Meditations onwards, Nietzsche's concern is that contemporary 'morality' (in which 
he includes Schopenhauerian pessimism) enshrines a set of values that are inimical to the 
cultivation of greatness, in particular: the relentless attempt to alleviate all suffering. 
Increasingly in his works of the 1880s, this perceived problem becomes a more dominant 
theme, hence the value of suffering is emphasised. 
        The idea that suffering is in some way needed for great achievement is by no means 
unique to Nietzsche's thought. The concept is deeply embedded in the work of Homer, which 
incidentally bears (both implicitly and often explicitly) upon Nietzsche's critique of 
contemporary values, and places him within a distinguished 18th and 19th century German 
tradition of philhellenism alongside the likes of Goethe, Schiller and Hölderlin. While 
Nietzsche is perhaps best known for his typically provocative and dramatic style of writing, 
offering familiar slogans such as "what does not kill me makes me stronger" (TI, 'Maxims 
and Arrows', §8), to conclude that this is all that Nietzsche is doing when he explores the 
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value of suffering—an over-romanticising and possibly insensitive nostalgia for the concept
—would be naive, and exegetically careless.  1
        In this thesis, I use Nietzsche's departure from Schopenhauer as a point from which to 
explore a central and under-appreciated theme in his work: identifying the kind(s) of value 
that suffering can have in virtue of its relation to greatness. This value relation has often 
previously been assumed to be merely instrumental; that suffering is valuable insofar as it is a 
stimulant to greatness. I draw upon contemporary axiology in order to shed light on whether 
this interpretation is (or can be) plausible. Crucial to such a project is a clarification of four 
major ambiguities: (a) how Nietzsche construes suffering in this context, and if this construal 
differs in other contexts; (b) if and how Nietzsche might think suffering can be graded (e.g. 
by its intensity, duration, or both); (c) what Nietzsche considers 'greatness' to consist in: as 
purely a matter of achievement of certain goals, or as purely a matter of admirable character 
traits, or some combination of both; (d) how to distinguish between something being non-
instrumentally necessary, and something being necessary-but-instrumental. These ambiguities 
and their associated controversies will be the focus of the chapters to come. 
        While my aim is primarily exegetical—to elucidate what Nietzsche's actual view is 
regarding the value of suffering and how it differs from the views of his opponents—I do so 
with a view to extracting some of his more independently plausible claims regarding the 
nature and value of achievement, which will be of interest to ethicists more broadly. 
Moreover, I defend the claim that insofar as Nietzsche is interested in the good life and 
questions of value surrounding it, he deserves to be taken seriously as an ethicist. 
        There is a wider question regarding how Nietzsche's response to suffering fits in to his 
larger project of life-affirmation and responding to the threat of nihilism. Many 
commentators interested in Nietzsche's attitudes towards suffering approach the question 
within this context, often only indirectly addressing suffering's specific value. I do not deny 
that life-affirmation is one of Nietzsche's major projects. However, in this thesis I focus on 
the much more narrow issue of how suffering is thought to be valuable in the context of 
 This is not to say that this Goethe, Schilller and Hölderlin were guilty of this, just that the figure 1
of Nietzsche that is unfortunately often presented in this way is certainly a false one.
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achievement and the production of greatness, drawing upon how Nietzsche understands the 
status of intrinsic and extrinsic value. 
        I begin, in Chapter One, by explicating what Nietzsche understands suffering to consist 
in by interpreting his conception of 'the will to power' in light of Schopenhauer's 'will to life'. 
In particular, I argue that Nietzsche accepts at least three major aspects from Schopenhauer's 
descriptive account of the will:  
(1) All willing springs from want or deficiency. 
(2) The will is never 'satisfied'. That is, even if a particular determinate goal is  
      attained, the will manifests itself by pursuing a new goal.  
(3) At least one form of suffering can be understood as 'resistance to the will'.  
In doing so I endorse a particular interpretation of the doctrine of the will to power defended 
by Bernard Reginster, and more recently Paul Katsafanas, who in my view are exceptions in 
the secondary literature insofar as they rightly place Nietzsche's persisting and mature views 
firmly within a Schopenhauerian framework. This is advantageous because, as I shall draw 
out, it has great explanatory power in elucidating controversial Nietzschean concepts—
including the ambiguities (a) and (b) above—from his early as well as later periods. In doing 
this, I also distinguish suffering from the phenomenon of pain, as well as other ways 
Nietzsche uses the term 'suffering' which are not relevant to my investigation regarding the 
pursuit of noble achievements. I then provide a critique of Nietzsche's evaluative 
disagreements with Schopenhauer, and his motivation for rejecting the hedonism which 
underpins his pessimism. 
        In Chapter Two I consider in detail what Nietzsche understands 'greatness' to consist in, 
for without doing so, one is unlikely to comprehend why and in what way suffering could 
have value in relation to it. While Nietzsche's veneration of individuals such as Beethoven 
and Goethe typically centres on qualities of character or their executive virtues—pride, 
strength, perseverance, 'nobility', and so on—I argue that character, broadly construed for 
now, is only a necessary condition for greatness and not a sufficient condition. While 
Nietzsche does care deeply about how one is, he also cares about what one does. In 
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establishing that achievements contribute to the concept of greatness in Nietzsche's view just 
as much as character, I explore the distinctions to be made between talent, taste, and luck, and 
their degree of interrelation in genuinely great individuals. I also draw two further 
distinctions which have received relatively little attention in the secondary literature on this 
topic. The first is the question of whether greatness, on Nietzsche's view, requires one to 
actually carry out great deeds, or merely that one has the potential to do so. I argue that there 
are good reasons to support the former interpretation. The second is the question of how 
much extrinsic conditions matter for greatness. In other words, does greatness have to be 
considered in relation to a particular cultural backdrop or not? I argue that while there is some 
evidence that Nietzsche thought so, he may have changed his mind in different periods of his 
work, and I ultimately remain open to this possibility. 
        Chapter Three discusses Nietzsche's broader claims about the nature of value and 
valuing. After establishing what Nietzsche understands greatness to consist in, I argue that he 
considers greatness as valuable for its own sake or 'as an end'. I then proceed to distinguish 
this concept from 'intrinsic value' in order to clarify how some interpreters are using the 
terms. By drawing upon contemporary value theory, I argue, following Christine Korsgaard 
and others, that 'intrinsic value' is properly contrasted with 'extrinsic value', and not 
'instrumental value'. The reason why this is significant is that there are numerous forms of 
extrinsic value, and making them explicit may help elucidate Nietzschean concepts with 
greater precision insofar as they provide us with a wider range of interpretive tools. 
Moreover, once we take into account the multiple ways something might be valuable based 
on its extrinsic or relational properties, we can begin to ask which kind of evaluation can be 
appropriately be attributed to Nietzsche's views on suffering. 
        I move on in Chapter Four to considering the case for attributing instrumental value to 
Nietzsche's account of suffering. I explore the arguments for such a view in light of the 
textual evidence Nietzsche provides, but ultimately argue that the instrumental reading, 
insofar as it treats suffering as only instrumentally valuable, is not sufficiently representative 
of Nietzsche's view. I provide support for this contention by drawing attention to and 
explicating two claims: 
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(1) The instrumental view is compatible with the Christian or 'moral' evaluation of 
suffering.  
(2) Nietzsche proposes a radical revaluation [Umwerthung] of values at least partly 
on the grounds that the Christian or 'moral' system fails to appropriately value 
suffering.  
I do so by firstly considering what an achievement is, and how it differs from merely 
satisfying a desire. I then move to discussing what is valuable about an achievement: the 
product reached or the process of reaching it. I argue that Nietzsche is in fact committed to a 
hybrid view in which the process of reaching a goal gives an achievement its value, but given 
his elitism, there likely must be substantive constraints on what these goals are. Unfortunately 
however, Nietzsche does not provide an account of what these constraints will be. While I 
aim to attribute this view to Nietzsche, I also argue that it is an independently plausible view, 
and that Nietzsche can contribute to the ethics of achievement just as much, if not to a greater 
degree, than typical Aristotelian accounts. 
        In the final Chapter, Chapter Five, I consider a plausible alternative to the instrumental 
view that is defended by Reginster: that suffering has value in virtue of forming part of a 
valuable whole. I first clarify how Reginster understands this evaluative claim to follow from 
his interpretation of the will to power, and then provide support for his view that what he 
calls 'contributory value' is distinct from instrumental value. Reginster argues that because 
suffering is an essential feature of Nietzschean achievement, we must also value suffering in 
such a way that it cannot be a regrettable feature. I argue that, as it stands, this argument is 
open to an objection, namely: that by taking advantage of the principle of organic unities—a 
principle that Nietzsche heavily engages with—there can be an essential part of a valuable 
whole which we nonetheless deplore. At work here is a distinction between two ways a part 
can have value in virtue of its relation to a whole. The first way is as an enabling condition, 
where a part retains its badness but allows for the production of a compensating good (X 
enables Y, which has value). The second way is as a contributor, where the part positively 
contributes to value to a whole (X contributes value to Y). I explore this distinction, and 
argue that if Nietzsche's revaluation of values is to be as radical as he claims, he must 
consider suffering to be valuable-as-a-part in a particular way, that is: as a contributor and not 
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an enabling condition. This interpretation, I claim, can be supported by drawing upon a 
broader theme of Nietzschean aestheticism; paying particular attention to the concept of the 
'hero' which features heavily from The Birth of Tragedy up to and including The Gay Science. 
By addressing what Nietzsche perceives as a tension between moral and aesthetic value, we 
may provide the tools to respond to the objection Reginster faces. 
        One potential exegetical complication one needs to be aware of in carrying out this 
project concerns how to proceed in determining, and often reconstructing, Nietzsche's 
thought. While Nietzsche never uses formal arguments himself, it is nonetheless sometimes 
permissible, appropriate, and even required, to employ them when presenting his views. The 
reason being that, as we shall see, he often makes several distinct claims within one passage. 
Together with his aphoristic style, this can make exegesis peculiarly difficult. Using formal 
arguments familiar to analytical philosophy is a useful tool in clarifying Nietzsche's thought 
on the specific point at hand, and I shall utilize them periodically throughout this thesis. 
        A second exegetical complication is that Nietzsche is a figure whose philosophy is 
generally considered to have significantly changed and developed in important ways over the 
course of his writing.  Taking this into account, claims such as: Nietzsche 'argues for X'; 2
'...develops an account of Y'; '...rejects all forms of Z', and so forth, have to be considered as 
at least potentially only relative to a particular period of Nietzsche's philosophy. Of specific 
relevance to my investigation is that Nietzsche's claims about the value of suffering become 
increasingly prevalent in his latter writings as a result of his amplified immoralism. 
Consequently, I more frequently discuss his works from 1881 onwards. However, I hope to 
demonstrate that in order to fully grasp the relationship between suffering and greatness, one 
must look to both Nietzsche's 'positivistic' period and his early period, not least in order to 
comprehend the perceived problem he is responding to in his 'great teacher' Schopenhauer. 
 A common view of the developmental phases of Nietzsche's philosophy divides his work into three 2
stages: an early period (1871-1878), a 'positivistic' period (1878-1881), and a mature period 
(1881-1889).
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A Note on the Nachlass and The Will to Power 
        Before I begin, there is a third complication of a philological nature that needs to be 
made explicit: the use of the Nachlass as a reliable textual source for interpretation of 
Nietzsche's position. It is first prudent to address the status of The Will to Power, which was 
constructed from portions of the Nachlass. After addressing the most problematic aspects of 
this text, I shall then identify competing traditions of thought that pertain to the 
appropriateness of referring to the Nachlass from which it was formed.  
        After Nietzsche's death in August 1900, and under the organisational supervision of his 
sister Elizabeth, Nietzsche's editors (primarily Heinrich Köselitz—otherwise known as Peter 
Gast—Ernst Horneffer and August Horneffer) collected his 1880's notebooks and assembled 
selected passages under the title of what was claimed to be his intended magnum opus: The 
Will to Power. This was published first in 1901 as 483 selected and arranged notes, and then 
again in two volumes in 1906 as 1,067 notes, which has become the most familiar edition. 
        There are three reasons to approach this text with caution, each of which has been 
developed in more detail than I can give here by Bernd Magnus in his 1988 paper "The Use 
and Abuse of The Will to Power".  Firstly, although Nietzsche certainly at one stage had a 3
"work in progress" entitled "The Will to Power: An Attempt at a Transvaluation of 
Values" (GM, III, §27), he later abandoned the idea altogether in 1888,  with segments of 4
texts that were evidently early drafts ending up forming parts of other published material, 
notably The Anti-Christ and Twilight of the Idols.  While not providing a sufficient reason to 5
reject The Will to Power altogether, this should motivate an initial suspicion over its 
legitimacy. 
 This paper builds on much of the work done on the status of the Nachlass in Mazzino Montinari, 3
"Nietzsche's Nachlaß von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht" in Nietzsche lesen, (de 
Gruyter, 1982).
 Bernd Magnus, "The Use and Abuse of The Will to Power" in Reading Nietzsche, (eds.) Robert 4
Solomon and Kathleen Marie Higgins, (Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 225. 
 For a more expansive account of Nietzsche's intention and eventual abandonment of the project, 5
see Wayne Klein, Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy, (State University of New York Press, 
1997), pp. 181-199.
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        A second reason concerns the order and the headings of the text. The notes from which 
Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche and the editors collected their material for The Will to Power 
were chaotic and unorganized. The order, numbering and arrangement of the book were not 
Nietzsche's, and the text was comprised of notes Nietzsche made at significantly different 
times. With this in mind, that unrelated passages have been grouped together under broad 
topic sections, although giving the impression of a coherent and ironed-out position, should 
raise suspicion. Moreover, notorious sections entitled '"Discipline and Breeding' [Zucht und 
Züchtung]", in which concentrated passages describe the "annihilation of the decaying 
races" (WP, §862; KSA, 1884, 25[211]), must be approached with caution. Indeed, Nietzsche 
had drafted plans for headings when he still intended to write the book, but 'Discipline and 
Breeding' occurred in only one (very early) draft out of a total of twenty-five.  The question 6
then becomes: why is it that the notes occur in their particular order? 
        This question cannot reasonably be considered aside from Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche's 
own motivations and political sympathies. She was an anti-Semite, avid German nationalist, 
and later a member of the Nazi party. Together with her husband Bernhard Förster, who in 
1881 founded the far right political organisation Deutscher Volksverein (German People's 
League), Elizabeth travelled to a site in Paraguay where they intended to set up a 'racially 
pure' and 'aryan' colony called Nueva Germania. After the limited success of the colony and 
the suicide of Bernhard Förster, Elizabeth returned to Germany in 1893 to find Nietzsche's 
writing beginning to stir interest across Europe. Considering her sympathies towards far right 
parties and proto-fascism emerging in Germany at the time, and her new control over 
Nietzsche's notes, one cannot rule out the idea that the particular compilation of The Will to 
Power was directed at least in part by a desire to colour Nietzsche's philosophy in a certain 
shade.  
        Thirdly, and perhaps this is the most pernicious point of all, notes were included in the 
text which Nietzsche had earlier discarded. These are more than enough grounds to call into 
question the credibility of The Will to Power as a text representative of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. One example Magnus focuses on is the text's final passage, which ends with: 
 Walter Kaufmann, "Editor's Introduction" to The Will to Power, (Vintage Books, 1968), p. 18.6
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This world is the will to power — and nothing besides! And yourselves are also this will to 
power — and nothing besides! (WP, §1067; KSA, 1885, 38[12]) 
As Magus notes, this was written by Nietzsche in July 1885 but later set aside (by February 
1888) as unusable.  Nevertheless, this discarded passage forms a large part of the foundation 7
for a tradition in the secondary literature, largely due to Heidegger's work on Nietzsche,  that 8
interprets the doctrine of the 'will to power' as an all encompassing ontological/cosmological 
doctrine. Little evidence can be found of the 'will to power' being discussed in this context in 
Nietzsche's published work. There are primarily two aphorisms in which this may occur: GM, 
II, §12 and BGE, §36. Nevertheless, as Magnus points out, even if these passages reflect a 
clear enough intention in the direction, they would constitute "two slender reeds out of more 
than 8,000 words of text on which to hang an ontology or cosmology" of the will to power.  9
       The concern over the inclusion of discarded notes, in addition to the section headings and 
general ordering of The Will to Power, suggest that it should not be taken to be on par with 
works Nietzsche approved for publication. However, the notes contained within the text are 
nonetheless his own. There are roughly three traditions in the secondary literature which 
differ as to the importance of this. I shall now briefly address them, and explicate the extent 
to which I consider making use of the notes from the broader Nachlass to be interpretatively 
appropriate for the purposes of this thesis. 
        One tradition of thought is that even though the Nachlass is at least partially formed of 
drafts for an essentially unfinished project, they represent Nietzsche's most up-to-date and 
refined philosophical views. Consequently, one should consider them of at least equal status 
to the published texts.  A stronger view is that this entails that one should prioritize the 10
views they express over Nietzsche's earlier, published material. This appears to be the 
approach favoured by Heidegger, who claimed that: 
 Bernd Magnus, (1988), p. 226.7
 For an excellent discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche and his own reasons for 8
emphasising a metaphysical reading of his key concepts, see Michael Zimmerman, "The 
Development of Heidegger's Nietzsche Interpretation", Heidegger-Jahrbuch, Volume II, (2005).
 Magnus, (1988), p. 227.9
 Scholars who hold something at least close to this view and heavily quote from the Nachlass 10
include Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, (Routledge, 1983), and John Richardson, Nietzsche's System, 
(Oxford University Press, 1996).
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What Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always foreground [...] His 
philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, unpublished work.  11
If our knowledge were limited to what Nietzsche himself published, we could never learn 
what Nietzsche knew perfectly well, what he carefully prepared and continually thought 
through, yet withheld.  12
More recently, Richard Schacht claims something similar (though in a more restricted form) 
when he writes that "these unpublished writings...contain much more of his expressed 
thinking on certain important matters than do his finished work".  13
        This view has been challenged, rightly in my view, by scholars from a contrary tradition 
that take the very fact that the notes were not authorized by Nietzsche for publication to 
invite scepticism about Nietzsche's investment in, and intention for them. R.J. Hollingdale, a 
proponent of this view, claims that aside from the notes that Nietzsche didn't explicitly 
discard, the Nachlass represents a process of testing out thoughts and developing potential 
ideas and extensions of his philosophy.  One method of interpretation thought to follow from 14
this is that a complete repudiation of Nachlass material is appropriate. There are grounds for 
supporting such a view. For example, as well as there being some philosophical ideas which 
appear almost exclusively in the Nachlass,  the literary style of these notes is generally 15
significantly different from that of the published works. This might indicate the notes serve 
more as experimental exercises or trials of philosophical ideas rather than anything close to a 
'philosophy proper'. 
        Between these two contrary positions of prioritisation and complete rejection, there is a 
more modest middle ground, which although it treats the Nachlass entries as ongoing thought 
 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Volume One: The Will to Power as Art, (Harper and Row, 1979), p. 9.11
 Heidegger, (1979), p. 15.12
 Schacht, (1983), p. 12.13
 See R.J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy, (Cambridge University Press, 1999).14
 As well as the doctrine of the will to power as an ontological thesis, the same might possibly be 15
said of the shift from Nietzsche's treatment of the 'eternal recurrence' as a hypothetical thought 
experiment intended for assessing one's psychology in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
to a scientific thesis in the Nachlass. See Magnus, (1988), p. 228.
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experiments, does not advocate a wholesale rejection of them. Rather, this middle position 
places firm confidence in Nietzsche's published work, and draws additional textual evidence 
from the Nachlass only as a supplement to them. This is the view I endorse: that the Nachlass 
can be used to assist in interpreting passages from the published texts when necessary, but 
should not be given equal station with them. For any references to the Nachlass notes which 
appear in The Will to Power, I shall quote from the latter for purposes of translation, but with 
an additional reference to their original form from the Colli and Montinari edition of the 
Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA).  16
  
 Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzio Montinari (de Gruyter, 1967), and are 16
cited by year, notebook number, note number. Taken from  www.nietzschesource.org
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Chapter One  
The Nature of Suffering — Nietzsche's Debt to Schopenhauer 
 
        Nietzsche often uses the term 'suffering' to refer to different phenomena. He also 
sometimes switches between a pejorative connotation associated with the term and a positive 
one. Both of these practices are very much implicit. To make matters more complex, 
Nietzsche also uses the term 'suffering' [Leiden] interchangeably with both 'pain' [Schmerz] 
and 'displeasure' [Unlust/Unmut]. The purpose of this chapter is to disentangle these issues 
and to establish which form of suffering I shall be focusing on in the thesis, that is: the 
suffering experienced in the pursuit of one's goals. I argue that following Bernard Reginster, 
this form of suffering is best understood by considering Nietzsche's conception of the will to 
power in light of Schopenhauer's will to life. Moreover, that once this is achieved, many of 
the ambiguities regarding terminology dissipate. Once I identify the extent of what Nietzsche 
adopts from the Schopenhauerian framework, I consider their most significant point of 
departure, namely: the evaluation of the will, the issue of hedonism, and its underpinning of 
Schopenhauer's pessimism. I suggest that grasping this point will inform Nietzsche's claims 
about the value of suffering and human greatness which appear well into the 1880s. 
  
1. Nietzsche's Terminology 
        Before we begin to assess how Nietzsche thinks suffering can be valuable, it is 
necessary to first comprehend what he means by the term. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
claims that "the sole ground of the world" is an "eternal, primal suffering" (BT, §4). Human 
existence is one in which we are forced to endure "the terrible destructions of world history 
and nature's cruelty" (BT, §7).  Similar claims persist into Nietzsche's later works. In Beyond 17
 Nietzsche's aim in this early work is at least in part a celebration of Hellenic culture, which he 17
viewed as accurately perceiving the true "horror and absurdity of existence" (BT, §7) and 
successfully grappling with pessimism (though he does not yet use the term), up until Socrates, 
through aesthetic creativity, specifically tragedy. As I shall argue, while Nietzsche is still heavily 
influenced by Schopenhauer's descriptive and evaluative views in this period, his later rejection is 
only of the evaluative dimension of pessimism. 
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Good and Evil, for example, he writes that nature is "boundlessly indifferent, without purpose 
or consideration, without pity or justice" (BGE, §9), and derides those who think it possible 
and hope to "abolish suffering", for "there is no more insane 'if possible'" (BGE, §225). 
Further, in The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche states that: 
Life operates essentially—that is, in terms of its basic functions—through injury, violation, 
exploitation, and destruction, and cannot be conceived in any other way. (GM, II, §11) 
I shall not review all of his arguments here,  but I take these passages to be at least partially 18
representative of a view Nietzsche consistently endorses,  namely, that suffering is a 19
fundamental feature of the human condition. Nietzsche may also endorse the view that it is a 
fundamental feature of all sentient life—a claim I consider later in this Chapter. However, for 
the purposes of clarity, my focus for now will be narrowly restricted to the human domain. 
        But, of course, more needs to be said for this claim to carry weight. In what way is 
suffering 'fundamental' to human existence, and is that distinct from its being essential or 
necessary? Does 'suffering' refer to a particular experience, or a family of distinct 
phenomena? I aim to answer these questions throughout this chapter, beginning with what 
Nietzsche understands suffering to consist in. 
        We commonly use 'suffering' as a blanket term to characterise a variety of mental states: 
depression, fear, loss, anxiety, loneliness, anguish, grief, distress, rejection, failure, 
hopelessness, stress, boredom, and so forth; as well as various physical states: hunger, 
exhaustion, fatigue, enduring extreme temperatures, persisting aches, bruising, and so forth. 
 Nietzsche heavily relies upon both empirical and apriori arguments made by Schopenhauer to 18
support these claims. For a helpful insight into just how much Nietzsche relies upon Schopenhauer's 
arguments, see Ivan Soll, "Pessimism and the Tragic View of Life: Reconsiderations of Nietzsche's 
Birth of Tragedy" in Robert Solomon and Kathleen Marie Higgins, Reading Nietzsche, (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), pp. 112-114. Soll's view is that Nietzsche accepts Schopenhauer's 
descriptive pessimism (i.e. that life is essentially suffering), but rejects his evaluative pessimism 
(i.e. that the value of life is overwhelmingly negative). This view is also well defended by Daniel 
Came. See Daniel Came, "The Aesthetic Justification of Existence" in Keith Ansell Pearson, A 
Companion to Nietzsche, (Blackwell, 2005), especially pp. 42-45. I discuss this in the final section 
of this chapter. For a discussion of further evidence that this is Nietzsche's descriptive view of 
human existence, see Phillip Kain, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence" in 
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 33, (Pennsylvania State University, 2007) pp. 49 - 63. 
 A possible exception to my claim would be Nietzsche's thought in 1878-1881, often referred to as 19
his 'positivistic' period.
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Each of these experiences admits of degrees, with perhaps some borderline cases.  For 20
instance, for someone who has a fear of heights, the distress and anxiety they may experience 
on top of a diving board will likely be less intense than they may experience at the summit of 
a mountain. Moreover, while we may conceive of the intensity of various forms of suffering 
in this way, the duration of suffering is also significant. An intense but week-long feeling of 
loneliness, for example, may not be strictly commensurable with a lifetime of mild 
loneliness. However, Nietzsche nowhere provides an explicit definition of the phenomenon 
of suffering, or what in particular unifies all of these experiences as instances of 'suffering'. 
        On the one hand, we might think that a lack of a strict definition here is not troubling. 
Instances of suffering may be obvious, at least to the sufferer. If this is the case, it is perhaps 
unsurprising Nietzsche does not give an explicit definition, and we shouldn't expect to find 
one in his work. Identifying suffering may be a case of 'I know it when I see it'. However, 
there are two problems that with this particular approach. The first problem is that Nietzsche 
often uses the term 'suffering' [Leiden] interchangeably with both 'pain' [Schmerz] and 
'displeasure' [Unlust/Unmut]. This can make it difficult to accurately interpret Nietzsche's use 
of the term. The reason, I shall shortly argue, is because these terms may refer to importantly 
different concepts. 
        A second problem is that Nietzsche often uses the term 'suffering' in a variety of 
seemingly incompatible ways in different contexts, and so it is important to distinguish what 
these are. This is crucial in order to be clear about which phenomenon I am discussing in this 
thesis and which I am not. Nietzsche frequently refers to suffering in a manner of approval. 
For example, he writes "Profound suffering ennobles; it separates" (BGE, §270), and: "How 
deeply humans can suffer almost determines their order of rank" (BGE, §270). Further still in 
the same work, Nietzsche tells us that the "highest type" of man has "hitherto almost always 
been the type that has suffered most" (BGE, §62). Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the paradigm 
'higher type', refers to himself as "the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering" (Z, III, §13). 
 For example, rejection may plausibly be all or nothing in some circumstances.20
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        On the other hand, Nietzsche also repeatedly uses suffering in a pejorative sense. He 
describes the "surplus of failures, of the sick, of the degenerate" among humankind as "those 
who are bound to suffer" (BGE, §62). Moreover, a consequence of the historical prominence 
of Christian morality is, in Nietzsche's view, that "everything sick and suffering has been 
preserved" (BGE, §62). In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche provides part of his 
account of how it has done this: the 'ascetic priest' engineered a 'slave revolt in values', in 
which "only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good; the 
suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly..." (GM, I, §7; emphasis mine). The ascetic's realm, 
we are told, is "the dominion of the suffering" (GM, III, §15). 
        There is a prima facie contradiction in the way Nietzsche uses the term 'suffering'. On 
the one hand Nietzsche appears to closely associate suffering with what he considers to be the 
'highest' type of individuals, and on the other he appears to closely associate suffering with 
the mediocre 'herd'. In order to make it clear that this contradiction is only apparent, we must 
single out and differentiate Nietzsche's uses of the term. I shall now distinguish just two ways 
Nietzsche conceives of suffering which are separate from the form I will focus on in this 
thesis.  21
1.1. Suffering as Existential Malaise 
        One way Nietzsche understands suffering concerns the justification of perceived ills and 
misfortune in the first place. In section 28 of the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche writes that "the meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering as such, has been the 
curse which has hung over mankind up to now" (GM, III, §28). He makes two important 
claims in this familiar passage. Firstly, the various misfortunes which may befall a person, 
such as those psychological and physical conditions mentioned above, can often be endured, 
and perhaps even desired if they are a necessary means to an end—for example, enduring a 
trip to the dentist for the sake of one's health. But what makes the human condition distinctly 
 Brian Leiter identifies at least five forms suffering can take that Nietzsche pays attention to, 21
which are broadly: (1) a "human instinct towards cruelty"; (2) "internalizing cruelty via bad 
conscience"; (3) "existential angst"; (4) "brute facts of physiology"; (5) that humans are "endlessly 
striving". See Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, (Routledge, 2002), p. 257. I explain just two for 
the present moment, but I shall return to Leiter's claim in Chapter Three.
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problematic, according to Nietzsche, is that we are in the peculiar position of being able to 
question what the meaning behind suffering is. Nietzsche holds that the lack of an answer to 
this question leads to an existential malaise, which is itself a kind of suffering. It results from 
there being "no answer to the crying question 'why do I suffer'?" (GM, III, §28).  
        Nietzsche's second claim in this passage is that this feeling of meaningless suffering can 
also be a consequence of asking a more fundamental question, namely: "why does man exist 
at all?" (GM, III, §28). Not only does misfortune give rise to existential suffering, but so does 
the "gaping void" which results from man not knowing how to "justify, explain, affirm 
himself": man "suffered from the problem of his meaning" (GM, III, §28).  22
        This phenomenon is part of why Nietzsche takes the 'slave revolt' in values through the 
medium of Christianity to have been so successful: it gave a meaning to suffering: "it 
explained suffering; it seemed to fill the gaping void" (GM, III, §28). I shall shortly explain 
how he takes it to have done this, but in spite of this, Nietzsche claims that this meaning 
"brought new suffering with it, deeper, more internal, more poisonous, more gnawing 
suffering" (GM, III, §28). This leads me to discuss a second conception of 'suffering': that of 
the character and constitution of the 'ascetic priest'. 
1.2. Suffering as Internalized Cruelty 
        A second way Nietzsche comprehends suffering directly results from his understanding 
of suffering in existential terms, and how Christianity sought to remedy it. He proposes a 
third component to the story, and starts by proposing that human psychology is such that 
when we are harmed (or at least perceived to be harmed) we have a tendency to seek 
someone or something to blame for it: 
 Ultimately, Nietzsche believes this problem, if unanswered, leads to what he calls "suicidal 22
nihilism" (GM, III, §28)—a possibility which again raises its head in light of Nietzsche's diagnosis of 
the 'death of God' (i.e. the collapse of belief in the bedrock of human meaning) (see GS, §125). This 
is at least one significant theme in Nietzsche's work that I take later philosophers of the 
'existentialist' tradition to be drawing upon and elaborating (specifically with regard to the emotion 
of angst).
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For every suffering man instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more precisely, for a 
culprit [Thäter], even more definitely, a guilty culprit who is receptive to distress—in short, 
something living on which he can upon any pretext discharge his feelings either in fact or in 
effigie. (GM, III, §15) 
This psychological insight—though in a less precise form—is entertained by Nietzsche six 
years earlier in Daybreak: "man sees in every feeling of indisposition and misfortune 
something for which he has to make someone else suffer", and explicitly links this to a form 
of "satisfaction [Befriedigung]" (D, §15). Nietzsche explicitly contrasts this with the typical 
human reaction to feelings of pleasure, which he perceives to not require justification: "pain 
always raises the question about its origin, while pleasure is inclined to stop with itself 
without looking back" (GS, §13). 
        Nietzsche makes an additional claim: that one's drives or instincts have to discharge 
themselves somehow, be it externally (i.e. upon another person or object) or internally (i.e. 
upon oneself):  "Every instinct which does not vent itself externally turns inwards  — this is 
what I call the internalization of man..." (GM, II, §16). This is a significant part of 
Nietzsche's story because according to him, if there is no guilty culprit (i.e. no meaning) for 
one's suffering, the sufferer can give it meaning by blaming himself — this is precisely what 
Nietzsche argues the ascetic priest orchestrated: 
"I suffer: someone must be to blame for it" — thus thinks every sickly sheep. But his 
shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: “Quite so, my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: 
but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it — you alone are to blame for 
yourself!" (GM, III, §15). 
Nietzsche interprets this internalization of blame as a form of 'cruelty' towards oneself, which 
he understands in terms of guilt (GM, II).  Adherents to this 'ascetic ideal' are consequently, 23
on Nietzsche's view, those who suffer from themselves: "the greatest and most sinister 
 Nietzsche holds this view because of his analysis of the origins of the institution of punishment in 23
terms of a debtor-creditor dialectic, whereby those who were wronged had their 'debt' paid back to 
them via taking pleasure in the guilty offenders' suffering (i.e. cruelty). This morbid practice 
culminates, in Nietzsche's view, in Christianity: the wrongdoer is perpetually in debt (and hence 
'guilty') to God in virtue of being inherently 'sinful', and therefore perpetually punishes himself 
through a certain form of asceticism. (GM, III, §20).
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sickness which still affects man even today, man's suffering from man, from himself" (GM, 
II, §16; cf. A, §22). 
1.3. Suffering as Striving 
        The two uses of the term discussed so far are importantly different from what I will be 
focusing my attention upon: that is, the suffering endured in the pursuit of, or striving 
[Streben] for, noble goals. In order to (1) understand what Nietzsche means by this third 
instance of suffering; and (2) disentangle his interchanging use of 'pain', 'suffering' and 
'displeasure', it is crucial to assess Schopenhauer's account of 'the will' from which Nietzsche 
implicitly appropriates aspects into his own account. I now turn my attention to presenting 
Schopenhauer's view. 
2. Schopenhauer and the Will to Life 
        In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer attempts to demonstrate that we 
can philosophically understand the essence of all organic life as various manifestations of one 
general principle.  For Schopenhauer this principle is the Wille zum Leben—or 'will to life'—24
a mindless, 'blind', non-rational urge at the foundation of every living thing.  
2.1. Motivation        
        Sentient beings are manifestations of the will, and to exist means constant striving 
[streben] towards a goal, or to be persistently directed towards some end. The fundamental 
goal or end that bears on all others is ultimately the perpetuation of life: the survival of the 
 The standard interpretation of Schopenhauer's account of the will is that it is analogous to the 24
Kantian 'thing in itself'. Although highly critical of aspects of Kant's metaphysics, Schopenhauer 
accepts the transcendental idealist distinction between the world of phenomena: how we 
experience the world as it appears to us; and the noumenal world: how the world really is in itself. 
For Schopenhauer, everything within the phenomenal world (the world of representation) is a 
manifestation of the will. Individual human and non-human animal wills are local manifestations of 
the same will. For a different interpretation to this traditional approach, see Julian Young, Willing 
and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
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material manifestation of the will. Crucially, the will operates within rational and conscious 
forms of life but is not rational or conscious itself. As Christopher Janaway remarks, it acts 
more as an "organizing principle" in the sense that, common to  humans, dogs, spiders, trees 
and so forth, all tend towards self-preservation and reproduction.  As organisms in this 25
world, all are driven towards "the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the 
species" (WWR, I, §60, p. 327). 
        However, the nature of the will is internally contradictory in the sense that various 
manifestations of it are in vicious competition, often motivated to feed upon each other. 
Paradoxically, this conflict is instigated precisely by the fact that we are all manifestations of 
the same will. Schopenhauer presents a paradigm example of this proto-Darwinian view of 
natural strife and struggle with the case of the bull-dog ant: 
But the bulldog-ant of Australia affords us the most extraordinary example of this kind; for if 
it is cut in two, a battle begins between the head and the tail. The head seizes the tail in its 
teeth, and the tail defends itself bravely by stinging the head: the battle may last for half an 
hour, until they die or are dragged away by other ants. This contest takes place every time. 
(WWR, I, §27, p. 147) 
2.2. Insatiability  
The nature of the will to life frames existence in terms of willing and attaining. However, the 
will is never eradicated, even when a particular goal or end is achieved. The will in this sense 
is perpetual and insatiable: 
at all grades of its phenomenon from the lowest to the highest, the will dispenses entirely with 
and ultimate aim and object. It always strives, because striving is its sole nature, to which no 
attained goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction; it can 
be checked only by hindrance, but in itself goes on forever. (WWR, I, §56, p. 308) 
For example, we may have a desire to eat an apple, but if we achieve this aim of eating an 
apple, the will does not dissolve upon satisfaction, but instead manifests itself in a new 
 Christopher Janaway, "Schopenhauer's Pessimism" in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, 25
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999), p. 325-326.
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desire. Because "every satisfied desire gives birth to a new one" (WWR, II, p. 573), we are 
caught in an endless cycle between willing and attaining. This structure of willing shall 
resurface below. 
2.3. The Will as a Source of Suffering          
        But how does this relate to suffering? Here I shall sidestep the scope of 'the will' in 
relation to non-sentient life, and focus solely on the striving of human beings, as is relevant to 
my thesis.  Schopenhauer defines suffering as the will’s "hindrance through an obstacle 26
placed between it and its temporary goal" (WWR, I, §56, p. 309). In other words, suffering is 
the non-attainment of goals, or resistance to the will. Schopenhauer explicitly presents 
suffering in direct contrast to happiness, which he defines as the attainment of goals or 
satisfaction [Befriedigung] (WWR, I, §56, p. 309). 
        Because the will never ceases willing, when happiness is achieved it is something 
temporary and fleeting. Moreover, it is nothing of the significance we want happiness to be; 
that is, according to Schopenhauer, a kind of enduring end state. 'Happiness', Schopenhauer 
argues, is illusive: it is always "located in the future, or else in the past" (WWR, II, p. 573). 
He concludes; "so long as we are the subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or 
peace" (WWR, I, §38, p. 196). But it is not obvious that unsatisfied desires constitute 
suffering. We must look at Schopenhauer's claims in detail to understand his argument and its 
ambiguities.  
        If existence means constant and unrelenting striving, then life will include many 
unsatisfied desires. This is because Schopenhauer defends the following claim:  
All striving springs from want or deficiency, from dissatisfaction with one’s own state or 
condition (WWR, I, §56, p. 309). 
 Though, much of what I shall present in this section as representative of Schopenhauer's view is 26
intentionally applicable to animal life as well. Schopenhauer's attention to animal suffering and the 
relatively wide scope of his moral community at the time was innovative, and a direct result of his 
thoughts on common experiences of striving and satisfaction.
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        The assumption here appears to be that if in principle a being was in a state of 
satisfaction where they lacked nothing, then this state would go on continuously. 
Schopenhauer does not think that this state is in fact possible, given the nature of the will, or 
indeed (as I shall discuss shortly) desirable for the agent. But the idea is that any instance of 
striving involves (or the agent believes it to involve) a need [Bedürftigkeit] or lack [Mangel]: 
"all willing as such springs from lack" (WWR, I, §65 p. 363). As a result, striving, by nature, 
implies an unsatisfied desire. 
        From here, Schopenhauer quickly makes a second claim: that striving, in involving an 
unsatisfied desire, "is therefore suffering so long as it is not satisfied" (WWR, I, §56, p. 
309).  This claim is much more controversial, for it is not the case that an awareness of one's 27
unsatisfied desires alone necessarily constitutes a sufficient condition for one to suffer. 
Schopenhauer must also endorse the idea that this lack, or unsatisfied desire, is a painful 
experience. 
        Schopenhauer does precisely this. He explicitly holds that desire implies pain: "the basis 
of all willing, however, is need, lack, and hence pain..." (WWR, I, §57, p. 312). In the same 
passage, he writes that "of its nature the desire is pain" (WWR, I, §57, pp. 313; cf. §65, p. 
363). The model examples Schopenhauer gives to support this view are that of hunger and 
thirst. When one is hungry, for instance, one is in need of sustenance. This lack of sustenance 
is made aware to the organism via the signal of a corresponding pain: dehydration, 
headaches, stomach pain, fatigue, and so forth. The hope for absence of this pain serves as a 
means to motivate the required action to satisfy the need. In this example, the degree of pain 
experienced is inseparable from the degree of hunger experienced. 
        Because we constantly will, we constantly strive. Because we constantly strive, we 
constantly lack or are in need. Because this lack is inherently painful, we suffer as long as we 
 Also: "all willing as such springs from lack, and hence from suffering" (WWR, I, §65 p. 363; 27
emphasis added).
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strive. Schopenhauer provides many examples to capture this bleak picture, but it is perhaps 
best captured by his use of the myth of Tantalus: 
[S]o long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng 
of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never 
obtain lasting happiness or peace...Thus the subject of willing is constantly lying on the 
revolving wheel of Ixion, is always drawing water in the sieve of the Danaids, and is the 
eternally thirsting Tantalus. (WWR, I, §38, p. 196) 
2.4. Boredom 
        Before I discuss the many objections to these controversial claims, Schopenhauer makes 
an important additional claim about the nature of the will. That is, that the nature of the will is 
such that if one lacks objects of willing, for example if objects of willing are constantly 
attained too easily, then one falls victim to an additional torment: boredom. He writes: 
If, on the other hand, it [any animal] lacks objects of willing, because it is at once deprived of 
them again by too easy a satisfaction, a fearful emptiness and boredom come over it; in other 
words, its being and its existence itself become an intolerable burden for it. (WWR, I, §57, p. 
312) 
Schopenhauer claims that "Boredom is anything but an evil to be thought of lightly; 
ultimately it depicts on the countenance real despair" (WWR, I, §57, p. 313). He was 
committed to this claim about the seriousness of boredom to the human psyche—perhaps 
more than any other philosopher before or after him—to the extent that he cites as evidence 
the "strict penitentiary system of Philadelphia" as making "mere boredom an instrument of 
punishment", resulting in bringing "convicts to suicide" (WWR, I, §57, p. §313). 
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        Schopenhauer also refers to boredom as a type of lack or "empty longing" (WWR, I, §58, 
p. 320).   The idea being that even though we suffer in striving, we need to strive in order to 28
avoid the pain of boredom.  His famous example to demonstrate this point is in an imagined 29
'utopia' where "everything grew automatically and pigeons flew about ready roasted...then 
people would die of boredom or hang themselves" (PP2, p. 293). 
        The need for something to strive towards in order to keep us occupied is, in 
Schopenhauer's view, what drives people in extreme cases to acts of violence and cruelty, and 
hence more suffering. How might this happen? Schopenhauer refers to a process of 
'internalisation' that is remarkably close to the Nietzschean theme of the "internalization of 
man" (GM, II, §16) that I discussed in section 1.2. If the "excessive pressure of the will" 
cannot express itself because there are no goals to pursue or the goals available are achieved 
to easily, then in order to avoid the "frightful desolation" and "inner torment" of boredom, 
one "tries to mitigate his own suffering by the sight of another's" (WWR, I, §65, p. 364). This 
purports to do two things. Firstly, it is an attempt to escape from suffering because 
Schopenhauer is committed to the plausible psychological view that "The calling to mind of 
sufferings greater than our own still their pain; the sight of another's suffering alleviates our 
own" (WWR, I, §65, p. 364). Secondly, the task of inflicting pain upon another gives the 
agent something to strive towards, and thus alleviates boredom for a short time. 
Schopenhauer takes this to be "revealed by history" (WWR, I, §65, p. 364), for example: 
Nero's cruelty and his burning of Rome. 
        Schopenhauer concludes that, ultimately, “life swings to and fro like a pendulum 
between pain and boredom, and these two are in fact its ultimate constituents” (WWR, I, §57, 
p. 312). This reveals that Schopenhauer's conception of the will has a particular structure. 
 As Julian young points out, Schopenhauer identifies three forms of boredom: (1) Perceptual: 28
when interaction with the world fails to stimulate the will, the world becomes "dreary" (WWR, I, 
§57, p. 314); (2) Conative: the frustration of lacking a goal and the resulting feeling of 'inner 
torment'; (3) Metaphysical: an existential malaise stemming from viewing the cycle of willing as 
arbitrary and not of an agents choosing (what later 'existentialists' would refer to as 'the absurd'). I 
mainly focus upon an aspect of (2) and how Nietzsche, as we shall see, also engages with the 
concept. See Julian Young, Schopenhauer, (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 141-142.
 Interestingly, Schopenhauer refers to the middle class of affluent societies as, ironically, 29
particularly susceptible to boredom; what he calls "the problem of leisure" (PP1, p. 331; cf. WWR, 
I, §57, p. 314; §60, p. 327).
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With the observation about our susceptibility to boredom, we can see that Schopenhauer's 
understanding of the will takes the form of a second-order desire to have first-order desires. 
We have a variety of first-order desires—to eat, marry, progress in our careers, watch films, 
and so forth—but we become bored, not when we lack these particular determinate ends, but 
when we lack "objects of willing" in general. Bernard Reginster has put this in the following 
way: "When we are bored, we are not lacking the determinate objects of particular desires, 
but we are rather lacking objects to desire".  In other words, the will to life is in essence a 30
will to will; a desire to have desires. This is what Schopenhauer means when he says that 
"willing and striving are its [life's] whole essence" (WWR, I, §57, p. 312). 
2.5. Types of Displeasure: Suffering, Pain, and Boredom 
        One of the many merits of Reginster's interpretation of the Schopenhauerian framework 
is that it makes use of clear terminological distinctions between forms of what we might 
broadly label displeasure.  Reginster draws out three concepts from the view outlined above: 31
(1) Suffering; (2) Boredom; (3) Pain.  Schopenhauer appears to reserve the term 32
'suffering' [Leiden] for the experience of frustration or resistance to the will. When we lack 
what we strive for, we experience suffering. Suffering therefore requires the existence of 
determinate ends. A second form of displeasure that has just been discussed is that of 
boredom. Boredom occurs when desires are satisfied too easily, and temporarily "no new 
desire appears on the scene" (WWR, I, §57, p. 314). Hence, boredom is a type of lack: the 
absence of striving. 
        However not all displeasure in life will arise from a frustration of desire. Some are 
independent of our desires in that they come unbidden. For example, getting stung by a wasp, 
losing a loved one, getting frightened suddenly, and so forth, are all things which can be 
experienced at any time, regardless of one's pre-existing desires. Reginster identifies these 
 Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, (Cambridge, Mass: 30
Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 122.
 For his detailed account of the nature of the will, see Reginster, (2006), pp. 106-123.31
 Reginster, (2006), pp. 113-114.32
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experiences in the Schopenhauerian framework as 'pain [Schmerz]'. Importantly, however, 
these pains may spawn immediate desires. When the wasp stings me, I develop a desire for 
the pain to stop. We might categorise the two phenomena by saying that suffering is active in 
the sense that it requires the existence of some determinate end for an agent to desire—it is 
constitutive of striving. In contrast, pain is passive because, although it may also be 
experienced while striving towards a certain goal, it can also be experienced regardless of the 
existence of such a desire—it is forced upon an agent. The role of pain as a stimulant to the 
will, and of suffering as constitutive feature of willing will later show its significance in 
Schopenhauer's, and respectively Nietzsche's, evaluation of the will. 
        Now that I have presented the Schopenhauerian picture of willing, I shall present a 
selection of standard objections to it which I take to be the strongest, and offer potential 
replies on Schopenhauer's behalf. 
2.6. Objections 
        We have just seen that Schopenhauer's a priori argument for pessimism centres upon the 
claim that unsatisfied desire constitutes a state of suffering; that instances of resistance to the 
will are inherently painful. Because we constantly have unsatisfied desires in our striving, we 
constantly suffer. 
        The first and perhaps most intuitive counter argument to Schopenhauer's view as I have 
presented it is that it is implausible that all instances of unsatisfied desire are painful. 
Schopenhauer holds that the 'willing' that is characteristic of human life ought to be 
understood on the model of thirst or hunger; that is, as need-based desire where an awareness 
of a perceived lack is inseparable from the corresponding pain. However, there appear to be 
at least three relevant counter examples to this model. 
        Firstly, one might point to the fact that some desires do not require a lack, rather, they 
depend upon having something already, where there is a wish to retain it. For example, I may 
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desire to retain my friendship with someone, or to continue living in the particular area I 
reside in. In both cases, I have rather than lack, and am 'satisfied' in the Schopenhauerian 
sense of attainment. Here, it is unclear how pain might be implied by my desire. This is 
precisely the objection made by David Cartwright, who argues that Schopenhauer 
presupposes that desiring involves a lack.  Cartwright's own example is that of desiring to 33
retain one's health: like the cases above, there is a desire yet no (obvious) dissatisfaction or 
lack. 
        There is a second type of case, closely related to this first example, which undermines 
the assumption that all desire indicates a painful lack. It might be thought that having a 
variety of unsatisfied desires constitutes a positive feeling rather than a negative one. 
Consider the concept of ambition. Many people have a variety of desires they hope to fulfil 
during their lifetime: to start a family; climb a mountain; swim with Dolphins; see the Great 
Wall of China; and so forth. Unlike the previous counter example in which there is no 
apparent lack, this second type of case acknowledges a lack of some kind, yet, it does not 
seem appropriate to regard it as a state of pain. Rather, they are desires one may look forward 
to fulfilling. In these sorts of cases it seems plausible that there is pleasure in this 
anticipation; many relish their future goals and ambition.  In fact, Schopenhauer himself 34
explicitly recognises this type of pleasure when he asserts that achieving a long awaited 
desire usually leaves us without much of an improvement in how we feel; that possessing 
something long sought after, while perhaps providing momentary pleasure, deprives the 
object of its initial charm (WWR, I, §57, p. 316).  35
 David E. Cartwright, "Schopenhauer on Suffering, Death, Guilt, and the Consolation of 33
Metaphysics", in E. von der Luft (ed.), Schopenhauer: New Essays in Honor of his 200th Birthday, 
(Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), pp. 51–66.
 In places, Schopenhauer characteristically points to the fact that the anticipation humans 34
experience, while sometimes providing pleasure, is also often a source of suffering in the form of 
anxiety. He makes this point by drawing a comparison with animals, who he claims because only 
live "in the present" (P2, §153, p. 294), are not subject to the distinctively human predicament of 
being aware of our bleak and arbitrary situation. This is a salient point, but that pleasure in 
anticipation at least sometimes occurs is all that is needed to undermine Schopenhauer's claim that 
pain and dissatisfaction are necessarily related. 
 Schopenhauer emphasises this psychology in the context of sex, writing that "everyone who is in 35
love will experience an extraordinary disillusionment after the pleasure he finally attains" (WWR, II, 
p. 540).
  32
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
        A third objection to the principle that desire implies pain has been raised by Jordi 
Fernández.  He draws attention to the relevance of a distinction that Thomas Nagel makes 36
between motivated and unmotivated desires. According to Nagel,  there is a difference 37
between the thing that motivates you and your being motivated by that thing. The former 
relates to 'unmotivated desires', such as hunger, which are closer to an impulse and are not 
explained in terms of an agents rational reasons. In contrast, the latter ('motivated desires'), 
such as the desire to eat a particular kind of food, or to catch the bus to work rather than 
drive, come about from the rational recognition that there is a reason for pursuing them. 
Schopenhauer heavily focuses on examples of unmotivated desires such as thirst and hunger, 
as these naturally and more obviously are associated with various forms of pain. However, 
the desire implies pain principle does not have the same intuitive pull regarding motivated 
desires. The worry then, is that Schopenhauer is using the term 'desires' too broadly, and 
carrying over the often accompanying pain of some desires onto all desires. 
        However, these objections conflate two concepts that ought to be clearly distinguished. 
As Christopher Janaway has pointed out in response to Cartwright, it is true that simply 
having a desire does not imply being in misery. But this is to mistake Schopenhauer's 
argument by equating desiring with striving.  There are two important differences between 38
these concepts. The first is that while striving, by definition, involves a commitment to 
making an effort in achieving a certain goal, this is not true of merely desiring. For example, I 
may have a desire for England to win the next World Cup, while at the same time 
acknowledging that nothing I do will affect the outcome whatsoever. I could also have this 
desire without ever knowing the eventual outcome. This is not true of a goal, which, in virtue 
of simply having it, commits one to pursuing or intending to pursue it. In short, to have 
something as a goal is, in part, to desire it, but it seems that you can desire something without 
having it as a goal (as in the World Cup case). 
 Jordi Fernández, "Schopenhauer's Pessimism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 36
73, No. 3, (2006), p. 656.
 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, (Oxford University Press, 1970).37
 Janaway, (1999), p. 329.38
  33
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
        The second and crucial difference between desiring and striving is that while desiring 
does not necessarily involve a deficiency or lack, as the counter examples above suggest, 
striving appears to. As Janaway remarks:  
part of what distinguishes striving from mere wanting is that I regard the prior state of affairs 
(the state of affairs minus my striving) as deficient in whatever it requires to ensure my goal.  39
Consider again the examples of desiring to retain or maintain one's friendship, residence, or 
health. Desiring to retain these things does not demand a change of any sort. But striving 
does aim at bringing about a change in situation. If the state I was in prior to striving involves 
no deficiency or dissatisfaction, then, Janaway suggests, it "becomes unintelligible" to 
describe myself as striving or trying to retain my friendship, residence, or health. Yet, as 
Julian Young points out, it does make sense to talk of striving to maintain one's health. As one 
gets older, one has to work harder to stay healthy, and this can appropriately be described as 
striving. This is because in this example there is already a conception of a lack, that is, the 
security of possessing health.  Health is something actively undermined during the aging 40
process, and therefore we have to work towards maintaining it and avoiding its deficiency. 
All of this considered, it seems correct to assert that all striving involves a lack, or at least the 
danger of a lack. 
        With this in mind, we must emphasise that it is striving or 'willing', not merely desiring, 
that Schopenhauer is concerned with: "All striving springs from want or deficiency, from 
dissatisfaction with one’s own state or condition (WWR, I, §56, p. 309; emphasis mine); "all 
willing as such springs from lack" (WWR, I, §65 p. 363; emphasis mine). Schopenhauer's use 
of the term 'desire', then, should be thought of in the stricter sense pertaining to having a goal 
one strives towards. I shall refer to this sense of 'desire' from here on. 
        I agree with Janaway that making explicit this distinction between desiring and striving, 
and attributing the latter to the real focus of Schopenhauer's argument, undermines the initial 
objection that dissatisfaction doesn't necessarily imply pain or 'suffering'. Nevertheless, there 
 Janaway, (1999), p. 329.39
 Young, (2005), p. 209.40
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is a significant rebuttal to consider: Schopenhauer appears to be guilty of ignoring the 
positive feelings experienced in striving to achieve one's goals. The objection regarding 
ambition made earlier against the idea of mere desires necessarily implying pain is also 
relevant in a more subtle manner concerning striving. A number of activities human beings 
routinely take part in—sports, crossword puzzles, video games, mountaineering, and so forth
—are designed specifically to draw out a struggle; to prolong attaining a goal. The reason for 
this is that pleasures are not simply experienced in terms of attainment, but often also in the 
activity leading to attainment.  41
        At least part of the reason Schopenhauer does not account for this kind of experience is 
that he seems to present, or at least overwhelmingly focus upon, each instance of striving as 
an isolated event. We strive for one goal, and if it is attained we strive for something else or 
face boredom. If on the other hand we fail to attain our goal, we suffer in continuing to strive 
for it or suffer striving for a new goal. This is not to say that Schopenhauer holds that we only 
strive towards one thing at a time, but that the model he provides fails to take into 
consideration that there might be pleasurable experiences to be found in the particular 
arrangement of one's goals: striving for each goal as part of an overarching life project. Take 
the example of a politician who has to achieve a vast amount of subordinate goals in order to 
reach his or her ultimate aim of becoming head of state. After each goal is realized, the 
politician is one step closer to attaining their ultimate goal. When one's goals are intentionally 
organised in this kind of way, Schopenhauer's picture of endlessly being driven by desires 
which induce painful lacks becomes less forceful to our intuitions. 
2.7. Qualifications  
        Schopenhauer may respond to these objections by making an important qualification to 
his characterization of suffering as unsatisfied desire or resistance to the will. Instead of 
holding that desire implies pain, it might be more plausible to suppose that unsatisfied desires 
 This was precisely the point that Georg Simmel made in his critique, arguing that Schopenhauer 41
failed to recognise that the will's progress towards achieving a goal is "attended more by a 
pleasurable sensation than a painful one". See Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 
(University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), pp. 55-56.
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that persist for too long imply pain, and that is what is properly understood as suffering. The 
following is an example to demonstrate this point. When waiting at a restaurant for one's 
meal, the desire to eat can be increased by the anticipation of the meal to come. The smell of 
the ingredients being prepared, instead of causing a painful awareness of a lack, may be a 
source of pleasure. Nevertheless, if this anticipation goes on for too long and the desire 
remains unsatisfied, one can become frustrated. Waiting further still, it seems more plausible 
to regard this as a painful state of hunger. 
        This point may be equally applied to other cases of striving given above. Consider the 
example of a Sudoku puzzle. While puzzles which are too easy make no demand on the 
player's skill or perhaps even sustained attention, puzzles which are too difficult for a 
particular agent and therefore take a very long time to complete (or worse still: cause the 
agent to get stuck) often become exasperating. Schopenhauer might best be interpreted to 
take striving to be analogous to this or the dining experience case: if we spend too long on an 
activity without achieving its aim, it is a source of painful frustration. 
        However, while this strategy may provide a more plausible account of the phenomenon 
of suffering, this characterization of willing loses much of the power that Schopenhauer 
intends it to have. This is because Schopenhauer's account of the will is one of his major 
arguments to support his pessimism; a view that famously characterizes his world view or 
Weltanschauung. There are at least four possible variants of the meaning of pessimism: 
(1) The psychological tendency to believe in the worst possible outcome in any given 
situation.  42
(2) A historical-philosophical claim: that mankind tends to grow worse as time goes 
on. 
 Brian Magee argues that all other forms of pessimism can be reduced to this form; as matter of 42
Schopenhauer's temperament. See Brian Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, (Oxford 
University Press, 1983), p. 14. However, I disagree with this view. The reason being that 
Schopenhauer argues against this sort of reductionism: belief in our sorry situation is explicitly not 
merely a matter of temperament and "one-sidedness" (WWR, I, §59, p. 323), rather, it is the result 
of the careful articulation of a number of detailed arguments; of "perfectly cold and philosophical 
demonstration" (WWR, I, §59, p. 323). The arguments Schopenhauer provides, while perhaps not 
ultimately successful in their aim, warrant consideration enough to motivate a possible defence of 
pessimism in the vein of at least (4).
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(3) Our world is the worst of all possible worlds. 
The fourth use of the term is a combination of two claims; 
              (4):  (a) Suffering is a fundamental condition of sentient life; 
                         (b) Non-existence is preferable to existence.  43
While Schopenhauer explicitly accepts (3),  the form most relevant for my purposes here is 44
(4).  If we accept the claim that striving necessarily involves pain, and the additional claim 45
that the nature of the will is such that we perpetually strive, then we can see how one might 
arrive at (4): we are perpetually in pain as a consequence of our own essence (the will). 
However, if Schopenhauer has to concede that only a particular kind of unsatisfied desire—
the one that persists for too long—is what constitutes a painful lack, then the argument loses 
much of its force as a motivation for pessimism. Consequently, Schopenhauer's model of 
suffering as unsatisfied desire would not successfully do the work he wants it to do. 
        There is a deeper objection regarding how Schopenhauer's argument that striving is 
suffering is intended to support (4). Claim (4) is a combination of two components, a 
descriptive component and an evaluative component. The evaluative component is that as a 
result of the descriptive component, (a) life is fundamentally suffering, (b) non-existence is 
preferable to existence. But how does Schopenhauer make the move from (a) to (b)? His 
implicit argument looks something like the following: 
 It is important to note that Schopenhauer seems to offer his own arguments which count against 43
this view by emphasising the great joy in aesthetic contemplation (WWR, I, Book 3). In WWR, II, Ch. 
46, Schopenhauer talks of exceptional individuals who live happy existences, and also pleasures 
which can come unbidden (WWR, I, §58, p. 319). I will not have time to assess his aesthetics and its 
relation to pessimism here, and I think Schopenhauer may have good responses to this tension, but 
it is worth raising. Of course, it matters little for the crucial claim relating to my thesis and for 
Nietzsche's position: that striving is in some sense suffering.
 See WWR, II, §46, pp. 583-588, and Schopenhauer's rejection of the opposing Leibnizian view—44
that this world is the 'best of all possible worlds'—as a "bitter mockery" (WWR, I, §59, p. 325).
 Schopenhauer only begins to use the term 'pessimism' in the second edition of The World as Will 45
and Representation in 1844. However, the essential claims of the concept are clearly adopted in 
the first edition in 1818.
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(1) Suffering is a fundamental condition of sentient life. 
(2) If suffering is a fundamental condition of sentient life, then existence involves  
      more negative value than non-existence. 
(3) Therefore, existence involves more negative value than non-existence [modus  
      ponens].  
But: 
(4) If existence involves more negative value than non-existence, then non-existence  
      is preferable to existence. 
(5) Therefore, non-existence is preferable to existence. 
What is particularly problematic about the argument above is premise (2). There is an 
undefended assumption, and this assumption is the truth of hedonism: the view that only 
pleasure is intrinsically good, and only pain is intrinsically bad. On a simple hedonistic 
conception of well-being, it is defined in terms of pleasure, or at least the absence from pain. 
Broadly construed, the best life is the most pleasurable life, or the life in which pain is 
minimized.  46
        If hedonism is true, and if Schopenhauer is right about unsatisfied desires implying pain, 
then it is easy to see how he reaches his pessimistic conclusion: one is continually kept in a 
state of negative value via perpetual striving or boredom. But Schopenhauer gives no 
argument to support this hedonistic assumption. I shall return to this objection in detail in the 
final section, as Nietzsche, while accepting premise (1), attacks Schopenhauer precisely on 
this evaluative issue, and it is the most significant point in their divergence. For now, I will 
set aside the evaluative aspects of suffering and remain focused upon the descriptive claims 
about the nature of the phenomenon. 
        We have just seen how there are a variety of objections to Schopenhauer's understanding 
of resistance to the will as necessarily constituting suffering. If we are to understand 
'suffering' as striving which involves 'dissatisfaction', then Schopenhauer appears to be using 
the term as a verbal slider. The idea being that some cases of dissatisfaction will no doubt be 
 There will be more complex forms of hedonism which take pleasure to be only a necessary 46
condition of goodness. For example, some may claim that the goodness of pleasure is conditional 
upon its experience through certain things (e.g. beauty, poetry). Schopenhauer's hedonism appears 
in its traditional, simpler, form: pleasure (of any kind) is a good.
  38
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
appropriately described as a state of suffering, however in a number of cases this 
'dissatisfaction' will not carry the significant negative weight Schopenhauer intends it to. As 
Cartwright puts it, Schopenhauer's use of 'dissatisfaction' "lacks the vital tone which is 
associated with misery".  47
         I shall now present Nietzsche's position with regard to the will, determining which 
elements of Schopenhauer's account he endorses. Moreover, I will also demonstrate that a 
number of the objections mentioned in this section are explicitly raised by Nietzsche. 
3. Nietzsche's Appropriation of the Will 
        It is uncontroversial that Schopenhauer profoundly influenced Nietzsche's philosophy, 
even if Nietzsche eventually came to position himself as diametrically opposed to the 
Schopenhauerian worldview. The controversy lies in the extent to which this influence plays 
a part in Nietzsche's thought: which aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy did he jettison, and 
which persist in his work. Now that we have an understanding of Schopenhauer's conception 
of the will, in this section I argue that Nietzsche accepts at least three significant elements of 
it: (1) The will is never 'satisfied'; (2) the will has the basic structure of a second order desire; 
and of the most importance to the concerns of this chapter: (3) at least one form of suffering 
can be understood as 'resistance to the will'.  
3.1. Will to Power vs. Will to Life 
        Nietzsche's theory of the Wille zur Macht or will to power is first and foremost a 
psychological theory about what motivates human beings, and indeed all organic life, to act.  48
 Cartwright, (1988), p. 59.47
 There is a tradition in Nietzsche scholarship following Heidegger that views the will to power as a 48
metaphysical and cosmological thesis. Much of this interpretation relies almost exclusively on 
passages from the Nachlass. Ultimately, I think these interpretations cannot be sustained. However, 
it is irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis whether the will to power can be anything more than 
a psychological thesis. I only have to show that the will to power has a certain psychological 
structure that tells us about the nature of suffering. To avoid overcomplicating the concepts at 
hand, I will focus solely on the will to power as manifested in humans.
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Nietzsche explicitly presents his theory of the will as a competing and more plausible account 
than Schopenhauer's. His argument appears to be that the will to life mistakenly takes the 
primary motivation for action to be to perpetuate and preserve existence.  On the contrary, 49
what people really seek, according to Nietzsche, is the accumulation and exercise of power. 
He writes that it is the aim of all living things “to grow, spread, seize, become 
predominant” (BGE, §259). Nietzsche's argument to demonstrate the strength of his thesis as 
opposed Schopenhauer's is best found in two passages: 
The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the 
really fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of power, and, wishing for 
that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation. (GS, §349; cf. TI, 'Skirmishes', 
§44) 
Physiologists should think twice before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the 
cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living being seeks above all to discharge it strength - 
life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent 
results. (BGE, §13) 
In the passage from The Gay Science, Nietzsche appears to suggest that empirical evidence 
contradicts the idea that humans are motivated by self-preservation, for it is the case that 
people are frequently motivated to act in a way that endangers their survival in order to 
achieve something they value higher than themselves, or perhaps even their species. 
Moreover, he claims that many cases will involve an agent ruining their life or perhaps even 
perishing in this pursuit. Particular cases of this nature, which do not appear to cohere with 
self or species preservation, will be of actions undertaken for the sake of 'power', according to 
Nietzsche: 
The living creature values many things higher than life itself; yet out of this evaluation itself 
speaks — the will to power! (Z, II, §12) 
even if we offer our lives, as martyrs do for their church, this is a sacrifice that is offered for 
our desire for power, or for the purpose of preserving our feeling of power (GS, §13) 
The passage from Beyond Good and Evil makes a subtler but related point. Because, 
according to Nietzsche, people seek to increase their power and discharge their strength, this 
 As Reginster points out (2006, p. 124), it is unclear whether this attack is aimed solely at 49
Schopenhauer. It is equally plausible that Nietzsche aims this argument at Darwin, or perhaps 
Spinoza.
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will often involve increasing their chances of survival by becoming stronger. This may 
therefore appear to look like an intention towards self-preservation, but is merely a result of 
the desire for power. In this way, Nietzsche suggests that the will to life confuses the 
consequence with the cause. Nietzsche rejects this aspect of Schopenhauer's conception of the 
will on these grounds. 
        It is important to distinguish between two different positions regarding the will to power 
as a theory of human motivation, both of which have at some stage been attributed to 
Nietzsche. These claims concern the scope of the will to power as a theory about agent 
motivation and action: 
(C1) A desire for power is what motivates all action.  
(C2) A desire for power motivates far more human actions than we have previously 
thought, even among those that do not obviously appear to be so motivated.  
The first claim, (C1), is altogether a much bolder position insofar as it aims to include all 
human action as reducible to a desire for power.  The more modest claim, (C2), stems from 50
doubts about whether there is enough textual support for attributing something like (C1) to 
Nietzsche, and doubts about its independent plausibility. For my purposes in this thesis, 
which is to investigate the value relation between suffering and 'greatness', I can remain 
neutral on this controversial issue. 
 This claim has found its most sophisticated defence—both exegetically and philosophically—in 50
Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, (OUP, 2013). 
Some interesting challenges to this view have been raised by Andrew Huddleston, who in light of 
these challenges defends (C2). See Andrew Huddleston, "Normativity and the Will to Power: 
Challenges to a Nietzschean Constitutivism", Journal of Nietzsche Studies ((Pennsylvania State 
University Press, forthcoming).
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3.2. The Nature of Power 
        The nature and extent of the will to power, and of power itself, in Nietzsche's philosophy 
is highly contested.  According to an influential interpretation propounded by Bernard 51
Reginster, and more recently Paul Katsafanas, the will to power is to be understood as “a 
desire for the overcoming of resistance in the pursuit of some determinate first-order 
desire”.  We can help elucidate this claim with the following example. Imagine an Olympic 52
athlete that genuinely desires to win a particular event at the games. This athlete, like many, 
not only wants to win, but wants to win in a particular way, namely: by skilfully triumphing 
over worthy opponents. Their worthiness, on this view, would be determined by how much 
'resistance' they may provide the agent.  53
        In this way, the athlete (1) desires a certain end, and also (2) desires opposition to the 
satisfaction of that end. So in other words, the will to power is a desire for a challenge: the 
overcoming of obstacles, and the experience of growth in obtaining power over something 
which one previously lacked power over. In Nietzsche's words, it is "a desire to overcome, a 
desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and 
triumphs" (GM, I, §13; emphasis mine). Daniel Came phrases this conception of the will to 
power in the following helpful way: 
We experience a growth in power in relation to phenomena over which we previously lacked 
power, phenomena which previously obstructed our willing. The experience of power 
therefore depends on the overcoming of obstacles.   54
 A number of different interpretations have been influential in the secondary literature. For 51
instance, Maudemarie Clark understands power as a capacity to achieve ends, and the will to power 
as a second order desire for the capacity to satisfy our first order desires. See Maudemarie Clark, 
Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 211ff. 
Walter Kaufmann has a different approach, and interprets the will to power as a will to self-
control. See Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 213-216. A further interpretation has come from John 
Richardson, who argues the will to power should be understood as the domination and 'mastery' of 
one's competing drives. See John Richardson, (1996), pp. 18-39.
 Reginster, (2006), p. 132.52
 This is not to say all resistances in this case, and others, must be external. It could be that the 53
agent has to overcome many internal resistances, such as fear, self-doubt, embarrassment, and so 
forth. I return to this particular point about which types of resistances one aims at, and their 
respective value, in Chapter Four.
 Daniel Came, "The Themes of Affirmation and Illusion in The Birth of Tragedy and Beyond" in Ken 54
Gemes, John Richardson, The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, (OUP, 2013), p. 210.
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Before I explicate the details of this view, a distinction must immediately be made here that 
Reginster unfortunately does not make explicit. He claims that "Power, for Nietzsche is not a 
state or condition but an activity, the activity of confronting and overcoming resistance".  55
But this seems to conflate power [Macht], and the feeling of power [Machtgefühl]. The will to 
power concerns the desire to increase the feeling of power. The desire for this feeling 
provokes the agent into seeking out challenges, giving them the opportunity to overcome 
them and to be consciously aware of their causal efficacy.  But it would be odd to think of 56
the concept of power itself as an activity or experience, rather than a capacity which enables 
certain actions. Power, for Nietzsche, is not necessarily what might be typically equated with 
the term—wealth, material possession, tyranny, control over others (i.e. what gives you 
power)—instead, power is the capacity to perform certain deeds, and to successfully engage 
with certain activities, but is not identical with those activities. This is precisely the objection 
raised by Ivan Soll, who claims that "A power is what enables various sorts of actions; it is 
not the actions themselves".  Like Soll, I additionally want to keep 'power' and the 'feeling of 57
power' separate in order to grasp the differences, as well as the similarities, between 
Schopenhauer's account of human motivation and Nietzsche's. 
        Reginster recognises that the will to power appears to be paradoxical in its structure. 
This is so in two ways. The first way is that it would have us strongly desire to be unsatisfied. 
As Nietzsche claims: "[A strong nature] needs resistance; hence it seeks resistance." (EH, II, 
§7). Reginster explains that the will to power "insofar as it is a will to the overcoming of 
resistance, must necessarily also will the resistance to overcome".  Hence, on this view, the 58
athlete not only desires to win the tournament, but also desires opponents who will give them 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 136.55
 It is salient that the feeling of power may also be attained by the mere belief that one has 56
triumphed. Nietzsche recognises this point in his analysis of the Christian concept of eschatological 
punishment: the strong nobles are humiliated in hell in the afterlife, while the weak are valorised 
in heaven. Although this does not change the actual power-as-capacity of the Christians, their 
envisaging of this fantasy gives them the feeling of power (see GM, I, §14).
 Ivan Soll, "Nietzsche's Will to Power as a Psychological Thesis: Reactions to Bernard Reginster" in 57
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Volume 43, Issue 1, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012).
 Reginster, (2006), p. 133.58
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a challenge, for "an easy prey is something contemptible for proud natures" (GS, §13). The 
second way the structure of the will to power seems paradoxical is that, like Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche repeatedly emphasises the perpetual nature of willing, to the extent that he 
similarly defends the claim that there is no state that provides lasting satisfaction.  
        To elucidate this claim, we might consider the following contrast. Psychological 
hedonism is the view that human actions ultimately aim at the experiential state of pleasure. 
Although many competing theories have disagreed with hedonism about what humans seek, 
they have endorsed the idea that our actions are solely orientated to achieve and abide in 
certain states that provide satisfaction. This is precisely the view that Nietzsche (and before 
him, Schopenhauer) rejects. In Nietzsche's view, when we achieve a certain goal, we 
immediately have a need to strive towards a new and greater one. He claims that “whoever 
reaches his ideal transcends it eo ipso” (BGE, §73), and much later on that "Every growth 
betrays itself in the search for a mightier opponent or problem" (EH, II, §7). The will to 
power is, in this second sense, paradoxical in that "its satisfaction brings about its own 
dissatisfaction".   59
        Consider again the athlete: after successfully overcoming the challenges of one 
particular event, the feeling of power that accompanied this activity will often wane after a 
certain period of time. This diminishing feeling of power, according to Nietzsche, not only 
provokes a renewed hunger for greater obstacles to overcome, but also a fading esteem for 
one's previous accomplishments. Nietzsche presents this idea of perpetual willing in 
explicitly Schopenhauerian terms: 
Whatever I create and however much I love it—soon I must oppose it and my love; thus my 
will wills it…Only where there is life is there also will: not will to life but—thus I teach you
—will to power. (Z, II, §12) 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 247.59
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In the same text, Nietzsche's Zarathustra refers to himself as "the advocate of life...the 
advocate of the circle" (Z, III, §13; emphasis mine).  On this point, Alexander Nehamas 60
writes that: 
willing as an activity does not have an aim that is distinct from it; if it can be said to aim at 
anything at all, that can only be its own continuation. Willing is an activity that tends to 
perpetuate itself, and this tendency to the perpetuation of activity…is what Nietzsche tries to 
describe by the obscure and often misleading term ‘will to power.  61
Heidegger makes a similar observation in his interpretation of the will to power when he 
writes that “will to power is will to will”.  At times, Nietzsche expresses a view very similar 62
to this. For example, he claims that "In the end one loves one's desire and not what is desired" 
(BGE, §175), and that "wanting to have always comes to an end with having" (GS, §363). 
While I think this view is correct in so far as it emphasises the perpetual nature of the will, it 
overlooks another important claim Nietzsche is committed to: willing requires a determinate 
goal that the subject cares about. 
        In Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas 
invites us to consider the structure of the will to power in contrast to psychological hedonism 
in order to make this point explicit.  With simple forms of psychological hedonism, the final 63
end of each goal-directed act aims at pleasure. In other words, the particular goals one 
pursues are ultimately a means to attaining pleasure. For example, in reading a novel, in 
playing football, in learning a new language, and so forth, the psychological hedonist will 
seek to reduce the explanation of this behaviour to the belief that these pursuits are 
 It is ambiguous whether "the circle" refers to the perpetual nature of the will or perhaps the 60
eternal recurrence. While both are plausible, I interpret Nietzsche to mean the former here given 
his mention of "life" and "suffering" in the same sentence: 'life' being another term he uses 
interchangeably with will to power — "the will to power…is just the will of life. (GS, §349; cf. Z, II, 
§12, BGE, §259) — and 'suffering', as we shall see, being a necessary component of power. Nietzsche 
uses the phrase in a later passage which adds weight to the interpretation relating it to a 
Schopenhauerian conception of willing: "This, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the 
eternally self-destroying....without goal, unless the joy of circle is itself a goal..." (WP, §1067; 
KSA, 1885, 38[12]).
 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), 61
1985, p. 79.
 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche—Vol. I: The Will to Power as Art, (HarperCollins, 1979), p. 37.62
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 160.63
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instrumental to experiencing pleasure. It is perhaps tempting to read Nietzsche's view of the 
desire for power in an analogous way: that all goals are pursued as a means to power. This 
would suggest that it would be plausible for me to pursue writing a thesis for the sake of 
overcoming resistance, without caring about the goal of completing the thesis. 
        Both Katsafanas and Reginster are right that there is a significant error in this reasoning. 
Firstly, if the will to power is understood as the experience of overcoming resistance to our 
desires, then resistance presupposes a determinate goal that one can face obstacles in trying to 
achieve. As Katsafanas writes: "The very concept of resistance is unintelligible except in 
relation to a determinate end: resistance is always resistance to the achievement of some 
end".  For example, if winning a game of football is my end, the relevant form of resistance 64
that needs to be overcome will be the opposing team. If writing a dramatic novel is my end, 
the relevant form of resistance will be in utilising a rich vocabulary and developing an 
engaging and complex storyline.  If the feeling of power lies within the activity of 65
overcoming resistance, it is difficult to separate it as an end independently of the activity.  66
        Secondly, and more importantly, for the concept of resistance to make sense the 
determinate first order end has to actually be desired by the agent for its own sake. If he or 
she does not care about achieving it, the obstacles to it will not count as resistance for them. 
Reginster defends this point by making an analogy between the will to power and 
participating in games. In contemplating playing a game, he claims, it may well be that all 
that matters is participation. But to actually engage in the game, winning must matter to the 
agent, since this motivation is what constitutes playing a game.  If I do not want to win, then 67
I cannot experience an increase in the feeling power from winning, for I never experienced a 
lack that needs to be satisfied. As Nietzsche claims: 
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 161.64
 In chapter three I discuss this point in more detail, particularly regarding different types of 65
resistance that the will to power is manifested in, and their differing value.
 This view is also defended by John Richardson, who puts it the following way: “power, as 66
something willed by every drive, ‘lacks content,’ requiring a contingent filling out from some given 
case”. See John Richardson, (1996), p. 24.
 I later discuss game playing in detail in Chapter Four when considering the value of achievement.67
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That I must be struggle and a becoming and an end and an opposition to ends—alas, whoever 
guesses what is my will should also guess on what crooked paths it must proceed. (Z, II, §12; 
first emphasis mine) 
        One's will to power then, as a descriptive thesis, will not be satisfied unless three 
conditions are met: (1) there is some first-order desire for a determinate end; (2) there is 
resistance to the realization of this end (the content of which will vary depending on what the 
end is); (3) this resistance is successfully overcome by the agent. We can now see that for 
Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, 'the will' is a second order desire to have desires; for continual 
activity. Nietzsche explains this activity in terms of a desire for an increase in the feeling of 
power; to meet with and overcome resistance in satisfying first order desires. Both Reginster 
and Katsafanas converge on this point. They claim that the will to power: 
...has the structure of a second-order desire:..a desire for the overcoming of resistance in the 
pursuit of some determinate first-order desire.  68
...has a certain structure. It consists not only in the aim of achieving some end, but also in the 
aim of encountering and overcoming resistance in the pursuit of that end.  69
Nietzsche does not offer an explicit list of substantive goals in connection to the pursuit of 
power. Rather, he presents a formal account regarding the structure of willing that is 
compatible with striving for a number of different goals.  For example, the politician 70
manifests the will to power in overcoming the obstacles and opposition in getting an 
important bill or law passed; poets and novelists overcome the difficulties involved in 
cleverly utilising language to represent or incite emotions; the warrior overcomes resistance 
to winning the battle by facing an opponent of significant ability. In these cases, one is 
already inclined to pursue a goal due to whatever motivating drive, and the will to power 
motivates one to pursue it in a particular way. John Richardson rightly draws attention to this 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 132.68
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 161.69
 I shall return to this point in the next chapter where I consider what value Nietzsche associates 70
with power, and what constraints there might be on the determinate ends.
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point, claiming that Nietzsche does not view the will to power as a thesis about what we will; 
rather, it is a claim about how we will.  71
        We have so far seen that Nietzsche's conception of the will is similar to Schopenhauer's 
in two respects: (1) the will is never 'satisfied': we perpetually strive; (2) the will has the basic 
structure of a second order desire. At this point we must explain the concept of 'resistance', 
and determine how far Nietzsche understands the term to reflect Schopenhauer's use of it to 
refer to suffering. 
3.3. Resistance as a Form of Suffering 
        Earlier we established that Schopenhauer defined suffering as the will’s "hindrance 
through an obstacle placed between it and its temporary goal" (WWR, I, §56, p. 309). For 
Schopenhauer, resistance to the will is inherently painful, and striving is therefore a form of 
suffering. We also established that this claim is deeply problematic, for not all instances of 
resistance to the will, or unsatisfied desire, plausibly constitute suffering. For example, the 
mountain climber who wants to reach the top of the mountain does not do so via the easy 
option of a helicopter, but by choosing the significantly difficult route of climbing. While the 
resistance for this activity is extremely high, it is not immediately obvious that difficulty in 
this case is synonymous with suffering. Since Nietzsche adopts at least two components of 
Schopenhauer's account of the will to life—(1) the will is never 'satisfied': we perpetually 
strive; (2) the will has the basic structure of a second order desire—the question is whether he 
also accepts the third claim that resistance is (or necessarily involves) suffering, and in doing 
so inherits the same problems Schopenhauer faces. 
        Reginster claims that "suffering is defined by resistance".  There are two ways one 72
might interpret this claim: (a) All resistance is, in some degree, suffering; (b) Suffering is one 
possible form of resistance. Reginster regards Nietzsche as firmly under Schopenhauerian 
 Richardson, (1996), p. 21.71
 Reginster, (2006), p. 177.72
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influence on this matter, and explicitly attributes the stronger claim, (a), to him. He continues 
that: 
The will to power, insofar as it is a will to the overcoming of resistance, must necessarily also 
will the resistance to overcome. Since suffering is defined in terms of resistance, then the will 
to power indeed "desires displeasure".  73
In defending Reginster's interpretation of the will to power, Katsafanas makes the same 
claim, that "in willing power we will a certain kind of displeasure or suffering".  Similarly, 74
Soll also explicitly associates Nietzsche's conception of striving for power with suffering: "it 
is only in overcoming difficulty, pain, and suffering, in successfully struggling and striving, 
that one experiences power".  Janaway and Gemes equally detect this characteristically 75
Schopenhauerian conception of suffering in Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power, and 
write that: 
...in willing power we will resistances. But resistances are experienced as suffering, so in 
willing power we are willing suffering, or at least willing something that necessarily involves 
suffering.  76
Nietzsche himself appears in places to endorse the stronger claim that resistance necessarily 
involves suffering. For example, Zarathustra claims that he is "the advocate of life, the 
advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle" (Z, III, §13; emphasis mine), and he refers 
to those suffering who are "unsatisfied and insatiable" (GM, III, §13). But apart from 
terminological similarities with Schopenhauer, it is unclear whether Nietzsche endorses the 
stronger claim that resistance equates with suffering. The passages in which Nietzsche does 
explicitly claim this reside almost exclusively in the Nachlass. As one of many examples: 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 133.73
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 193.74
 Soll, (1988), p. 124.75
 Christopher Janaway and Ken Gemes, "Life-denial Versus Life-affirmation: Schopenhauer and 76
Nietzsche on Pessimism and Asceticism" in Bart Vandenabeele (ed.), Companion to Schopenhauer: 
Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 297.
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...driven by that will it seeks resistance, it needs something that opposes it — Displeasure, as 
an obstacle to its will to power, is therefore a normal fact...man does not avoid it, he is rather 
in continual need of it... (WP, §702; KSA, 1888, 14[174]) 
Reginster heavily relies on such passages to draw this parallel with Schopenhauer. As I have 
claimed earlier in the thesis, this is exegetically problematic. But we might explain 
Nietzsche's possible endorsement of the claim in another way. Reginster argues that 
Nietzsche's philosophical exercises take place within a Schopenhauerian context, and can't be 
adequately grasped without acknowledging this point. I agree with Reginster, and hold that 
his interpretation is particularly admirable in distinctively taking seriously the depth of this 
influence. The following move might be made from here. Soll argues that Nietzsche, 
particularly in his early period, often takes for granted the plausibility of arguments earlier 
made by Schopenhauer. Although Nietzsche does not explicitly mention them, Soll writes 
that "unquestionably, he was aware of these arguments and agreed with their conclusion that 
life is predominantly suffering".  Came comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that in light 77
of Schopenhauer's a priori and empirical arguments: 
Nietzsche accepts that human existence is chiefly characterized by an ineluctable and all-
pervasive suffering, and that life offers no real opportunity for lasting satisfaction or 
happiness.  78
Nietzsche's acceptance of the Schopenhauerian claim that striving necessarily involves a 
painful lack may be one of these implicit endorsements, and hence, why he does not 
explicitly defend the claim (at least in the published works). Perhaps more significantly—
given that I have agreed with Reginster and Katsafanas that Nietzsche accepts the 
Schopenhauerian framework of willing—Nietzsche does not explicitly deny the claim. While 
constituting a much weaker reason to attribute the claim to Nietzsche, it nonetheless 
strengthens Reginster's case. 
        Reginster seeks to add weight to his interpretation by defending the following claim: 
 Soll, (1988), p. 118.77
 Came, (2007), p. 42.78
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I cannot have a desire for some determinate object and be indifferent to its possession. In 
other words, I cannot have a desire and not suffer from its frustration. Hence, the desire to 
desire cannot be satisfied without causing the agent significant displeasure, for its satisfaction 
requires that the agent have an unsatisfied desire.  79
However, I argued in section 2.6 that there are good reasons to hold that there are many ways 
in which one can have an unsatisfied desire (or more appropriately a goal) which one does 
not suffer from, and can in fact derive pleasure from. Moreover, that the desire implies pain 
principle is plausible in cases of unmotivated desires, but does not have the same strength 
when considering motivated desires. The reason, I argued, is that while unmotivated desires
—for example, hunger—are intuitively associated with suffering, this is not obviously true of 
motivated desires—for example, the desire to travel on the bus and not the train—which are 
explained in terms of an agents rational reasons. 
        One reply that Reginster could make here is to claim that resistance and suffering are 
both a matter of degree. Low resistance means a minimal amount of suffering, and great 
resistance means great suffering. The claim may only be that the will to power necessarily 
involves at least some degree of suffering.  
         My reply is twofold. First of all, using terms such as 'frustration' and 'dissatisfaction' in 
cases of low resistance appears to run into the same problem of equivocation. Being 
'frustrated' or 'dissatisfied' at experiencing difficulty in completing a puzzle lacks the 
connotation associated with pain and agony that would accompany the frustration or 
dissatisfaction of a starving person. Furthermore, if suffering is only being referred to in this 
highly restricted and qualified way, it is questionable whether it is the appropriate term to be 
using to identify resistance. My second reply considers the problem from the opposite 
direction. Some instances of extremely high resistance—such as the climbing of a mountain
—still do not seem to appropriately be described as suffering. Reginster is right to suggest 
that people choose to do activities such as these in virtue of the fact they provide a challenge 
and won't easily be achieved (thereby satisfying the will to power), but it would be a further 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 134.79
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claim to suggest that these people desire or seek out 'suffering' in doing so, or that their 
unsatisfied desire of getting to the top—unless it persists for too long—is in itself painful. 
        Because the principle that desire implies pain is implausible for the reasons I have 
discussed, we have reason to avoid attributing it to Nietzsche, and interpret him to defend the 
weaker claim that (b) suffering is one possible form of resistance. Like the qualification I 
suggested in my discussion of Schopenhauer, resistances to the will are perhaps best 
understood as suffering when they persist for too long. For example, when the goal of my 
activity—reaching the top of a mountain, writing a novel, composing a symphony, winning a 
battle—is drawn out for a significant period of time, it is then plausibly a type of 
'dissatisfaction' that is associated with suffering. It is plausible, because many forms of 
resistances and challenges, such as these, may provoke a number of emotions associated with 
the term: frustration, anxiety, fear, depression, and so forth. They may also provoke physical 
forms of suffering: exhaustion, fatigue, broken bones, and so on.  For the purposes of my 
thesis, which is to identify the type of value that suffering has in relation to greatness, I only 
have to defend this weaker claim, and this is certainly a claim Nietzsche defends. The 
distinction between non-painful resistance and suffering is only problematic for my thesis if 
non-painful forms of resistance and suffering make different contributions in value once 
overcome, other than in degree. I shall argue later that this is not the case.  80
        The answer to this question is significant for the following reason. If the feeling of 
power consists in the overcoming of resistance, and not all resistance is suffering, then it 
follows that suffering is only contingently related to power, and it is really resistance felt as 
difficulty that is at issue. The result being that one could be a creative genius and, at least in 
 Furthermore, accepting a qualified form of the principle that desire implies pain is not as much 80
of concession for Nietzsche as it is for Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer explicit employs the principle 
as the main argument for his descriptive pessimism, using it to demonstrate its plausibility a priori. 
However, Nietzsche makes no such explicit move.
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theory, never suffer (at least in the way under consideration).  As I shall argue in the next 81
chapter, this may conflict with subsequent claims Nietzsche makes about the relation between 
suffering and greatness.   
        So far, I have presented Reginster's interpretation of the will to power as the overcoming 
of resistance, and accepted that Nietzsche endorses the Schopenhauerian claims that (1) the 
will is perpetual; (2) it has the structure of a second-order desire. Moreover, that because of 
the implausibility of the principle that desire implies pain, Nietzsche is best interpreted as 
endorsing a qualified version in which (3) suffering is one possible form of resistance to the 
will. I have tried to show that this is not just an issue of terminology, but of concepts, arguing 
that resistance may be best interpreted as difficulty rather than always suffering. Furthermore, 
that Nietzsche can accept that only some resistances constitute suffering, without 
undermining the view that life fundamentally involves suffering (the descriptive claim of 
pessimism). One reason is that suffering as resistance to the will is just one form of suffering, 
and as I argued in the first section of this chapter, Nietzsche identifies many more. A second 
reason is that, due to the argument regarding the perpetual nature of the will, painful 
resistances are, in Nietzsche's view, likely to be numerous. I shall now address Nietzsche's 
most significant point of departure from Schopenhauer: his evaluation of the will, and his 
rejection of the hedonism which underpins Schopenhauer's pessimism. 
3.4. Nietzsche's Rejection of (Evaluative) Pessimism  
        Although Nietzsche understands one form of suffering in this way, he differs radically 
from Schopenhauer in his perception of what it entails evaluatively (i.e. the value of life) and 
 Although it is not the focus of this thesis, the consequences of this point are significant for 81
Reginster's wider aim, which is to provide an account of the will to power which serves as a life-
affirming alternative to Christian Nihilism. Recall Nietzsche's famous claim that "the 
meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering as such, has been the curse which has hung over 
mankind up to now" (GM, III, §28). Reginster attempts to provide a meaning for suffering in terms of 
the will to power, placing it as the "the principle of revaluation" (Reginster, (2006), p. 150) in 
Nietzsche's wider ethical project. While I agree that the problem of suffering is a central feature of 
Nietzsche's rejection of Christian morality, the worry I am considering is that if overcoming 
resistance is what is essential for meaningful creative activity, and resistance is really to be 
understood as difficulty rather than always suffering, then the 'meaning' that Reginster proposes 
Nietzsche offers in order to avoid "suicidal nihilism" (GM, III, §28) will only extend to very particular 
and restricted instances of suffering. 
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normatively (i.e. how one ought to act in light of this value). Earlier in section 2.6, I raised an 
objection to Schopenhauer's account of the will as an argument for pessimism, which is a 
commitment to two claims: (a) life is essentially suffering, (b) non-existence is preferable to 
existence. Schopenhauer makes the connection between the descriptive (a) and the evaluative 
(b) by assuming the truth of hedonism. His argument for pessimism is valid, but according to 
Nietzsche it is not sound. Nietzsche writes in a later note: 
"The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently it were better that 
the world did not exist"—"the world is something which rationally should not exist because it 
causes the feeling subject more displeasure than pleasure"—chatter of this sort calls itself 
pessimism today!...I despise this pessimism of sensibility: it is in itself a sign of deeply 
impoverished life. (WP, §701; KSA, 1887, 11[61]) 
Nietzsche rejects the evaluative component of Schopenhauer's pessimism by criticising 
hedonism in at least the following two ways.  82
        Nietzsche's first argument against hedonism concerns the theory's internal coherence as a 
descriptive psychological view about human motivation. The psychological hedonist claims 
that all human action is directed at experiencing happiness, defined in terms of a favourable 
balance of pleasure over pain. But this, according to Nietzsche, is to mistakenly construe 
pleasure and pain as antithetical absolutes, and consequently to fail to grasp the nature of 
happiness, which he claims involves the intimate relation of both phenomena. A distinction 
must be made at this point between a superficial account of happiness that Nietzsche 
attributes to hedonists with a pejorative connotation (what he usually refers to as 
'happiness' [Glück]), and what Nietzsche understands happiness to properly consist in (what 
he usually refers to as being 'cheerful' or 'joyful' [fröhlich]). 
        In a number of places Nietzsche espouses a version of what is now commonly referred 
to as the 'hedonic paradox'. According to the paradox, happiness (in this case defined in terms 
of pleasure) is unobtainable—or, on stronger versions of the paradox, diminished—when 
pursued directly. For example, suppose John enjoys playing darts. If we ask John what he is 
doing when he throws a dart at the target, he is unlikely to respond with "I throw darts in 
 cf. Came, (2005).82
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order experience happiness!". Rather, John is likely to explain the causal process of his 
behaviour by the fact that he simply likes playing darts, and therefore acquires happiness 
indirectly. A stronger version of the paradox might be exemplified by a person who in 
attempting to seek happiness through a means of friendship with a new group of people, 
actually ends up pushing those people further away from him or her. The purpose of the 
paradox is to demonstrate that in order to experience happiness, one's aim in their activity 
must be directed at something other than happiness itself. 
        Nietzsche's version of the paradox as an argument against hedonism recurs in a number 
of his texts. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche explicitly defines happiness as "the feeling that 
power increases — that a resistance is overcome" (A, §2). What hedonists misunderstand is 
that 'happiness' is in fact, in Nietzsche's view, actually a bi-product of the increased feeling of 
power; of the activity of overcoming of resistance. Hence, in attempting to undermine 
hedonistic conceptions of happiness which define it in terms of pleasure, he refers to pleasure 
and pain as "attendant and secondary phenomena" (BGE, §225) and "mere consequences, 
mere epiphenomena" (WP, §702, KSA, 1888, 14[174]). He claims that "pleasure is only a 
symptom of the feeling of power attained", and continues that "there is no striving for 
pleasure: but pleasure supervenes when that which is being striven for is attained: pleasure is 
an accompaniment, pleasure is not the motive" (WP, §688; KSA, 1888, 14[121]). 
       Nietzsche is arguing that, in contrast to the "English happiness" of "comfort and 
fashion" (BGE, §228),   the "deep sleep" of 'Indian philosophy', as "contentment" (A, §2) 83
and "submission" (D, §60; GM, I, §10), real happiness is an activity in which one's level of 
strength is challenged by an appropriate level of difficulty, which Nietzsche interprets 
suffering to be a form of. On this view, if an activity is too difficult then the agent is likely to 
become uneasy or nervous. If the activity is too easy—it does not provide enough resistance
—then the agent becomes bored. Nietzsche criticises Schopenhauer specifically in this way: 
 Nietzsche mistakenly attacks Mill's utilitarianism with his objections to hedonism (BGE, §225, 83
§288). Mill was well aware of the paradox, and his brand of utilitarianism was not the simple 
hedonistic form Nietzsche attributes to him. However, while Nietzsche's objection may be more 
readily used against Bentham, it can certainly be used in responding to Schopenhauer's hedonism, 
which, in being a tacit assumption, takes the most basic of forms.
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It is not the satisfaction of the will which is the cause of pleasure (I want to fight this 
superficial theory — the absurd psychological counterfeiting of the nearest things), but rather 
the will's forward thrust again and again become master over that which stands in its way. The 
feeling of pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact that the will is 
never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance. (WP, §696; KSA, 1887, 11[75]) 
Nietzsche at times endorses a stronger version of the paradox in which pleasure or happiness 
is not possible without pain or suffering, and that pursuing these ends directly actually 
diminishes them. He specifically aims this stronger criticism at normative theories—
Christianity, Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and so forth—which in his view define happiness in 
terms of "the absence of suffering" (GM, III, §17). In a famous passage from The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche attacks the 'compassionate', who always seek to maximise 'happiness' and 
alleviate suffering, in the following way: 
Ah, how little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for 
happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in 
your case, remain small together (GS, §338) 
The claim is that in seeking to avoid suffering, the 'compassionate' deprive themselves and 
others of what Nietzsche seems to consider a necessary condition of happiness. As Nietzsche 
puts this earlier in the same passage: "the path to one's heaven always leads through the 
voluptuousness of one's own hell" (GS, §338). In addition: "only at this price do we purchase 
the most precious pearl that the waves of existence have hitherto washed ashore!" (GS, §302). 
Yet again in the same work, he reiterates this point in more explicit terms: 
But what if pleasure and displeasure were so tied together that whoever wanted to have as 
much as possible of one must also have as much as possible of the other (GS, §12) 
This formulation of the paradox reveals Nietzsche's use of the Schopenhauerian framework in 
his conception of the will to power. In order for the feeling of power to increase, there must 
first be dissatisfaction. There must also be significant resistance to the satisfaction of this 
desire. In the process of overcoming this resistance, one's feeling of power increases, and as a 
result, one experiences pleasure or 'happiness' (which Nietzsche commonly refers to as 'joy'). 
The important component of the stronger formulation of the paradox turns upon Nietzsche's 
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understanding of 'dissatisfaction' here, which the passages from The Gay Science above 
appear to necessarily associate with painful experience. This supports Reginster's 
interpretation which I presented above, in which "suffering is defined by resistance". 
However, it also faces the resistance as difficulty vs. resistance as suffering ambiguity that I 
raised. If it is possible to increase the feeling of power via overcoming non-painful resistance, 
then the stronger version of the paradox is not as compelling as the more plausible weaker 
version. 
        Nietzsche argues, then, that psychological hedonism fails on its own terms by failing to 
conceive of happiness as an activity rather than a placid state. However, Nietzsche's primary 
argument against hedonism concerns its evaluative and normative dimensions: that pleasure 
or happiness is the only intrinsic good, and that (typically) one ought to act in a way that 
maximises it. 
        Whereas Schopenhauer took the gratuitous amount of suffering in the world to be a 
sufficient reason to conclude that life is not worth living, Nietzsche simply refuses to accept 
pleasure and pain as the sole measures of value. "Happiness" according to Nietzsche "is no 
argument in favour of something"; and "making unhappy" is similarly "no counter-argument" 
(BGE, §39). In the same work, Nietzsche claims that "hedonism or pessimism or 
utilitarianism or eudaemonism: all these modes of thought which assess the value of things 
according to pleasure and pain" are "naiveties" which should be looked down on "with 
derision" (BGE, §225). Nietzsche later makes a similar claim which specifically responds to 
Schopenhauer's conception of willing as an argument for evaluative pessimism: 
The normal dissatisfaction of our drives, e.g. hunger, the sexual drive, the drive to motion, 
contains in it absolutely nothing depressing; it works rather as an agitation of the feeling of 
life, as every rhythm of small, painful stimuli strengthens it (whatever pessimists may say). 
This dissatisfaction, instead of making one disgusted with life, is the great stimulus to life. 
(WP, §697; KSA, 1887, 11[76]) 
This passage is telling. Nietzsche refers to pain experienced in resistance to the will, which 
Schopenhauer recognises, but evaluates this phenomenon in a polar opposite way. Where 
Schopenhauer saw this pain as essentially negative, Nietzsche understands it to be valuable in 
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virtue of its relation (yet to be specified) to 'life', by which Nietzsche means the overcoming 
of obstacles; the will to power. 
        Nietzsche is clear that measuring one's wellbeing purely in terms of pleasure and pain 
has dire consequences:  
If you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of 
existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbour another religion 
in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comfortableness. 
(GS, §338) 
The claim is that hedonism in some way "renders man ludicrous and contemptible" (BGE, 
§225). In the preface to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche similarly speaks of "wretched 
contentment" (Z, Preface, §3) as an ideal of "the last men" (Z, Preface, §5). Because these 
men pursue hedonistic happiness directly and as an end, Nietzsche describes them as the 
"most despicable men" (Z, Preface, §5).  Although Nietzsche allows that 'higher 84
men' (discussed in detail in the next chapter) will be 'joyful' or 'cheerful' as a consequence of 
exercising their will to power—what he refers to as the "happiness of Homer" (GS, §302)—it 
is not in virtue of this happiness that they are admirable on Nietzsche's view. This indicates 
that power, and more importantly the striving for power, is valuable for Nietzsche 
independently of any pleasure it may bring. 
        Theories of wellbeing typically fall into three categories, of which hedonism is one. A 
second theory is the 'desire-fulfilment' or 'preference-satisfaction' view, according to which 
wellbeing is constituted by the fulfilment of one's desires. On this view, some desires may be 
satisfied which don't necessarily bring pleasure to the agent, for example: the desire to avoid 
cognitively disabling drugs which would nonetheless alleviate great pain; or the desire to 
know if one's friend has been disloyal.  A third theory of wellbeing holds that pleasure and 85
 In understanding Nietzsche's conception of happiness in terms of striving and overcoming 84
challenges, one is reminded of Euripides' famous saying: "Danger gleams like sunshine to a brave 
man's eyes".
 It is important to stress that although Schopenhauer's terminology centres on desires and their 85
satisfaction, his view of wellbeing is hedonistic insofar as he reduces dissatisfaction to pain. 
Incidentally, Schopenhauer's a priori argument for pessimism may be more compelling on a desire-
satisfaction account of wellbeing.
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the satisfaction of desire may be good things, but that there are many things which constitute 
wellbeing independently of them. This theory has been labelled the 'objective list' view by 
Derek Parfit, who argues that other things—knowledge of important matters, friendship, 
autonomy, achievement—can constitute a benefit to an agent for their own sake.  This view 86
is sometimes also referred to as 'perfectionism', though strictly speaking perfectionism is a 
type of objective list theory, which seeks to identify which things are good by giving an 
account of what is distinctive or essential (or both) to human beings.   87
        Nietzsche's claim is that hedonism "renders man ludicrous and contemptible" (BGE, 
§225) in failing to recognise values distinct from pleasure, namely: achievement. Nietzsche, 
of course, does not frame this objection using this terminology, but his emphasises on the 
value of power, and of striving for power, is the anchor of his rejection of hedonism and his 
endorsement of some form of objective list theory. Nietzsche's positive evaluations of power 
are numerous: 
What is good? — All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in 
man. 
What is bad? — All that proceeds from weakness (A, §2) 
Moreover, the value of power is a theme which recurs throughout Nietzsche's investigation 
into what the conditions must be to reach "the highest power and splendour actually possible 
to the human type" (GM, Preface, 6). What belongs to "the noble type of man", Nietzsche 
tells us, is "...the feeling of plenitude, of power which seeks to overflow..." (BGE, §260); he 
"honours himself as one who is powerful" (BGE, §260). This characterization of power in 
accordance with the good persists in a number of Nietzsche's texts from: 
The demeanour adopted by the nobility is an expression of the fact that the consciousness of 
power is constantly playing its charming game in their limbs (D, §201) 
 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 493-502.86
 The most rigorous defence of this view can be found in Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism, (New York: 87
Oxford University Press, 1993). Hurka also specifically addresses what he takes to be Nietzsche's 
brand of perfectionism in Thomas Hurka, "Nietzsche: Perfectionist" in Leiter and Sinhabubu (eds.), 
Nietzsche and Morality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).
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One would have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is 
constantly being overcome. (TI, 'Skirmishes', §38) 
Because Nietzsche values power and the striving for power, and resistance can be one form 
of suffering, Nietzsche considers suffering to be valuable in some capacity that Schopenhauer 
does not allow for. Before I discuss what this value is, it is first necessary to establish in 
detail what Nietzsche understands a well-lived life to consist in; who are these 'higher men'; 
and what is it about them which is valuable. 
Conclusion 
        In this chapter I have disentangled one form of suffering from at least two other forms 
Nietzsche discusses. I elucidated the conception of suffering in the pursuit of goals by 
interpreting Nietzsche's conception of the will to power in light of Schopenhauer's will to life. 
I argued both accounts of the will share at least three important aspects: (1) The will is never 
'satisfied'; (2) the will has the basic structure of a second order desire; (3) at least one form of 
suffering is understood as 'resistance to the will'. However, Nietzsche is best interpreted as 
holding that only some forms of resistance of the will constitute suffering namely: those 
resistances which persist for too long. These are purely descriptive claims. Where 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche significantly disagree—a battle which persists from the 
beginning to the end of Nietzsche's philosophical work—is with regard to the will's 
evaluation. Schopenhauer, in assuming the truth of hedonism, makes the jump from (a) 
human life is fundamentally suffering; to (b) non-existence is preferable to existence. 
However, while Nietzsche accepts (a), he is able to affirm the converse of (b) by denying that 
pleasure adds value to one's life and pain detracts value from one's life. Or at the very least, 
that pleasure is not the only good in life. Now that we have an account of what suffering is, I 
move on to discuss what Nietzsche understands a good life to consist in, and the role power 
plays in its value. 
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Chapter Two:  
Human Greatness 
        As early as Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche writes that mankind "must work 
continually at the production of individual great men — that and nothing else is its task", and 
that mankind "ought to seek out and create the favourable conditions" under which "those 
great redemptive men can come into existence" (UM, III, §6). I take it to be uncontroversial 
that increasingly into his philosophical career, Nietzsche believed human greatness to be an 
appropriately valuable goal, at least for certain types of people.  Where there is controversy 88
however, cocnerns: (1) what the specific content of greatness is: what does the "highest 
splendour possible to the type man" (GM, preface: §6) consist in?; (2) what type of value 
greatness has in Nietzsche's broader axiological schema. In this chapter, my focus is on the 
debate regarding (1). 
        Nietzsche does not provide an explicit account of what the concept of 'greatness' entails. 
Broadly speaking, there are two relevant features to consider: what a great agent is, and what 
a great agent does. Put another way, there are internal conditions (character) and external 
conditions (achievements) to consider. Nietzsche's repeated paradigms of greatness include 
figures as seemingly diverse as Beethoven (e.g. UM, III, §3; HH, §155; BGE, §245), Cesare 
Borgia (e.g. BGE, §197; TI, ‘Skirmishes, §37), Napoleon (e.g. HH, §164; GM, I, §16), Julius 
Caesar (e.g. BGE, §200; TI, 'Skirmishes', §38), Nietzsche himself (e.g. EH, V, §1), and most 
frequently Goethe (e.g. TI, 'Skirmishes', §49; GS, §103). But it is unclear whether Nietzsche 
takes these individuals to be great in virtue of their character traits, or in virtue of their 
particular achievements. This ambiguity has consequently shaped the terrain of contemporary 
inquiry into this important concept in such a way that typically consists in either one of these 
two features as sufficient to account for it. I discuss the arguments for such positions here, 
with my own view being that both achievements and traits of character are necessary for 
 Nietzsche is often more explicit about the concept of greatness in some works than others—88
notably Beyond Good and Evil. The importance of greatness may shift through Nietzsche's broader 
developmental trajectory between periods of his writing. As I suggest later, there may be some 
evidence of Nietzsche changing his mind about this from his early to mature period.
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what Nietzsche understands greatness to consist in. I then explore whether these features are 
together sufficient.  I shall firstly address traits of character.  
1. Great Persons 
        Nietzsche has a number of different terms and designations for the great individuals 
whom he venerates. The most frequent being "higher type" (BGE, §62; A, §4, §5), "free 
spirit" (GS, §347; BGE, §44), "hero" (BT, §24; D, §240; GS, §268) and "noble" (GS, §55; 
BGE, §287). Perhaps a case may also be made for "Übermensch", discussed almost 
exclusively in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is important to clarify that at least some of these 
terms are distinct from Nietzsche's use of "great" (e.g. UM, III, §6; BGE, §212, §225; EH, II, 
§10; WP, §957) in so far as they are technical terms; they have a (relatively) consistent 
meaning in his schema.  'Greatness', on the other hand, is a broader term which does not 89
have a stable usage in the texts. While a claim that, for example, 'Beethoven is a free spirit', 
would tell us that the author believed Beethoven to challenge prevailing social norms, a 
claim that 'Beethoven is the pinnacle of greatness' does not indicate precisely what it is about 
Beethoven that is being referred to, only that he is 'good'; 'exceptional'; or 'exemplary'.  
        However, my focus is not upon what Nietzsche means by the term greatness, but what 
he thinks is conceptually distinctive about those he admires the most: "the greatness of man, 
the concept 'greatness'" (BGE, §212). By paying attention to the relevant passages from the 
primary sources, and by assessing how 'greatness' is approached in the secondary literature, I 
shall argue that the concept of greatness involves a synthesis of (at least some of) the 
technical terms mentioned above, and that therefore it is possible that one may qualify as, for 
example, 'noble', but not 'great'. 
        Alexander Nehamas has argued that Nietzsche "refuses to offer any descriptions of what 
an ideal person or an ideal life would be like".  However, I think this is too strong. In a 90
 I will not have time to elucidate each concept in detail here, but as the Chapter progresses I 89
shall attempt to distinguish at least some of them from each other, and how they may only form a 
part of the concept of greatness.
 Nehamas, (1985), p. 890
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number of places, Nietzsche describes at least some of the distinguishable features of these 
individuals. Typically, they centre on qualities of character which make up a "noble 
soul" (BGE, §287), rather than their specific achievements. 
        Before discussing what these qualities are, there is an ambiguity, both in Nietzsche's 
work and also in much of the secondary literature, that needs to be made explicit. This 
concerns what is entailed by the term 'character'. It is standard practice for commentators to 
interpret greatness of 'character' to refer exclusively to a number of executive virtues, by 
which I mean those traits that are manifested in controlling, deciding upon, guiding, and 
bringing about action. This appears to be how the term 'character' is understood by Brian 
Leiter,  Simon Robertson,  Andrew Huddleston,  and Bernard Reginster.  However, it is 91 92 93 94
important to be aware of a potential distinction between two other aspects of a person which 
may fall under the umbrella term of their 'character', all of which are relevant in some way to 
Nietzsche's understanding of greatness: (1) one's skill or ability; and (2) one's taste (i.e. which 
goals one chooses to pursue). As we shall see, these three properties may come apart in 
various ways. I shall return to this point later, but for the purposes of structure I shall 
hereafter, following Leiter, refer to character traits as just those executive virtues Nietzsche 
venerates. I will now present a representative, but not necessarily exhaustive, list of these 
identifiable character traits. 
        In a variety of places, Nietzsche presents these higher types of people as being solitary 
by nature. The higher man "...is always in his own company, whether he associates with 
books, human beings, or landscapes" (EH, II, §2). Moreover, this is something the great 
individual actually desires: he "strives instinctively for a citadel and a secrecy where he is 
 Leiter uses the terms "characteristics" and "traits" to refer to what Nietzsche associates with 91
greatness. See Leiter, (2002), pp. 116-122.
 Robertson uses the term 'character' to refer to what he calls "self-orientated qualities". See 92
Simon Robertson, "Nietzsche's Ethical Revaluation" in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 37, 
(Pennsylvania State University, 2009), p. 78.
 Huddleston also refers to "character traits" or, the more Nietzschean, "quality of soul" to describe 93
these executive virtues. See Andrew Huddleston, Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of 
Culture, (Princeton: Doctoral Thesis, 2012), pp. 37-44.
 Like Huddleston, Reginster retains Nietzsche's concept of the condition of the "soul" to describe 94
these features. See Reginster, (2006), pp. 190-192.
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saved from the crowd, the many, the great majority..." (BGE, §26). Nietzsche is even more 
explicit about this condition when he writes that the concept of greatness entails "being 
noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live 
independently" and that "he shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary" (BGE, §212). 
        A related quality that Nietzsche considers is how one is "able to be different” (BGE, 
§212). Truly great individuals, Nietzsche argues, go against the grain and challenge the 
norms of their cultural environment: "the higher man courts opposition, and provokes it" (GS, 
§297; cf. BGE, §211). The idea is that there is some value to be found in the individuality and 
rarity of certain persons. As Nietzsche puts it, "what can be common has ever but little 
value", and that "great things are for the great...and, in sum, rare things for the rare" (BGE, 
§43, §62; cf. GS, §3, §55). This point will resurface later in the next chapter. 
        Another quality of character that Nietzsche presents as a constitutive feature of greatness 
is a certain kind of "pride in oneself" (BGE, §260). He writes that "the noble soul has 
reverence for itself" (BGE, §287), and that "perhaps the effect of selfishness is precisely at its 
greatest in the noblest persons" (GS, §55). In other places, Nietzsche appears to make a 
stronger claim by endorsing a form of ethical egoism—the view that one ought to do only 
what is in one's self interest—for higher types of people: "egoism pertains to the essence of 
the noble soul" (BGE, §265). 
        A fourth important condition of greatness is that individuals exercise their will to power 
to a high degree. Since the pursuit of power necessarily involves struggle, great individuals 
actively seek it out: "[A strong nature] needs resistance; hence it seeks resistance." (EH, II, 
§7). The relevance of this point will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. But Nietzsche 
emphasises that since great individuals seek out struggle and perhaps suffering, they must 
have a fifth quality: the psychological strength and discipline to endure and be resilient to it; 
a "hardness and capacity for protracted decisions" (BGE, §212). 
        Yet another important quality of character great individuals have on Nietzsche's view is a 
capacity for self-control or 'self-mastery' in organising strong yet diverse drives. Broadly 
construed, Nietzsche understands a drive [Trieb] as a disposition that generates or provokes a 
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certain pattern of activity.  Certain interpretations have Nietzsche claim that human beings 95
have a number of different drives, including (but not limited to) a drive associated with 
knowledge (GM, III; WP, §423; KSA, 1888, 14[142]); sex (GS, §14); hunger (D, §119; WP, 
§702; KSA, 1888, 14[174]); and most notoriously: power (GM, III, §18; HH, §142 and 
passim). Furthermore, that each of these drives constantly seeks expression: they aim to 
discharge themselves through a particular end, and as such are in competition with one 
another. For instance, Nietzsche talks of their "play and counterplay among one another" (D, 
§119), where every drive is “tyrannical” in so far as they want to be “the legitimate master of 
all the other drives" (BGE, §6).  Leslie Paul Thiele, a proponent of this kind of 96
interpretation, puts it in the following way. He argues that each drive “has its will to dominate 
and exploit its competitors…" and that the individual is therefore "a battleground of 
competing drives, each with its own perspective”.  97
        In a number of places, Nietzsche identifies great individuals to the extent to which they 
manage, control and organise these strong yet varied drives in a unified way to a high degree. 
In the case of Caesar and da Vinci, he writes that: 
...in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable instincts, they have also inherited and 
cultivated into them a proper mastery and subtlety for carrying on the conflict with 
themselves (that is to say, the faculty of self-control and self-deception). (BGE, §200) 
And of Shakespeare: 
The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest 
strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant "man" shows himself strongest, one 
 Nietzsche uses Drive [Trieb] seemingly interchangeably with Instinct [Instinkt]. I shall adopt this 95
assumption for my purposes here.
 I will not have time here to assess Nietzsche's conception of drives and their wider relevance to 96
his ethical evaluations in any detail. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Katsafanas, 
(2013), Chapter 6; Maudemarie Clark, and David Dudrick, “Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of BGE 
19,” in Ken Gemes and Simon May (eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, (OUP, 2009), pp. 
247–68; Ken Gemes, "Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation" in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 38, 
(Pennsylvania State University, 2009), pp. 38-59; Richardson, (1996), especially pp. 44-48.
 Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, (Princeton: Princeton 97
University Press, 1990), pp. 57-58.
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finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e.g., in Shakespeare), but are controlled. (WP, §966; 
KSA, 1884, 27[59]) 
Similar views are expressed elsewhere in Nietzsche's work: he recognises a "fundamental 
will of the spirit" in higher men that seeks "to be master internally and externally". Moreover, 
this 'spirit' "has the will of a multiplicity for a simplicity, a binding, taming, imperious, and 
essentially ruling will" (BGE, §230). The paradigm example of this capacity in Nietzsche's 
view is, unsurprisingly, Goethe, whom we are told "disciplined himself to wholeness". (TI, 
‘Skirmishes’, §49).  98
        While Nietzsche acknowledges these qualities, there may be others I have not mentioned 
here. Furthermore, it is not obvious whether Nietzsche intends all of these qualities to be 
necessary for greatness, or just various combinations. The crucial point, however, is that all 
of them up are qualities of a person's character: they concern what an agent is like. It is these 
properties that Nietzsche frequently associates with the concept of nobility. 
        One view is that 'noble' qualities of character are all that Nietzsche understands the 
concept greatness to entail: that being great is being a certain way, regardless of a person's 
particular achievements. This appears to be the view taken by Brian Leiter, who states that 
certain traits, including most of which discussed above, are "plainly sufficient" for 
greatness.  Let us call this view (i.e. the view that greatness resides in individuals solely in 99
virtue of exercising certain qualities of character, irrespective of the content of the goals they 
pursue) the Pure Character View. 
        Supporters of the Pure Character View may point to Nietzsche's repeated emphasis on 
character traits, and apparent silence on particular accomplishments, as sufficient to support 
their view. In describing individuals he venerates, Nietzsche repeatedly associates their value 
with the traits mentioned, and almost never with their effects or achievements.   
 For more detailed discussion on 'self-mastery' and its specific relation to greatness, see 98
Christopher Janaway, "Nietzsche on Morality, Drives and Human Greatness" in Christopher Janaway 
and Simon Robertson, Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity, (OUP, 2012). I discuss the role of 
organic unity in Nietzsche's ethics in detail in the final chapter. 
 Brian Leiter, (2002), p. 116.99
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        But I think there are strong reasons to reject the Pure Character View, both as an 
interpretation of Nietzsche and as a position in and of itself. Here I invoke an argument given 
by Andrew Huddleston. Huddleston first responds to the fact that Nietzsche generally does 
not refer to great particular achievements, instead almost exclusively describing the great 
individual in terms of his personal qualities. According to Huddleston, the reason for this is 
that it is "so obvious" that to be great is to accomplish great things that "Nietzsche never sees 
fit to mention it explicitly".  In other words, that great achievements form a necessary part 100
of the concept of greatness is a 'background assumption' in Nietzsche's understanding of the 
concept. 
        This is a reasonable assumption on Nietzsche's part. The motivation for this line of 
thought is that Huddleston argues, plausibly, that the Pure Character View "risks admitting 
underachievers, however sedulous, into the pantheon of great individuals".  The point is 101
that there may be cases where someone retains all the traits of character Nietzsche frequently 
venerates—self reverence, solitariness, toughness in the face of suffering, and so forth—yet 
underachieves. 
        Building upon Huddleston's point, there are several reasons that could lead to these type 
of cases. Perhaps one such reason may be that this person simply has no goals. Alternatively 
this person may have goals but never attempts to achieve any of them. However, as 
Christopher Janaway has recently suggested, merely possessing the virtues mentioned above 
appears to be incompatible with either not having or never pursuing any goals.  Janaway 102
proposes that Nietzsche may hold that no individual who satisfied the internal conditions of 
greatness could fail to have goals they seek to achieve. If, for example, we accept the 
condition that all great individuals exercise their will to power to a large degree, then as I 
 Andrew Huddleston, (2012), p. 30.100
 Andrew Huddleston, (2012), p. 29.101
 Janaway, (2012), p. 192. Janaway is strongly committed to the view that 'internal' traits of 102
character are necessary for greatness, which I agree with. He appears open to the view that 
greatness could also be a matter of 'external' achievements, but refrains from commitment to this 
view. I view my project here to be building on Janaway's important discussion.
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have presented the doctrine, they are by definition engaging in the pursuit of goals. The 
objection is, that if one fails to have and pursue goals, one fails to possess an internal 
condition necessary for greatness. 
        But this response does not undermine Huddleston's argument that the Pure Character 
View allows underachievers to exemplify greatness. This is because we might well imagine 
cases of third variety, perhaps like some interpretations of Don Quixote, where (i) one retains 
the traits Nietzsche admires and (ii) one has many goals, and (iii) one pursues them all, yet 
constantly fails to achieve them due to a lack of talent, ability or skill. 
        It seems implausible that cases of this nature would qualify as what Nietzsche 
understands greatness to be. Failures may be honourable and glorious in some instances: 
perhaps fighting a battle against a significantly stronger opponent, yet with the knowledge 
that it will inevitably end in defeat. Failures, as Nietzsche acknowledges, are often also 
instrumentally valuable in that we learn from them: "I do not know whether I do not have 
more reason to be grateful to my failures than to any success" (GS, §303). Nevertheless, if no 
goals were ever achieved, no difficulties were ever overcome, it is unlikely Nietzsche would 
view them in a similar light to the great individuals he admires.  103
        A related and perhaps more pressing problem with the Pure Character View is that it 
leaves open the possibility that these noble individuals can focus their efforts on and pursue 
trivial or worthless ends. Robertson points out precisely this worry: 
it seems that individuals may possess and exercise such qualities yet direct their activities 
toward goals we (or Nietzsche) would deny manifest excellence. If so, they may fail to count 
as genuinely excellent individuals.  104
 An important question arises here: does Nietzsche value significant talent or ability merely as a 103
means to, or as an enabling condition of, greatness? Or rather, is significant talent or ability 
constitutive of greatness? One reason for thinking that it is constitutive of greatness is the 
following. There may be cases where one retains a noble character, has good taste, and lacks 
significant ability, yet still manages to achieve one's goals through pure luck. It is unlikely Nietzsche 
would see this case, where no difficulty was overcome, as a great act. It is important that this case 
involves pure luck, because, as we shall see, Nietzsche credits luck with playing a significant role in 
the realization of greatness. The role of luck in achievement more generally will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.
 Robertson, (2009), p. 78.104
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The following is a typical Rawlsian example to demonstrate the force of this objection.  105
Suppose a person, Andy, does not care for writing novels or plays, composing music or being 
politically active. Instead, Andy directs his activity at counting blades of grass in large fields. 
This is an extremely difficult task as it demands not only a very careful and meticulous 
approach in differentiating each blade, but a very sharp memory of which have been already 
accounted for. Andy, let us imagine, is solitary in nature, and prefers to pursue his project 
rather than interact with others. We can imagine him retaining all of the executive virtues 
mentioned above. We can also imagine Andy being extremely talented, having an 
extraordinary ability to remember which blades of grass he has counted and which he has not. 
But upon completion of his laborious task, there is a strong intuition that Andy is not worthy 
of admiration. Rather, perhaps, like Sisyphus (and perhaps Don Quixote, though for a 
different reason to Andy—assuming Don Quixote has worthy goals), he is even deserving of 
pity for having wasted his time on such a trivial project. Regardless, it does not seem 
plausible that Andy would genuinely figure in Nietzsche's conception of great individuals. 
        A possible response to this objection might refer back to Janaway's point about the lack 
of one or more necessary virtues. In the example given, Andy appears to be an over-
simplified individual without a multiplicity of diverse drives, and it is on these grounds that 
he fails to count as great. This line of argument is taken by Ken Gemes, who in giving his 
own example of a person who solely directs their activities at collecting stamps, argues that 
this person is unlikely to be expressing the full range of their drives and so fails to satisfy at 
least one necessary aspect of the model of greatness Nietzsche propounds.  But again, I 106
think this can be surmounted by expanding the grass-counting example. Perhaps Andy has 
many other diverse, yet equally ludicrous, projects which he unifies under one will, thus 
giving his drives an opportunity for expression.  
 For the original use of the example, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: 105
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 432.
 Ken Gemes, (2009), p. 57. Janaway also makes this argument, though differs from Gemes in his 106
characterisation of drives, which he takes to have the potential to dissipate completely. I discuss 
the implications of this for greatness shortly. See Janaway, (2012), p. 188.
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        This objection draws attention to the question of whether Nietzsche holds that certain 
substantive goals have independent value and others do not. Nietzsche's apparent silence on 
this matter has been taken by some to indicate that he has no explicit or implicit substantive 
account, but rather only associates valuable achievements with formal properties which are 
compatible with a number of different goals. This view is defended by Thomas Hurka, who 
writes that: 
In an early work he [Nietzsche] said the one thing 'needful' is to 'give style to one's character', 
so its elements are unified by 'a single taste', and that it matters less whether this taste is good 
or bad than whether it is a single taste.  107
Hurka continues that "He [Nietzsche] deemed activities good if they involve organizing one's 
aims around a single goal whatever that goal is".  Defenders of this kind of view often point 108
to a familiar passage where Nietzsche notes that "Whether this taste was good or bad is less 
important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste” (GS, §290). The idea here 
being that, supposedly, there is no standard of correctness in matters of taste, but value is to 
be found in organising one's single taste to govern one's variety of diverse projects. While it 
is certainly true that Nietzsche's higher men are driven towards the completion of a unifying 
project (what Hurka rightly identifies Nietzsche to mean by 'style'), it is unlikely, and the 
above passage does not obviously demonstrate, that Nietzsche thinks that the goals one 
directs oneself towards do not matter at all.  
        In many places, Nietzsche indicates that tastes can be ranked in terms of their value. For 
example, he clearly thinks that many people have bad taste: “One must,” as Nietzsche says, 
“shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many” (BGE, §43). Nietzsche's continues: 
Books for all the world are always foul-smelling books: the smell of petty people clings to 
them. Where the people eat and drink, even where they venerate, it usually stinks. One should 
not go to church if one wants to breathe pure air (BGE, §30). 
 Thomas Hurka, "Games and the Good", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 107
Volumes, Vol. 80, (2006), p. 230.
 Hurka, (2006), pp. 230-231.108
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The use of the pejorative term 'rabble' [Pöbel] is repeated frequently to denote those of bad 
taste (BGE, §190, §224; EH, I, §4). 'Bad taste' must be clearly distinguished from having no 
taste, which the phrase is sometimes taken to mean. When Nietzsche refers to bad taste, he 
(also) refers to unworthy ends. For instance, after claiming that one must “shed the bad taste 
of wanting to agree with many”, he writes that "'Good' is no longer good when your 
neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there exist a 'common good'! The 
expression is a self-contradiction: what can be common has ever but little value" (BGE, §43). 
Here he suggests that if some end is considered good by the majority, then it is for this reason 
not worth much. But this is quite different from having no taste whatsoever. It is not that one 
has taste or one does not, but rather Nietzsche talks of those with "elevated taste" (BGE, §26), 
indicating that there must be other tastes from which certain individuals' can be elevated 
relative to. 
        The claim that Nietzsche is only interested in the formal properties of achievements and 
not their substantive content is problematic. However, I consider these issues in great detail in 
Chapter Four when I assess the nature and specific value of achievements. I postpone a 
detailed defence of these doubts, and Hurka's possible response, until then. 
        For the reasons given, I agree with the view that it is unlikely Nietzsche holds that there 
are no standards of correctness in matters of taste, and that therefore he would understand the 
tastes of 'higher men' to be only apparently better than  'sick' and 'inferior types'. The relevant 
point here is that it is difficult to read Nietzsche as accepting cases such as Andy as genuine 
instances of human greatness.  Because one can retain noble traits of character yet direct 109
oneself towards worthless goals, this indicates that the Pure Character View is insufficient to 
account for the concept of greatness. 
        Notice that this objection does not necessarily commit one to an interpretation of 
Nietzsche in which he holds a codifiable standard of taste (i.e. a strong account of precisely 
which substantive achievements are excellent). Rather, one might follow Nehamas in 
 Many similar cases to Andy can be thought up. Reginster gives the example of satisfying purely 109
formal properties by managing to eat twenty five pies in one sitting. See Reginster, (2006), p. 181. 
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sensibly holding that Nietzsche has no codifiable standard of correctness in this respect, but 
in addition, one may nonetheless hold that there are some things which Nietzsche fairly 
obviously does not think exhibit good taste or excellence (e.g. grass-counter cases).  
        One possible response that defenders of the Pure Character View could make at this 
point is to draw attention to the ambiguity regarding the content of 'character' that I flagged 
earlier. The two objections I raised against the Pure Character View in this section were that 
it allows for (i) cases where noble persons lack the ability to achieve their goals; (ii) cases 
where noble persons pursue worthless goals. However, if one were to adopt a broader 
conception of 'character' which includes not just executive virtues, but also skill and taste, 
then it might be thought that these objections dissolve.  
        On this view, greatness would be a matter of satisfying three necessary traits of 
character: it requires a virtuous, highly skilled individual with good taste. However, any 
combination of just two of these elements of character yield insufficient results for what 
Nietzsche understands as greatness: 
(a) A virtuous individual with good taste can constantly fail to meet his goals.  
(b) A virtuous and highly skilled individual can direct his efforts towards valueless goals.  
and, as I shall argue shortly, 
(c) A highly skilled individual with good taste can lack virtue. 
This is important because Robertson and Huddleston both suggest that having trivial goals or 
underachieving due to a lack of ability imply that Nietzsche must value not just character, but 
also particular achievements. However, by making a significant concession and expanding 
what 'character' includes, it might be said that this move is perhaps too quick. For one still 
might hold, as the Pure Character View does, that particular achievements are results of great 
character, but not what greatness consists in. It is important for me to refute this claim, for my 
thesis is that Nietzsche holds there to be a valuable relation between suffering-in-pursuit-of-
achievements and greatness.  
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        Nevertheless, I do not find this proposed response convincing. A conception of character 
that included all of the above components would be highly stipulative, and would require 
hard work to establish it's appropriate conceptual parameters. Such parameters are not 
discussed in detail by defenders of the Pure Character View, leaving the concept of character 
open to ad lib expansiveness. Moreover, although I disagree with Hurka's characterization of 
the way Nietzsche values achievements (i.e. in terms of purely formal properties), I agree that 
Nietzsche determines the content of greatness at least partly by the pursuit of and 
achievement of goals. The objections raised against the Pure Character View involved 
demonstrating that it allowed for either the lack of achievement or the achievement of 
worthless goals. I take this to show a commitment to the view that greatness is a matter of, at 
least partly, doing rather than merely being. In what follows, I expand upon Nietzsche's 
emphasis on the importance of achieving worthy goals. 
        For the reasons so far discussed, I conclude that the Pure Character View is implausible. 
Being great is not simply a case of being a certain way. This conclusion implies the need for 
another terminological distinction: between 'nobility' on the one hand and 'greatness' on the 
other. If, as I suggested, 'nobility' is used to refer to traits of character, and greatness is not 
just a matter of character, then the two concepts come apart. I now turn my attention to the 
question of just how important traits of character are to Nietzsche's understanding of 
greatness by considering a competing view. 
2. Great Achievements 
        An alternative interpretation of Nietzsche's understanding of human greatness might be 
that it is best measured solely in terms of particular achievements or 'external' conditions. For 
example writing great novels, constructing powerful empires, making scientific discoveries, 
and so forth. After all, it might be more plausible that while men like Shakespeare, Goethe 
and Beethoven may have certain character traits in common, their creative output is what 
really distinguishes them from the rest of humankind. Let us call this view (i.e. the view that 
greatness resides in purely excellent achievements, regardless of an individual's nature) the 
Pure Achievement View. 
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        One might find the Pure Achievement View to be, prima facie, an attractive position. It 
may be obvious, as Huddleston suggests, that to be great is to accomplish great things. But 
like the Pure Character View, the Pure Achievement View also has deeply problematic 
implications which render it implausible. Perhaps the most effective ammunition that those 
who want to attack the Pure Achievement View can utilize is in §287 of Beyond Good and 
Evil, where Nietzsche asks "...what allows one to recognise the noble human being?", and 
continues that: 
It is not actions that prove him — actions are always open to many interpretations, always 
inscrutable — nor is it "works". Among artists and scholars today one finds enough of those 
who betray by their works how they are impelled by a profound desire for what is noble; but 
just this need for what is noble is fundamentally different from the needs of the noble soul 
itself and actually the eloquent and dangerous mark of its lack. It is not the works, it is the 
faith that is decisive here, that determines the order of rank — to take up again an ancient 
religious formula in a new and more profound sense: some fundamental certainty that a noble 
soul has about itself, something that cannot be sought, nor found, nor perhaps lost. (BGE, 
§287) 
In this passage, Nietzsche appears to be explicitly denying that "actions" or "works", 
including what we might call achievements, are what constitute greatness. The reason being 
that valuable goals can sometimes be brought about skilfully, but for the wrong reasons: for 
example as a result of the desire for greatness, which stems from a lack, rather than 
producing works as a result of being great. 
        One of Nietzsche's own examples of valuable achievements brought about by figures he 
does not consider to be great is religious literature, more specifically: Christian religious texts 
in Germany. Nietzsche considers the "preacher" to be "the only one in Germany who knew 
what a syllable, what a word weighs, how a sentence strikes, rises, falls, runs, runs to an 
end..." (BGE, §247). In other words, in purely aesthetic terms, certain Christian texts are 
great works. However, Nietzsche certainly does not consider the Christian preacher to be a 
'higher man' or paradigm of greatness. 
        It is significant that Nietzsche does not simply take these achievements to be 
attributively good; that is, merely good as an instance of a Christian text, in the same way 
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that we could recognise someone to be a good serial killer. Rather, Nietzsche views these 
texts as valuable as achievements in themselves.  This can be seen in Nietzsche's praise of 110
The Lutheran Bible, referring to it as "the best German book hitherto", and that compared to 
it, "...almost everything else is merely 'literature'..." (BGE, §247). In spite of this, Luther as a 
person is the target of repeated vicious criticism from Nietzsche, who refers to him as a 
"peasant apostle" (A, §53), a "fanatic" (A, §54) who has "...all the vindictive instincts of a 
failed priest in him" (A, §61), and stands as an "antithetical type of the strong, emancipated 
spirit" (A, §54). 
        A second example of this nature might be found in Nietzsche's later opinion of Wagner. 
Regarding the opera Parsifal, Nietzsche wrote in a letter to Peter Gast: "on purely aesthetic 
grounds; has Wagner ever done anything better?", and goes on to praise its "clarity of musical 
description", the psychological effects of which are found "in Dante, but nowhere 
else" (Letter to Peter Gast, January, 1887, SL, pp. 259-260). However, while recognising the 
value of the work as an aesthetic achievement, Nietzsche also writes that it: 
...is a work of perfidy, of vindictiveness, of a secret attempt to poison the presuppositions of 
life — a bad work. The preaching of chastity remains an incitement to anti-nature: I despise 
everyone who does not experience Parsifal as an attempted assassination of basic ethics. 
(NCW, 'Wagner As The Apostle Of Chastity', §3; cf. GM, III, §1-4)  
While Nietzsche certainly thought that Wagner was significantly talented, even after their 
relationship broke down (e.g. BGE, §256), and that composing operas is a worthy goal to 
pursue, Nietzsche repudiates Wagner in virtue of, among other things, supposedly 
sympathising with Christianity, Schopenhauerian pessimism, and German nationalism: all of 
which, Nietzsche understands, are indicative of a 'sick' character in one way or another. 
        The proposition is then, that human greatness cannot reside solely in actions or specific 
achievements for Nietzsche, because sometimes they can be brought about by people who, 
perhaps on account on their motives, have a bad character: they lack 'nobility'. 
        It might be thought that BGE §287, which was just used as evidence against the Pure 
Achievement View, might be used to support the Pure Character View. After all, it explicitly 
 I am grateful to Simon Robertson for raising this issue.110
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denounces "works" in favour of the "faith" of the "noble soul". However, it is in no way 
obvious that Nietzsche is suggesting that "works" do not matter at all in determining human 
greatness. In other words, BGE §287 at best claims that noble character traits are necessary 
for greatness, but it does not claim that they are sufficient. Nietzsche's intention here, it 
seems, is simply to urge us to use caution when judging a person to be great purely by their 
effects, because actions, and the 'achievements' they result in, are "always open to 
interpretation": there is an epistemological constraint which prevents us from knowing how 
or why they were brought about. 
        In setting up the issue of what Nietzsche understands greatness to consist in, I have 
focused on two characters: the first, which I have just discussed in this section, achieves a 
variety of excellent things. The second has a number of virtues (e.g. self-reliance, endurance, 
pride, and so forth). The problem I raised with the first character was that some things can be 
achieved for reasons Nietzsche considers to be of disvalue (e.g. ressentiment). The problem I 
raised with the second character was that an individual could retain these virtues yet fail to 
achieve anything great, either because (i) they have no goals; (ii) they have noble goals but 
constantly fail to reach them (i.e. Huddleston's objection); (iii) they pursue trivial or 
worthless goals (i.e. Robertson's objection). 
        However, there is a third character to consider which is significant here, and that the 
commentators discussed so far have largely overlooked: those with "talents far beyond their 
genius" and "virtuosos through and through" (BGE, §256) who, for reasons beyond their 
control, are prevented from achieving. I shall now address this type of case with the hope of 
further improving the scope of the existing literature on Nietzsche's understanding of 
greatness. 
         Let us assume for the moment that Nietzsche holds that building an empire is a noble 
achievement. Now let's suppose that we have two figures: Alexander the Great and Alexander 
the Not-so-great. Both excel at their studies at the Macedonian military academy, each 
developing their capacity for intricate strategy and armed combat. Both Alexanders, let us 
imagine, are equally talented in the discipline of war and the politics of maintaining an 
empire. For the sake of argument, let us also assume they both have all the executive virtues 
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Nietzsche takes the great individual to exercise. Now suppose that whilst Alexander the Not-
so-great dies in 334 B.C., just before the campaign to conquer to the Persian Empire — a 
goal both Alexanders have a taste for, Alexander the Great sets out on the campaign and 
successfully achieves the of building his own empire. The relevant question is whether, on 
Nietzsche's view, both Alexanders are appropriate examples of human greatness due to their 
shared capacity for achievement, or whether only Alexander the Great qualifies on account of 
his actually carrying out his aim. 
        A second case that draws attention to this distinction is that of the English composer 
Thomas Linley the younger. Linley was a precocious composer and performer in the mid to 
late 18th century who subsequently became known as the 'English Mozart'. Unfortunately, 
however, Linley drowned in a lake in a boating accident at the age of 22, which was seen as a 
great tragedy for English music. Mozart himself later remarked that "Linley was a true 
genius" who "had he lived, would have been one of the greatest ornaments of the musical 
world".  Although there is a clear epistemological constraint on the issue of what one might 111
turn out to be, the relevant question is whether Linley would count as great in Nietzsche's 
view in virtue of the vast potential he had. 
        Examples of this nature call for a distinction between (a) a person having noble goals 
and the ability to achieve them, and (b) a person actually achieving these goals. It is, at least, 
not immediately obvious whether Nietzsche would accept (a)-type cases as genuine instances 
of greatness. 
        In cases where a would-be achiever is prevented from doing so due to circumstances 
beyond their control (e.g. death), Nietzsche explicitly recognises the need to account for luck 
as a variable which can affect how a person turns out. For instance, in Human, All Too 
Human, Nietzsche states that to understand the nature of great individuals, one must "gain an 
insight into their power and its origin", taking into account "what fortunate circumstances 
played a part" (HH, §164; emphasis mine). Much later, Nietzsche claims that "the higher the 
type of a man a man represents, the greater the improbability he will turn out well", and 
continues: "chance, the law of absurdity in the total economy of mankind, shows itself in its 
 Cited in Linda Kelly, Richard Brinsley Sheridan: A Life, (Faber & Faber, 2012), Ch. 8.111
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most dreadful shape in its destructive effect on higher men, whose conditions of life are 
subtle, manifold and difficult to comprehend" (BGE, §62). Even later in The Antichrist, 
Nietzsche expresses a similar point in emphasising that the higher type is a "lucky hit"; that 
across history and cultures, these individuals are "chance occurrences of great success" (A, 
§4; emphasis mine). Section 274 of Beyond Good and Evil is where Nietzsche most explicit 
about the importance of luck with relevance to the emergence of higher men: 
It requires luck and much that is incalculable if a higher human being in whom there slumbers 
the solution of a problem is to act — 'break out' one might say — at the right time. Usually it 
does not happen, and in every corner of the earth there are people waiting who hardly know to 
what extent they are waiting but even less that they are waiting in vain. Sometimes the 
awakening call, that chance event which gives 'permission' to act, comes but too late — when 
the best part of youth and the strength to act has already been used up in sitting still; and how 
many a man has discovered to his horror when he 'rose up' that his limbs had gone to sleep 
and his spirit was already too heavy! 'It is too late' — he has said to himself, having lost faith 
in himself and henceforth for ever useless (BGE, §274). 
There are a number of intertwined points being made in this passage, but the significant point 
that I want to draw attention to is that Nietzsche appears to credit luck with determining, at 
least some of the time, whether a person is merely potentially great or actually great.  112
Although Nietzsche draws this distinction, indicating that the vast majority are 'too late' to act 
on opportunities to achieve great things, there is nonetheless ambiguity regarding the status 
of potential achievers. The first line refers to them as 'higher human beings', yet the tone of 
the passages seems to suggest regret that the "strength to act has already been used up". 
        However, Nietzsche continues: 
Could it be that, in the realm of genius, 'Raphael without hands' is, taking the phrase in its 
widest sense, not the exception but the rule? — Perhaps genius is not so very rare: perhaps 
what is rare is the five hundred hands needed to tyrannize over the kairos, 'the right time' — 
to take chance by the forelock! (BGE, §274) 
The phrase 'Raphael without hands' is used by a character in the 18th century play Emilia 
Galotti by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and is intended to indicate the incompleteness of 
genius in a person: that one might lack the means by which one's genius would come to be 
 I discuss the role of luck in the context of achievement in detail in the following Chapter Four.112
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realized. For example, if Raphael (understood to be a paradigm of human genius) were to 
have lost his hands — the very instruments needed for painting — his capacity for creativity 
would be severely limited. This passage might be taken as evidence that Nietzsche would 
endorse the mere potential to achieve worthy goals as a genuine instance of greatness, for the 
suggestion appears to be that 'genius' or the capacity for achievement may be possessed by 
many, but luck sees to it that only few ever realize it. 
        But this strategy would fail to take into consideration the distinction between significant 
talent and 'nobility' that I presented earlier. The above passage suggests that there is 
something admirable in the genius who lacks the means of achieving his goals, namely his 
talent, but it is not clear that Nietzsche associates him with greatness as understood in his 
frequent examples: Shakespeare, Beethoven, Cesare Borgia, and so forth. Though these 
individuals all certainly exhibited an extraordinary talent and skill in their respective fields, 
Nietzsche does not venerate them purely in virtue of this property. As we saw above, one can 
be talented and lack good taste, or talented and lack noble character. Therefore, this passage 
does not necessarily support the thesis that Nietzsche endorses (a)-type cases (e.g. Alexander 
the Not-so-great) as great individuals. 
        There may in fact be reason for defending the opposing thesis: that Nietzsche holds that 
greatness is manifested by individuals who exercise certain qualities of character and by their 
actual worthy achievements. Nietzsche repeatedly expresses approval of the power of lasting 
influence and the leaving of one's mark in history through one's achievements. He speaks of 
the man who can "extend his will across great stretches of his life" (WP, §962; KSA, 1885, 
34[96]) and who forms a part of a new "caste" who will rule Europe with "a long, terrible will 
of its own that would be able to cast its goals millennia hence" (BGE, §208), and "those 
artists of violence and organisers who build states" (GM, II, §18). 
        But does Nietzsche view the extent of one's achievements as at least part of what 
greatness consists in, or merely an effect of greatness? Let us again consider Nietzsche's 
paradigms of greatness: Napoleon, Shakespeare, Cesare Borgia, Julius Caesar, Beethoven, 
and so forth. All of these individuals achieved various ends that resonated throughout history, 
initiated significant cultural shifts, attracted disciples and imitators, and altered international 
borders. At times, Nietzsche appears to endorse the view that the value of individuals' 
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achievements is at least partly in virtue of these effects. This is suggested at the start of the 
fourth essay of Untimely Meditations when he writes: "For an event to possess greatness two 
things must come together: greatness of spirit in those who accomplish it and greatness of 
spirit in those who experience it" (UM, IV, §1). In other words, a virtuous persons' acts must 
influence others to at least some degree to count as truly great. This is perhaps most clearly 
stated when Nietzsche concludes that "the individual deed of a man great in himself lacks 
greatness if it is brief and without resonance or effect" (UM, IV, §1).  113
        On the contrary, it might be claimed in response that Nietzsche himself is a 
counterexample to this interpretation. On the one hand, by the time he wrote Ecce Homo in 
1888, Nietzsche had not attracted a significant readership, let alone had any extended 'effect 
on history'. But on the other hand, Nietzsche certainly regarded himself as great. This 
suggestion is that these two points imply that having an impact in the world is not a necessary 
condition of greatness. However, while Nietzsche's work did not have a profound impact 
during his active years, he undoubtedly believed that it would have a profound impact in the 
immediate future. For instance, he famously writes: 
I know my fate. One day there will be associated with my name the recollection of something 
frightful — of a crisis like no other before on earth, of the profoundest collision of 
conscience, of a decision evoked against everything that until then had been believed in, 
demanded, sacrificed. I am not a man I am dynamite. (EH, V, §1)   
Of course, Nietzsche's work which had been completed by that time did go on to have far-
reaching effects in the world. Nonetheless, if one holds that greatness is conditioned upon 
one's effects in the world, but those effects take place long after the achievements that causes 
them, one runs the risk of yielding strange results. We would have to say that even though 
Nietzsche completed his various books, he did not manifest greatness until they had a 
significant impact in history a number of years later. On this view, there is a 'waiting period' 
of sorts between an intrinsic feature of greatness (the achievement) and an apparent extrinsic 
feature of greatness (its impact), with one only qualifying as great when all of these 
 I am inclined to agree with this interpretation of Nietzsche, yet it is worth noting that other 113
passages may appear to suggest a change in his mind. See BGE §285. 
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conditions have been met. If one wants to avoid this position, a further distinction must be 
made with regard to one's actual achievements: that even when one's goals are realized, 
greatness is conditioned upon those achievements having a profound extent in the present, or 
at some point in the future. 
        However, there is an epistemological constraint regarding this qualification. It is often 
difficult to know whether one's achievements will at some point have far-reaching effects in 
the world. Many artists, philosophers, poets and playwrights were little appreciated in their 
time, yet turned out to be tremendously influential, sometimes hundreds of years down the 
line. Another question would be if this impact or recognition is required to persist, for it 
might be that one's achievements are celebrated in a particular time yet, for whatever reason, 
are forgotten entirely in years to come. Does one cease to be great in such cases? Moreover, 
presumably (and as UM, IV, §1 appears to suggest) Nietzsche must have in mind the 
recognition of great achievements by suitable people, and not merely 'the rabble'. That 
Beethoven's scores are enjoyed by similarly skilled contemporary composers and musicians 
is what counts, and not the recognition of those who lack "greatness of spirit" (UM, IV, §1). 
        Nietzsche does, at least in one place, explicitly recognise the relevance of temporality, 
and claims that great achievements are often not experienced or appreciated by the 
contemporary society or culture in which they take place. He writes:  
The greatest events and thoughts — but the greatest thoughts are the greatest events — are 
comprehended last: the generations which are their contemporaries do not experience such 
events — they live past them.  What happens here is similar to what happens in the realm of 
the stars. The light of the furthest stars comes to men last; and before it has arrived man 
denies that there are — stars there. 'How many centuries does a spirit need to be 
comprehended?' — that too is a standard, with that too there is created an order of rank and 
etiquette such as is needed: for spirit and star (BGE §285) 
This interesting passage may be in tension with UM, IV, §1 that I drew upon earlier, in the 
sense that it does not claim that events are only great once they have been recognised. Rather, 
it refers to great events prior to recognition. If events, or achievements, can be considered 
great prior to any appreciation of them, then it may be that Nietzsche considers 'effects in 
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history' of these events later down the line as consequences of greatness rather than 
conditions. This may indicate a change in Nietzsche's mind on the issue at some point 
between 1876 and 1886. 
        Huddleston is sympathetic to the view that greatness for Nietzsche is just as much a 
matter of this extrinsic features as it is of the intrinsic features described so far. He recognises 
that one may retain noble traits of character that contribute to greatness, and that one may 
have accomplished a number of worthy goals that Nietzsche typically associates with 
greatness, but, he writes: "being great also requires being recognized by others as having 
these features or having done these things that redound to greatness".   114
        On the one hand, it is clear that Nietzsche draws some relation between the greatness of 
individuals and the impact they have in human history. However, the textual evidence to 
suggest that Nietzsche considers it a necessary condition of greatness is thin. The probable 
explanation is that Nietzsche did not have a worked out 'theory' of greatness to that extent. 
For this reason, I do not endorse, but remain open to, the status of this particular extrinsic 
property as a necessary condition of greatness.  115
        Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that Nietzsche certainly cannot be committed 
to the claim that the extent of one's achievements is a sufficient condition for greatness, only 
that it can be at best a necessary condition. The reason for this is that Nietzsche of course 
recognises that the slave revolt in values had widespread effects on human civilisation. Yet, 
while he acknowledges their cunning [List], he does not think its instigators great, nor the 
aims of the revolt anything to be celebrated. One particular example is Paul the Apostle, who, 
although he had a tremendous impact upon the world in Nietzsche's view, is referred to as a 
"hate-obsessed false coiner" and "dysangelist" (A, §42) that is characterized by "rabbinical 
insolence" (A, §41). On the other hand, compare this to Nietzsche's view of Napoleon. His 
achievements certainly had far reaching implications in history, but with him "the ideal of the 
ancients itself emerged in flesh and blood and with unheard-of splendour" (GM, I, §16). 
 Huddleston, (2012), p. 42.114
 Another I consider in the next chapter is that of rarity value.115
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Nietzsche refers to him as the "incarnation" of "the noble ideal as such" (GM, I, §16).  116
Consequently, the value of the extent of an achievement is conditional, at least partly, upon 
the achiever having a noble character, and the content of the goal. 
3. The Compound View 
We have so far seen that the Pure Character View and the Pure Achievement View are both 
insufficient for what Nietzsche understands greatness to consist in. The implication then, is 
that a compound view, where both character traits and achievements must be necessary 
components of greatness, is appropriate. The five potential interpretations of Nietzsche's 
position on the table up to this point are: 
(1) Greatness solely resides in individuals; such individuals are great solely in virtue 
of exercising certain qualities of character, irrespective of the content of the goals 
they pursue (the Pure Character View). 
(2) Greatness solely resides in excellent achievements; individuals who achieve these 
are mere channels of greatness, not themselves great (the Pure Achievement View). 
(3) Greatness resides in individuals who exercise certain qualities of character and 
have the capacity for worthy achievements. 
(4) Greatness is manifested by individuals who exercise certain qualities of character 
and by their actual worthy achievements. 
 It is worth noting that it could be said Nietzsche's view of Napoleon is at times ambiguous. For 116
example, in the same passage, Nietzsche refers to him as a "synthesis of the inhuman and the 
superhuman..." (GM, I, §16). This may indicate an understanding of Napoleon as a noble individual 
whom nonetheless directs his activities towards goals which Nietzsche finds appalling, or, at the 
very least, unworthy of admiration. I am unsure as to whether this passage can support such a 
claim on its own.
  83
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
(5) Greatness is manifested by individuals who exercise certain qualities of character 
and by their actual worthy achievements, which must have a significant impact in the 
world. 
        I have argued that (1) and (2) are implausible as readings of Nietzsche. I have also 
argued that Nietzsche likely rejects (3) in favour of (4), which I accept as the most plausible 
reading.  I reserve from commitment to (5) on the grounds of a lack of consistent textual 117
support, but leave the possibility for a defence of the view open. Since the purpose of my 
thesis is to explore the value that suffering experienced in the pursuit of one's goal  has in 
relation to greatness, it is only necessary that I show Nietzsche to accept that greatness 
resides at least partly in achievement. 
        It might be said that the view that greatness is a matter of both character and 
achievement is uncontroversial, for perhaps it is implausible to suppose that one's character 
can be assessed independently of expression of it through one's actions or deeds.  For how 118
could one provide evidence of one's character without observing their actions deeds? 
However, there are two points to be made in response. 
        Firstly, this chapter has investigated Nietzsche's evaluative position. If it is true that one 
cannot comprehend character without its manifestation in achievement, the question still 
remains whether individuals are great purely in virtue of their character, or if their substantive 
achievements have independent value. In other words, it would remain open whether, on 
Nietzsche's view, character traits or achievements are merely enabling conditions for 
greatness (X enables Y, which has value) or contributors to greatness (X contributes value to 
Y). I have argued for the latter here. 
 Though, my project is compatible with those inclined to defend (2).117
 This claim might be made by defenders of interpretations of Nietzsche as an 'expressivist' about 118
agency, according to which (very generally), what an agent is simply is (or is revealed by) what he 
or she does. In other words, one's deeds are inexplicably linked to, or 'express', one's character. 
Proponents of this view include Robert Pippin, "Lightning and Flash, Agent and Deed" in Critical 
Essays on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Christina Davis Acampora, (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006), pp. 131-146; David Owen, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality, (Acumen Press, 
2007); Aaron Ridley, "Nietzsche's Intention: What  the Sovereign Individual Promises" in Nietzsche, 
Self and Agency, eds. Ken Gemes and Simon May, (OUP, 2008).
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        Secondly, my interest is in a particular kind of action or deed: those worthy of 
admiration, or what are appropriately designated as 'achievements'. As I have argued in 
section 1, many character traits Nietzsche values can be expressed through actions or deeds 
which he would not count as worthy achievements. This indicates that Nietzsche considers 
the two as conceptually distinct. Consequently, my conclusion that Nietzsche regards 
individuals as great in virtue of both is not undermined. 
        However, there are two important additional features of greatness that I have not 
mentioned so far. The reason I have delayed discussion of them until now is that they are 
contentious for any of the five interpretations outlined above. Firstly, I have assumed up to 
this point that greatness is a threshold notion: either one is great or one is not (with perhaps 
some borderline cases). On this view, there is a dividing line regarding the degree to which 
one satisfies the conditions of achievement and character, beyond which one counts as great 
and within one counts as not great. But even so, the properties of greatness that I have argued 
Nietzsche identifies admit of degree. For instance, some may have a greater degree of organic 
unity among their drives, or satisfy their will to power more than others that count as 'great'. 
Moreover, some may have further reaching achievements. As result, it seems some can in 
principle be greater than others, or as Janaway puts it, greatness "is not an all-or-nothing 
affair".  119
        A second point to consider is that it is plausible that individuals can potentially lose the 
property of greatness over time: that one could cease to count as great in Nietzsche's view. 
Nietzsche suggests one possible route to this in his account of human drives, which as we 
saw in section 1 he understands to be necessary for greatness when diverse yet strong and 
unified. Nietzsche writes in Daybreak that drives can "wither away like a plant without 
rain" (D, §119; BGE, §274) if they are not regularly nourished. For example, after a certain 
time without satisfying a creative drive to paint, that drive in an artist may well "grow 
faint" (D, §119). 
 Janaway, (2012), p. 191.119
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        Janaway suggests that this passage from Daybreak is evidence that Nietzsche believes a 
drive can disappear from the agent completely (though not necessarily wilfully).  An 120
alternative view, suggested by Katsafanas, is that a drive can never completely leave an 
agent, rather its affect upon them can just be depleted to a degree to which it no longer 
influences them.  Whether Janaway's stronger claim or Katsafanas' weaker claim is more 121
plausible is an interesting question, but it is not directly relevant for my purposes here. Either 
view can recognise that greatness requires strong, diverse and unified drives. The relevant 
point being that if Nietzsche holds both: 
(1) Greatness necessarily requires drives be strong, diverse and unified. 
(2) Drives can fade over time to the extent that they don't influence an agent. 
Then in principle: 
(C) One can have the property of greatness at one time t and not at another u. 
One example that captures this line of thought is that of the character Robert Baratheon from 
the fantasy epic A Song of Ice and Fire. At one point, Robert was considered a renowned and 
fearsome warrior. He had diverse but strong tastes in feasting, romance, in matters of war, 
and took pleasure in challenges. However, after winning the crown and having no more 
enemies to battle, Robert became complacent and immersed himself in drink and excessive 
feasting. As a result, he gained a large amount of weight, and his appetite for contest and 
achievement diminished. In Nietzschean terms, at least some of Robert's drives diminished in 
strength while a small number of others began to dominate unchecked and disjointed. 
        Nietzsche makes another important claim which may lend support to this idea of one's 
having the property of greatness at one time and not another. In §273 of Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche explicitly distinguishes between the disposition towards others of a person 
striving for greatness, and one already great. Regarding the former, he writes that "a human 
 Janaway, (2012), p. 190.120
 Katsafanas, The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious, (Oxford 121
University Press, 2016), p. 100.
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being who strives for something great considers everyone he meets on his way either as a 
means or as a delay or obstacle — or as a temporary resting place" (BGE, §273; cf. UM, III, 
§6). In contrast, he continues: "The lofty goodness towards his fellow men which is proper to 
him becomes possible only when he has reached his height and he rules" (BGE, §273). The 
idea here being that a great individual, one who has complete control and an abundance of 
power to reach his ends, has no need for treating others instrumentally or perhaps callously. 
Rather, he is generous and courteous on account of his lack of dependence on anyone. As 
Nietzsche writes later in The Antichrist: "when an exceptional human being handles the 
mediocre more gently than he does himself or his equals, this is not mere politeness of the 
heart — it is simply his duty..." (A, §57).  122
        In making this distinction between the need for cold determination in striving for 
greatness, and the kindness and graciousness of the already great individual, Nietzsche 
emphasises a feature of the developmental dimension of greatness. This dimension is 
additionally relevant to Nietzsche's drawing of attention to the importance of luck (discussed 
above) as a significant condition for the cultivation of great individuals. If "fortunate 
circumstances" (HH, §164) can lead to the emergence and development of a great individual 
in realizing their potential excellence, then it seems perfectly plausible to allow for the 
opposite to occur: that a stroke of bad luck or misfortune could, in some cases at least, 
deprive a person of the property of greatness at a later point in their life. With these distinct 
types of cases in mind, we can perceive more sharply Nietzsche's understanding of the 
contingency of possessing greatness as a property. 
 In a note one year earlier, Nietzsche appears to perhaps suggest a different view. The already 122
"great man", he writes, wants "no 'sympathetic' heart, but servants, tools; in his intercourse with 
men he is always intent on making something out of them" (WP, §962; KSA, 1885, 34[96]). Leiter 
(2002, p. 117) quotes this passage, and from only the first half of BGE, §273, to support the view 
that treating others instrumentally is a necessary character trait of the great individual. As I discuss 
above, the second half of BGE, §273 importantly casts doubt on whether the isolated notebook 
entry can serve the purpose Leiter intends. Nonetheless it is of interest that Nietzsche may have 
altered his view.
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Conclusion 
        This chapter has not sought to discuss every controversy surrounding the concept of 
greatness, but it has (I hope) provided clarity on at least three ambiguities and assumptions 
regarding its criteria. Firstly, and most central to this chapter, I distinguished extraordinary 
talent, exquisite taste, vast achievement, and noble character traits, and considered their 
relevance to greatness, resulting in a Nietzschean understanding of the concept as extremely 
exclusive, hence his emphasis on the rare and exceptional. Secondly, I raised the question of 
whether greatness is a matter of actually instantiating these properties, or merely having the 
potential to achieve them. I concluded by suggesting that greatness is a matter for actually 
having these properties. Thirdly, I considered whether Nietzsche considers extrinsic 
conditions, such as reception of works or effects in history, as necessary for greatness. This 
question is significant, yet it has received relatively little direct attention in the secondary 
literature. I have suggested that these conditions do, at least at one stage of Nietzsche's 
thought, seem to make some difference. Ultimately however, I remain open on this important 
issue given the lack of consistent and substantial textual support. 
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Chapter Three:  
Values & Valuation 
        Now that we have an understanding of (a) what Nietzsche understands greatness to 
consist in, in this section I shall discuss (b) what type of value Nietzsche thinks it bears. I 
argue that Nietzsche takes greatness to be valuable 'for its own sake', but that this should be 
distinguished from 'intrinsic' value. I distinguish the two concepts by drawing upon 
contemporary debates in axiology regarding notions of intrinsic and extrinsic value. I use this 
as a platform to then discuss different forms of the latter in order to expand the philosophical 
resources needed to fully explain Nietzschean conceptions of value. Finally, I explore the 
notion of value more generally, and Nietzsche's understanding of it, with a conceptual 
analysis. 
1. The Value of Greatness 
        At the beginning of the previous chapter I claimed it to be uncontroversial that Nietzsche 
believes human greatness to be an appropriately valuable goal, at least for certain types of 
people. We are now in a position to explicate this claim: what does the "highest splendour 
possible to the type man" (GM, preface: 6) amount to? Nietzsche consistently draws a sharp 
distinction between the value of great individuals' lives and the value of the lives of the 
majority, or 'the herd'. He makes no secret of his strident elitism: 
How can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? 
How can it be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and 
most valuable exemplars, and not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken 
individually, are the least valuable exemplars (UM, III, §6) 
This famous passage makes a number of independent points, but the claim relevant to my 
investigation is the contrast Nietzsche clearly draws between the "most valuable 
  89
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
exemplars"—i.e. great individuals—and the "least valuable exemplars"—i.e. the common 
herd.  Nietzsche draws this contrast again in his later works: 123
The well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of 
value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naiveté of English 
biologists” (GM I, §17) 
Basic error: to place the goal in the herd and not in single individuals! The herd is a means, 
no more! (WP, §766; KSA, 1886, 5[108]) 
It is clear that the "single individuals" and the "few" being referred to in these passages are 
the types of figures of greatness discussed in the previous chapter. Nietzsche frequently 
describes these great individuals in terms of their being "rare" [selten] and an 
"exception" [Ausnahme] (e.g. UM, III, §6; GS, §3, §55; BGE , §43, §62; GM, III, §14, and 
passim), while he reserves the pejoratives: "herd" [Heerde]; "common" [gemeinsam]; 
"mediocre" [mittelmässig], for the contrasting majority: the "rabble" [Pöbel].  Nietzsche 124
clearly values greatness, but to what extent? 
1.1. Greatness as Having 'Intrinsic Value' 
        One traditional view, defended by Leiter, is that Nietzsche conceives of human greatness 
to have what he calls 'intrinsic value': "what seems to have intrinsic value for Nietzsche is 
human excellence or human greatness".  There are two issues to flag here. Firstly, Leiter's 125
claim can be read in different ways that have varying strength: 
(1) Human greatness is the only thing with intrinsic value; everything else is merely a 
means to this end. 
 It is significant that Nietzsche claims that the least valuable are only so "taken individually", for 123
the implication is that collectively the herd has some important value in virtue of its role as part of 
Nietzsche's conception of culture [Kultur / Cultur]. I will not have time to address this important 
theme here, but an excellent discussion of the importance of the herd and its relation to great 
individuals can be found in Huddleston, (2012), esp. Ch. 1-3; (2014).
 I discuss the significance of rarity later in this chapter: specifically, whether Nietzsche at least 124
partly values great individuals in virtue of their rarity, or only as an indicator of these individuals 
instantiating other valuable features.
 Leiter, (2002), p. 128.125
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(2) Human greatness is one intrinsic value among others. 
It is unclear whether Leiter is committed to the much stronger claim (1), but given the aims 
of this thesis, I only have to commit to interpreting Nietzsche to defend the weaker claim (2). 
The second issue, and more significant for my purposes here, is that there are radically 
different conceptions of 'intrinsic value' employed by philosophers. It is crucial (as will 
become apparent) to be clear about what precisely is being referred to if Nietzsche's claims 
about value are to be properly understood. 
        In a footnote, Leiter presents what he means by 'intrinsic value' in the following way: 
What has intrinsic value has value in-itself; what has extrinsic value has value only as a 
means to something else (e.g. something with intrinsic value).  126
  
There are three potential problems with Leiter's claim: 
(1) What has value "in-itself" is vague and needs clarification. This point is 
particularly pertinent given Nietzsche's complex terminology regarding the 
types of value he rejects. 
(2) Contrasting what has value "in-itself" (properly understood) with what has 
value "as a means" involves a category mistake. Strictly, these terms apply to 
different concepts. 
(3) That extrinsic value should be understood as that which has value "only as 
a means" is deeply problematic, for there are numerous forms of extrinsic 
value. 
The truth of point (3) is crucial for my thesis. This is because I am investigating which types 
of value Nietzsche can be said to attribute suffering. If it turns out there is only intrinsic value 
and instrumental value, the project involves little controversy. Points (1) and (2) are likely 
issues of terminology rather than conceptual disagreement. However, in attempting to draw 
upon contemporary debates in value theory in order to clarify Nietzsche's position, it is 
 Leiter, (2002), p. 129.126
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important to spend some time distinguishing these concepts to avoid confusion. I shall 
address each point consecutively in an attempt to elucidate what Leiter means by 'intrinsic 
value', and if this concept is appropriately attributed to Nietzsche's understanding of the value 
of human greatness. 
        The traditional account of intrinsic value is associated with G.E. Moore. It can be 
captured in two claims. Firstly, Moore claims that something's intrinsic value can depend 
only on its intrinsic properties: 
...the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely 
on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.  127
A common example of an intrinsic (or 'non-relational') property would be the property of 
being square. This is a property which something possess 'in-itself', absent of any conditions 
or contexts. On the contrary, an example of an extrinsic (or 'relational') property would be the 
property of being feared; the thing possessing the property relies on something outside itself 
to derive it from (in this case, the attitudes of others). 
        From his first claim, Moore assumed a second claim to follow: that intrinsic value 
cannot be affected by changes in context, its value must be the same wherever it appears, as 
long as its bearer's intrinsic properties remain constant. In other words, what has intrinsic 
value has essential or unconditional value, according to Moore. He writes: 
it is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to possess that kind of value at one 
time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to possess it at another; and equally impossible 
for it to possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and to possess it 
in a different degree at another, or in a different set.  128
Nietzsche explicitly rejects both of these claims as indicative of what he pejoratively calls 
"metaphysical value" (GM, III, §24) and a "typical prejudice by which the metaphysicians of 
 G.E. Moore, "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" in his Philosophical Studies, (London: Routledge 127
& Kegan Paul, 1922) p. 260.
 Moore, (1922), pp. 260-261.128
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all ages can be recognised" (BGE, §2). I shall not review all of his arguments here, but 
Nietzsche repeatedly repudiates the first claim that Moore later endorsed: that intrinsic value 
is wholly dependent on a thing's intrinsic properties. For instance, in two passages from the 
1880's, Nietzsche makes this rejection explicit: 
There is nothing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in itself, but that there 
are states of soul in which we impose such words upon things external to and within us (D, 
§210) 
Whatever has value in our world does not have value in itself, according to its nature—
nature is always value-less:—but has been given value at some time...(GS, §301) 
Further evidence of Nietzsche's rejection of this claim can be found in the Part One of 
Beyond Good and Evil, where he specifically attacks this very idea that:  
...the things of the highest value must have another origin of their own — they cannot be 
derivable from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, mean little world... (BGE, §2)  
Nietzsche attributes a form of this view to Plato, among others, and claims that "the worst, 
the most wearisomely protracted and most dangerous of all errors" is "Plato's invention of 
pure spirit and the good in itself" (BGE, Preface). 
        It is worth noting that in two later works, Nietzsche makes claims that may appear to be 
in tension with this interpretation. He uses the term 'natural value' [Natur-Werth], which 
appears in Twilight of the Idols: "The natural value of egoism" (TI, 'Skirmishes', §33), as well 
as in two sections of The Antichrist: 
On a soil falsified in this way, where all nature, all natural value, all reality, had the 
profoundest instincts of the ruling class against it, there arose Christianity (A, §27) 
All the concepts of the church are recognised for what they are: the most malicious false-
coinage there is for the purpose of disvaluing nature and natural values. (A, §38) 
Nietzsche here is attacking Christianity on the grounds that it not only undermines an 
affirmation of this world—the only reality—by postulating an imaginary and non-natural 
realm, but it is hostile to life: "the priest disvalues, dissanctifies nature: it is only at the price 
of this that he exists at all" (A, §26). But it is ambiguous what Nietzsche means by Natur-
Werth in these passages.  
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        Tamsin Shaw, in light of Nietzsche's claims about "natural value", argues that "the 
primary objects of value for Nietzsche...seem to be held to be valuable in themselves".  To 129
support this claim, she points to the same passage, in which Nietzsche later states that in the 
Christian worldview:  "everything valuable in itself, becomes utterly valueless, inimical to 
value" (A, §26). This phrase—"was seinen Werth in sich hat"—certainly appears to be in 
tension with Nietzsche's apparent earlier rejection of it in the passages above. Shaw translates 
the phrase as "intrinsically valuable", which would amplify the tension and undermine my 
interpretation. 
        There are two ways one might reconcile Nietzsche's seemingly contradictory claims. 
The first option is to concede that Nietzsche in fact changes his mind about the status of 
value: that from Twilight of the Idols onwards, he holds that there are things which are 
valuable 'in themselves', or due to their intrinsic properties, and these are 'natural values'. A 
second option would be to claim that Nietzsche must mean something else by 'natural value', 
and that §26 of The Antichrist is not representative of the view Shaw appears to attribute to 
him. 
        Several reasons exist in favour of the latter move. Firstly, if Nietzsche did change his 
mind on this issue, and understood 'natural values' to be things which are valuable in virtue of 
their intrinsic properties, then it would be a very radical change given his repeated earlier 
claims that "nature is always value-less" (GS, §301; cf. D, §38; §210). With this in mind, one 
would expect Nietzsche to dedicate significant attention to the claim. However, Shaw draws 
upon very few passages to defend her interpretation. A further reason to push against the 
reading of Nietzsche Shaw appears to defend is that passages from the Nachlass which 
Nietzsche wrote down in 1888—the same year as The Antichrist and Twilight of the Idols—
suggest that he never gave up on his rejection of intrinsic value. For instance, he notes that 
the Sophists "postulated the first truth" that instances of a "good-in-itself do not exist" (WP, 
§428; KSA, 1888, 14[115]). 
 Tamsin Shaw, Nietzsche's Political Scepticism, (Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 122.129
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        For these reasons, 'natural value' cannot plausibly be taken to support an interpretation 
of Nietzsche in which he regards something's intrinsic value to be wholly dependent upon its 
intrinsic properties. As a result, Nietzsche must be using the phrase 'natural value' in a 
different way to that which Shaw proposes. I will not have time to discuss what this may be 
here,  but it is sufficient for my purposes merely to distance it from the Moorean conception 130
of intrinsic value under consideration. 
        Nietzsche also rejects the second component of the Moorean conception of intrinsic 
value: that what has intrinsic value is valuable unconditionally. The value of X is 
unconditional where it does not depend on the context in which X occurs. For example, one 
might suppose, contra Kant,  that happiness's being good for me does not depend on the 131
value of its object or the context in which it occurs.  132
        Nietzsche expresses his rejection of this view—"the worst of tastes, the taste for the 
unconditional" (BGE, §31)—explicitly in Beyond Good and Evil. He claims that "happy 
distrust, pleasure in mockery are signs of health: everything unconditional belongs in 
pathology" (BGE, §154). Nietzsche here appears to be presenting deliberately provocative 
examples of states in which something may have negative value in one context but is of 
positive value in another. 'Pleasure-in-mockery' is cited, explicitly as an example opposed to 
 I suggest that the term is plausibly interpreted in light of a particular criticism of Christian 130
morality that Nietzsche repeatedly makes: that it is 'anti-natural' or 'anti-nature' [Widernatur]. This 
particular term, Widernatur, first appears in 1887 in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, 
and occurs more than thirty times afterwards. Nietzsche suggests that, in some way, Christian 
morality is hostile to what is natural, and he objects to it precisely on these grounds: "it is the lack 
of nature, it is the utterly ghastly fact that anti-nature itself has received the highest honours as 
morality" (EH, XIV, §7; cf. GM, II, §22). This is not to say that Nietzsche endorses the claim that 
'everything that is natural is valuable', but rather that 'whatever is valuable is natural'. Natur-
Werth, I claim, is best understood as a rejection of the 'other-worldly'. 
 Kant famously used happiness as an example of a conditional value: happiness is only good when 131
it is deserved - it is conditional upon virtue. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, (Prometheus Books, 1988), Section One.
 Both Ridley and Leiter identify another form of what they call 'unconditional value' which 132
Nietzsche rejects: what is "valuable no matter what". This includes: (1) if a value cannot be 
trumped any other; (2) it is not dependent on contingent facts; (3) it is not dependent on their 
being valuing beings. See Aaron Ridley, "Nietzsche and the Re-Evaluation of Values", Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 105, (2005), p. 157; Leiter, (2002), p. 129. Here I am only concerned with 
the sense of unconditional that denotes an insensitivity to context and relational features.
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the concept of unconditional value. It suggests mockery, something traditionally understood 
as bad, might for Nietzsche and his audience become good in some contexts. 
        Nietzsche more directly addresses the issue in section two of the same work: 
It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and honoured things 
resides precisely in their being artfully related, knotted and crocheted to these wicked, 
apparently antithetical things, perhaps even in their being essentially identical with them 
(BGE, §2) 
This passage is telling. Firstly, the value of good states of affairs or objects is suggested by 
Nietzsche to be constituted by their relation to "apparently antithetical" (emphasis mine) 
other states of affairs or objects. Here, Nietzsche is claiming that negative values are only 
'apparently' negative in that when they enter relations with certain other values, they gain 
value and hence, are no longer negative. He then suggests that negative values are perhaps 
"essentially identical" with positive values, further distancing his theory of value from the 
Moorean conception in which intrinsic value does not vary depending on circumstance. 
        So if Nietzsche rejects the traditional conception of intrinsic value, he must have 
something else in mind when he refers to human greatness as the "highest value". To be clear, 
I do not suggest that Leiter attributes something like the Moorean conception of intrinsic 
value to Nietzsche, rather that his terminology is potentially confusing given Nietzsche's own 
imprecise axiological framework. By referring to 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' value, Leiter runs 
the risk of appearing to conflate the grounding of value with how things are valued. That is to 
say, it confuses the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction with the means/end distinction. 
        The need to identify this conceptual difference has been famously emphasised by 
Christine Korsgaard in her influential 1983 paper "Two Distinctions in Goodness". In this 
paper, she calls attention to the inadequacy of the traditional contrast between intrinsic value 
and instrumental value. She presents the issue in the following way: 
One is the distinction made between things valued for their sakes and things valued for the 
sake of something else — between ends and means, or final and instrumental goods. The 
other is the distinction between things which have their value in themselves and things which 
derive their value from some other source: intrinsically good things versus extrinsically good 
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things. Intrinsic and instrumental good should not be treated as correlatives, because they 
belong to two different distinctions.  133
The proposal is that there is a distinction to do with (1) "things which have their value" in 
some way on the one hand; and a distinction to do with (2) "things valued" in some way on 
the other. While (1) concerns the grounding of something's value by focusing on its 
properties, (2) concerns the way we value things. Korsgaard's suggestion then, is that the 
term 'intrinsic value' is used appropriately only when it refers to the value something has on 
account of (or when it 'supervenes on') its intrinsic or non-relational properties, whereas 
something 'valuable for its own sake' is appropriate to describe the way we value something 
as an end, or its final value. 
        To disentangle the terminology clearly, Korsgaard's suggestion is the following: 
Ways things have value:     Intrinsic value = the value a thing has in itself (in virtue of  
                                                                       its intrinsic properties). 
                                                        Extrinsic value = the value a thing has derivatively (in  
                                                                                     virtue of its relational properties). 
             Ways we value things:        Final value = for the things own sake (as an end). 
                                                          Instrumental value = for the sake of something else (e.g.  
                                                                                            as a  means).  134
On the Moorean conception of intrinsic value, all final values are intrinsic. In other words, 
that to value something for its own sake or as an end is simply to value it for its intrinsic or 
non-relational properties. However, Korsgaard's insistence on this distinction between 
intrinsic value and final value puts this traditional view under scrutiny. If we separate out 
these two distinctions — intrinsic vs. extrinsic and ends vs. means — we open up the 
possibility of things holding final value at least partly on extrinsic grounds. 
 Christine Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness" in Philosophical Review, 92 (1983): p. 170.133
 The phrase 'valuable for the sake of something else' is confusing. As I will argue shortly, there 134
are more ways than just instrumentally in which something can be appropriately described as this.
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        This position has recently found increasing support, notably from Shelly Kagan,  Toni 135
Rønnow-Rasmussen,  Jonathan Dancy,  and John O'Neil,  all of whom defend the 136 137 138
following claim in one way or another: 
(C) There are final values that are not intrinsic. 
These philosophers defend (C) at least partly because they are prepared to acknowledge more 
forms of extrinsic value than just the instrumental. In supporting this view, I will now discuss 
my objection to Leiter's claim that "what has extrinsic value has value only as a means to 
something else...".  In doing so, we will gain a clearer understanding of the distinction 139
between intrinsic and final value. Furthermore, we will have more apparatus available to us 
to interpret Nietzsche's claims about the value of human greatness, and in turn the value 
suffering can bear in relation to it. 
1.2. Non-Instrumental Extrinsic Value 
        Leiter's claim is problematic. Earlier, I defined extrinsic value as the value something has 
in virtue of its relational properties, or that when something has extrinsic value, its value is 
derivative of something else—something either with intrinsic value, or that will itself be 
further related to intrinsic value. For example, money might be valuable because it enables 
one to buy a boat. A boat may be valuable because it allows one to travel. Travelling may 
bring one pleasure. Assuming for the sake of argument that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, 
 Shelly Kagan, "The Limits of Well-being", in The Good Life and the Human Good, eds. Ellen 135
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, (Cambridge University Press: 1992): p. 184; see 
also "Rethinking Intrinsic Value" in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 4, (1998).
 Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Wlodek Rabinowicz, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its 136
Own Sake" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 100 (1), (1999): pp. 33-49.
 Jonathan Dancy, "Are There Organic Unities?", Ethics, Vol. 113, No. 3, (2003), pp. 629-650.137
 John O'Neil, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value" in The Monist, (1992): p. 124.138
 Leiter, (2002), p. 129.139
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then both money and the boat, in this case, have extrinsic value because they are related (at 
least in part) to pleasure in a certain way. 
        But the question arises: what sort of relation must obtain between a certain thing, X, and 
another, Y, if X is to be said to be good derivatively of Y? The relation which has traditionally 
attracted the most attention from philosophers is the causal or means-end relation. One school 
of thought, call them instrumentalists, identifies the means-end relation as the only relation, 
thereby equating extrinsic value with instrumental value, as Leiter appears to do. William 
Frankena is but one who adopted this view:  
One may also say that something is good on the ground that it is a means, necessary, 
sufficient, or both, to a good end, as when one says, 'It is a good idea to go to the dentist twice 
a year.' Then it is extrinsically or instrumentally good, or good as a means.  140
However, assuming the instrumental relation to be the only extrinsic relation would be a 
mistake. There seem to be strong grounds for acknowledging a number of other ways 
something might be valuable based on its relational properties, ways which are not in virtue 
of an instrumental capacity (though they may also retain this capacity). I shall now consider a 
selection of types of extrinsic value which have received some attention in the literature. 
A. Symbolic Value 
        One possible form of non-instrumental extrinsic value is symbolic value, according to 
which something might be called good because of what it signifies. Symbolic value has most 
recently been defended as a distinct form of extrinsic value by Rae Langton,  Jonathan 141
 William Frankena, Ethics, (Prentice-Hall Incorporated: 1963), p. 65.140
 Rae Langton, "Objective and Unconditional Value" in Philosophical Review, 116 (2), 2007, p. 141
163.
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Dancy,  Ben Bradley,  and Fred Feldman.  The idea in its simplest form can be 142 143 144
expressed in the following way.  
        Suppose a person values X, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. So X 
is valuable because it is in some way related to something of final value, Y. But X might not 
have anything to do with the effect of bringing about Y. Rather, this person values X because 
it serves as an indication, or is symbolic, of Y. If this formulation is correct, X has symbolic 
value. 
        Langton gives the example of a wedding ring to illustrate this model. She writes: 
If Rudolph values his wedding ring for the sake of its association with his marriage, he values 
his wedding ring "for the sake of something else", but he does not value it as a means or 
instrument.   145
 The idea is that, ordinarily, wedding rings do not act as a means to the marriage (though we 
could possibly imagine cases where they might), rather they are valuable at least partly as a 
representation of something taken to be valuable for its own sake: a type of personal 
relationship. Yet, being symbolic of something is still clearly a relational property. So 
Langton concludes that  
Rudolph values his ring neither instrumentally, nor as an end; but he does value it 
extrinsically, for the sake of its association with his marriage.  146
Here is another example that is more relevant to the focus of this thesis. Athletes often 
compete in tournaments and competitions in order to achieve various goals. The attainment of 
some of these goals often result in the awarding of a trophy or medal of some kind to mark 
their achievement. For instance, when Mike Tyson won the world heavyweight title in 
Boxing, he was awarded the title belt. Similarly, when martial artists progress to a more 
 Jonathan Dancy, "Was Moore Right About Punishment?" in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, 142
Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, (Oxford University Press, 2007).
 Ben Bradley, "Extrinsic Value" in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 91, No. 2, (1998), p. 118.143
 Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can: An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic, (D. Reidel Publishing 144
Co.: 1986) p. 26.
 Langton, (2007), p. 163.145
 Langton, (2007), p. 163.146
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advanced level, they are awarded a colour belt corresponding to their rank of skill. Let us 
suppose for the moment that achievement is valuable for its own sake. In the case of athletes 
like Mike Tyson or martial arts experts, we might say their trophy belts have symbolic value 
in virtue of representing their achievements. 
        Instrumentalists may object that the supposed symbolic value in the examples given is 
really just instrumental value in disguise. In other words, one might object on the grounds 
that in the case of wedding ring and the trophy, their supposed symbolic value can be reduced 
to the value they possess instrumentally. 
        This counter argument runs in the following way. The wedding ring may symbolise 
Rudolph's marriage, but we can then ask: why is that valuable? It is valuable, instrumentalists 
will say, because in reminding the ring bearer of that time, this may be a means to pleasure or 
some other positive experience. Similarly in the case of the trophy, instrumentalists might say 
it is valuable because it is a means to some positive cognitive experience (e.g. pleasure or 
pride): it reminds him or her of their triumph, and is therefore instrumental. In this way, the 
wedding ring and the trophy both act as a means to something that could be taken to be of 
further value. 
        This objection, however, is unconvincing. Defenders of symbolic value as a distinct 
species of extrinsic value need not deny that in these examples the wedding ring and trophy 
have instrumental value. This is in fact uncontroversial. They only need argue that they also 
bear another kind of value as well, namely as a representation of something of further value. 
This point is well observed by Langton. Regarding the wedding ring, she writes: 
To be sure, the ring may have effects, it may remind him of a loved one, it may provoke 
unease when glimpsed in mid-flirtation, but he [Rudolph] does not value them for (or not only 
for) the sake of these useful effects.  147
The reductionist strategy employed by the instrumentalist needs to ensure that everything 
extrinsically valuable about X is accounted for in instrumental terms. If the ring or trophy is 
not valuable purely in virtue of its beneficial psychological effects, or other possible 
 Langton, 2007, p. 163.147
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instrumental benefits, then the reductionist strategy fails to fully explain why they are valued. 
Until the instrumentalist can do this, there seems to be grounds to argue for at least one type 
of extrinsic value which is not instrumental. 
B. Sentimental Value 
        Another way something might be valuable due at least in part to its extrinsic properties 
may be in virtue of its personal significance. For example, jewellery, photographs, or even 
clothing, may have little or no value for their own sake, yet they may become so when they 
are family heirlooms or have been given as gifts by close friends. We might refer to this as 
sentimental value. 
        This form of value has received relatively little attention from moral philosophers, 
however Guy Fletcher has recently discussed the concept in detail, and gives the following 
account: 
something is sentimentally valuable if and only if the thing is valuable for its own sake in 
virtue of a subset of its relational properties, where the properties include any or all of having 
belonged to, having been given to or by, or having being used by, people or animals, within a 
relationship of family, friendship, or romantic love, or having been used or acquired during a 
significant experience.  148
Take the example of a samurai sword. In Japan, it is still practised by some families who have 
retained them to hand down a samurai sword as a family heirloom. Of course, the sword has 
value in virtue of its instrumental capacities: it is good for cutting. However, this is not the 
only reason it is valued. It is also valuable to the family in virtue of a different sort of 
relational property: the fact that it was given to them by an ancestor. The sword would not 
have this value if it was simply found by someone on the street. Here, the sword is valuable 
for its own sake due at least partly to its sentimental properties. 
        The definition given above is not comprehensive, as Fletcher acknowledges, for two 
reasons: (1) it leaves out the question of why it is that the relational properties sometimes 
generate sentimental value and other times do not; (2) it also does not fully address the limits 
 Guy Fletcher, "Sentimental Value" in The Journal of Value Enquiry, 43, (2009), p. 56.148
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of what can be a bearer of sentimental value. Fletcher allows that bearers of sentimental 
value include objects and places, but is also likely to include a wide range of other 
possibilities, such as pieces of music.  For the purposes of this chapter however, this will 149
not matter a great deal. The issue at hand is whether this relational property is a genuine form 
of extrinsic value that is distinct from the instrumental. 
        Often the term 'sentimental' is used in a pejorative sense to mean something like 
'excessively emotional', 'soppy' or perhaps 'corny'. It is important to note that this usage is 
entirely different from the one used in value theory, which instead refers to a particular kind 
of relation to something that involves emotion or sentiment. It could be that the pejorative 
sense of 'sentimental' results from something having sentimental value for someone. For 
example, the film Spinal Tap is a 'mockumentary' about an 80's heavy metal band. In one 
scene, the interviewer is asking the guitarist of the band, Nigel Tufnel, about the guitars in his 
various collection. They come to one guitar which Nigel describes as very special to him on 
an emotional level. The interviewer goes to pick up the guitar and Nigel gets extremely upset 
and irrational, decreeing that the guitar can't be touched, pointed at, or even looked at!   
       The point of this example is to show that something of genuine sentimental value might, 
and often does, lead to inappropriate 'sentimental' behaviour, but that these two uses of 
'sentimental' are only contingently related. This part of the chapter solely focuses on 
sentimental value not taken in a pejorative sense. 
        The objection which was levelled at symbolic value may also be relevant to sentimental 
value. It might be that sentimental value can be reduced to instrumental value. When 
someone looks at a photograph of a loved one, it might be said that the photograph is 
valuable because it brings that person some form of happiness.  But one can respond in 150
similar ways. I may value such a photo even though I don’t derive any pleasure from looking 
 Fletcher, (2009), p. 56.149
 Incidentally, the case of the wedding ring might be better explained in terms of sentimental 150
value rather than symbolic value. Yet, this would not harm my argument here, which is merely to 
identify at least one other form of non-instrumental extrinsic value.
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at it. In fact, it may be rather painful for me to look at the picture, for example in the case of a 
deceased and sorely missed relative. 
        As with symbolic value, proponents of the view that sentimental value is a genuinely 
distinct form of extrinsic value need not deny that certain things that will bear it may also 
bear instrumental value as well. Fletcher addresses this issue by making the following claim: 
(C) the sentiments that are necessary for the generation of sentimental value need not co-exist 
with the value.   151
Fletcher argues this to be true in two ways. First of all, it is true in a weak sense: sentimental 
value does not require the continued felt presence of particular conscious sentiments. When 
one gets into an argument with a family member and feels anger looking at an old photograph 
of them, it does not seem to be true that this photograph no longer has sentimental value. That 
person may continue to have a positive sentiment for their family member even while being 
angry with them. 
        But there is a stronger sense in which (C) is true according to Fletcher: that sentimental 
value can outlast the sentiments that generate it.  In other words, something may continue 152
to have sentimental value even after the relationship from which its value arose ends. The 
family photograph, for example, may continue to have sentimental value even if the members 
of that family now feel indifferent, or perhaps hostile, toward each other. 
        This stronger claim that Fletcher makes is significant because it provides a response to 
the instrumentalist claim that things of supposed sentimental value can be reduced to 
instrumental value. If looking at the photo is not a means to X in any way but still retains 
sentimental value, as could plausibly be the case, then this particular instrumental argument 
fails. 
 Fletcher, (2009), p. 57.151
 Fletcher, (2009), p. 57.152
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C. Rarity Value 
        A third possible form of non-instrumental value is rarity value. There are many kinds of 
things which at one time existed in abundance, but, for one reason or another, have now 
significantly decreased in number: 1956 Cadillac Eldorados; minted Roman coins from the 
time of Nero; Black Rhinos; and so forth. There are also many kinds of things which emerge 
as distinct in some respect: the latest piece of technology; exceptional athletes; an innovative 
novel; various collector items, and so forth. All of these are unique or rare in a sense, and it is 
a natural thought that each of them is plausibly more valuable in virtue of this property. 
        The proposition (so far) is that if X is or becomes rarer, then X tends to increase in value 
in virtue of this fact. Uniqueness or rarity is clearly a relational property: it depends upon the 
limited existence or non-existence of other things of the same kind. But the relation is not 
(obviously) instrumental. There are a variety of examples that aim to demonstrate the value 
this type of relational property can have. Dancy gives the example of a book which can 
become more valuable when the only other copy in existence is burned.  The value that is 153
increased, Dancy argues, is neither intrinsic nor instrumental. This is because, firstly, the 
value is dependent on the fact that that it is now the only book of its kind to exist, which is 
quite clearly a relational property: it depends on the non-existence of similar books. 
Secondly, the value added is not necessarily a means to anything.  154
        Monroe Beardsley discusses the case of a rare stamp.  Many people collect and sell 155
stamps, with some of the rarest stamps fetching vast sums of money. For example, the British 
 Dancy, (2003), p. 633.153
 Rarity value is engaged with, explicitly and implicitly, in environmental ethics in at least two 154
ways. Firstly, with respect to rare species that are either (1) near extinction; or (2) have unique 
capacities. For example, Black rhinos are a species which are currently classified as 'critically 
endangered' by the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature). Black rhinos, and other 
species of similar status, have a property which leads various organisations and campaigns to 
attempt to protect them because they are thought to be valuable in an additional sense that is 
neither intrinsic nor instrumental. This may be at least partially explained in terms of the species' 
rarity. A second way rarity value is utilised in environmental ethics concerns human relationships to 
landscapes. John O'Neill has argued that a natural habitat or wilderness can be valuable for its own 
sake purely in virtue of the fact that it has not been visited by human beings. See O'Neill, (1992), p. 
124.
 Monroe Beardsley, “Intrinsic Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 26, (1965), p. 155
1.
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Guiana One Cent Magenta is one of nine in the world, and was auctioned for £6.4 million. 
This sum would likely be extremely less if there were hundreds of thousands of the stamp in 
existence. Here, the British Guiana is made more valuable (tracked in this case by its price) 
not because of its instrumental properties—it is in fact totally useless for posting these days
—but because of its property of rareness.  156
        The issue of rarity value is particularly relevant to Nietzsche. One feature of Nietzsche's 
'higher types' or great individuals appears to be that they are, in some capacity, rare; an 
exception [Ausnahme] amongst the majority. It would be difficult to overestimate the 
frequency with which this association pervades the texts. He repeatedly contrasts the "rarest 
and most valuable exemplars" (UM, III, §6) with the pejorative "herd" [Heerde]; the 
"common" [gemeinsam]; the "mediocre" [mittelmässig]; and the "rabble" [Pöbel]. To take 
just a few passages, Nietzsche claims in The Gay Science, for instance, that the "taste of the 
higher type is for exceptions (GS, §3). In Beyond Good and Evil, which as we saw in the 
previous chapter is incidentally where Nietzsche is most explicit about the content of human 
greatness, he writes plainly that "what can be common has ever but little value", but that 
"great things are for the great...and, in sum, rare things for the rare" (BGE, §43). Shortly after 
in the same work, Nietzsche claims that in contrast to the "surplus of failures, of the sick, the 
degenerate, the fragile" and so on,  the "successful cases, among men too, are always the 
exception" (BGE, §62). The same sentiment is found in later works: "Great and fine things 
can never be common property: pulchrum est paucorum hominum [beauty is for the 
few]" (TI, 'What the Germans Lack', §5). 
         For these higher types, rarity will involve maintaining either or both of the following 
two facets: (a) instantiating distinctive features or distinctive combinations of features; or (b) 
instantiating particular features to a relatively high degree. We can distinguish at least two 
ways Nietzsche considers great individuals to do so.  
        The first way concerns the rarity of social dissent. In the last chapter I claimed that one 
necessary character trait for greatness is a person's aversion to traditions and established 
values: a "hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, institutions" that surround them 
 Kagan gives the similar case of a rare classic car: its instrumental value may be significantly 156
lacking, yet it might be tremendously valuable on account of its rarity. See Kagan (1992), p. 184.
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(UM, III, §6). He claims that  "the ability to contradict, the attainment of a good conscience 
when one feels hostile to what is accustomed, traditional, and hallowed — that is still more 
excellent and constitutes what is really great, new, and amazing in our culture" (GS, §297). 
Similarly, that "today the concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, 
being able to be different" (BGE, §212). From a later note, Nietzsche again asks "What is 
noble?" and answers that "one knows how to make enemies everywhere... That one 
constantly contradicts the great majority not through words but through deeds" (WP, §944; 
KSA, 1888, 15[115]).  Great individuals instantiate this property to a distinctively high 157
degree. 
        A second way great individuals can satisfy (a) is by achieving a tremendous and 
distinctive amount. Nietzsche mentions Beethoven, Goethe, Shakespeare, and so forth, at 
least partly because their achievements are particularly exceptional. We can translate this into 
the conceptual scheme of the will to power which I outlined in Chapter One: the feeling of 
power corresponds to the amount of resistance to the will that is overcome. The achievements 
of great individuals involved an exceptional amount of resistance: "One would have to seek 
the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome" (TI, 
'Skirmishes', §38). Hence, one can be considered rare in virtue of exercising their will to 
power to a high degree. 
        One can also be considered rare in (b)-type cases. For Nietzsche, this concerns the 
relation between the two constituents of greatness I identified in the previous chapter: virtue 
and significant achievement. I argued that great individuals are those who satisfy both of 
these conditions and, as a result, are particularly exceptional human beings. Perhaps many 
people are high achievers, and many others have Nietzschean virtues, but having both of 
these properties, the thought goes, is especially distinctive. 
        However, in all of the cases I have discussed so far, it is ambiguous whether Nietzsche 
values exceptional individuals in virtue of their rarity (at least in part), or whether rarity is 
merely a consequence or indicator of (a) and/or (b). Remarkably little has been written about 
 These are but a few of the passages in which Nietzsche emphasises the value of digression from 157
norms. For others, see: D, §297; GS, §55; A, §54; and particularly Nietzsche's attention to the 'free 
spirit' [Freigeist], who is at least in part defined by this trait: HH, Preface, §7; §225, D, §56; GS, 
§347; BGE, §44.
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this issue. Ivan Soll, one of the few commentators who at least acknowledges it, claims in a 
footnote: 
[Nietzsche] sometimes seriously considers the idea that what is common in the sense of being 
widespread is for that reason alone less valuable than things that are rare, that rarity in itself 
not only is prized by us, but deserves to be. Nietzsche argues that what is common in the 
sense of common place may often be, and deserve to be, for that reason, considered the 
opposite of what is noble, exceptional, and valuable. To the extent that Nietzsche is 
developing a non-moral criterion of valuation based on the notion of nobleness, he often tends 
to treat what is common, even in the sense of widespread, as lacking value. Or at least he 
argues that rarity has been and still is prized for its own sake. He points out that there has 
been an equation of what is rare with that is valuable or noble, and even sometimes seems to 
condone this equation.  158
There are a number of interesting yet separable points Soll makes here. The first is historical: 
that things which are unique, rare, or exceptional, have often been taken to be valuable in 
virtue of this feature. The second point is that Nietzsche endorses this practice as legitimate: 
it ought to be the case. I agree with Soll that this is highly plausible as an interpretation of 
Nietzsche, but Soll does not go into detail about the specific type(s) of rarity that Nietzsche is 
interested in. There is a distinction to be made between at least three possible interpretations 
of the claim that rarity has value in-itself: 
(1) Rarity is sufficient for X's value (nobility simply is being exceptional). 
(2) What is rare or exceptional always counts in favour of X's value. 
(3) What is rare or exceptional sometimes counts in favour of X's value. 
Claim (1) is exceptionally strong, and, as I shall shortly argue, implausible both in itself and 
as a reading of Nietzsche. Claim (2) takes rarity as having pro tanto value. That is, rarity 
always confers value upon something, but is just one consideration among many possible 
others, and so all things considered something rare may not be very valuable. This is still a 
 Ivan Soll, "The Self Versus Society" in Julian Young (ed.), Individual and Community in 158
Nietzsche's Philosophy, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 167.
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controversial claim, but considerably weaker than claim (1). Claim (3) is weaker still, and 
holds that there must be some constraints on context with regard to rarity's value. 
        It might be objected that (3) to too weak to support to the view that I am proposing, that 
is: that rarity itself can confer value, and can't be explained away in terms of instrumental, or 
some other value. The general objection to the notion of rarity value is the doubt that 
something's being rare doesn’t matter in itself; that the world does not somehow become a 
worse place if it turned out that a book, stamp, island, species, or person wasn't actually rare. 
Furthermore, that this might be indicated by reflecting on specific examples where rarity does 
not seem to make a difference in our positive evaluation of that thing. For instance, while 
there may be an intuition that rarity is a good-making property in the case of some classes of 
things (e.g. stamps), we are less inclined to say that rarity acts in this way when we consider 
cases of especially sadistic or effective serial killers. Ted Bundy was exceptional in the extent 
of his murder count, but is he more valuable in virtue of this?  
        This objection can be translated into examples of two sorts which reflect Nietzschean 
concerns. One example would be a case in which a person is exceptionally incapable, or 
peculiar in their inability to achieve anything. In terms of the exercise of their will to power, 
this person—in stark contrast to someone like Goethe—is unique in overcoming little if any 
'resistance'. That Nietzsche would find such a person valuable in virtue of this feature is 
unlikely. A second and more substantive type of case that Nietzsche himself addresses is the 
character and deeds of Paul the Apostle in The Antichrist. Nietzsche's interest in Paul stems 
from his interpretation of him, and not Jesus, as the creator of what came to be Christianity. I 
shall not explain why Nietzsche interprets him in this way. The relevant point here is that 
Paul is portrayed as a "hate-obsessed false coiner" and "dysangelist" (A, §42) like no other. 
He is exceptional in at least two profoundly negative ways. Nietzsche argues that he 
instantiates vices—e.g. ressentiment—to a distinctively high degree. For instance, it is 
claimed that "on the heels of those glad tidings [Jesus] came the worst of all: those of 
Paul" (A, §42), and that "Paul was the greatest of all apostles of revenge (A, §45).  
        As a result of his hatred and desire for revenge, Paul created the concept of personal 
immortality and eschatological judgement as an imagined revenge against the ruling nobility 
of the time. Nietzsche considers this very concept to be adopted into Islam: Mohammed 
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inherited "The invention of Paul, his means for establishing a priestly tyranny, for forming 
herds: the belief in immortality — that is to say the doctrine of 'judgement'... (A, §42). 
Whether Nietzsche's historical claims about Paul and the sequence of events in the 
development of Christianity are true is irrelevant here. Given the historical success of 
Christian values, and the claim that they are in some sense inimical to the production of 
human greatness,  Nietzsche holds Paul responsible for his exceptionally detrimental effect 159
on human history and culture. 
        By drawing attention to such cases, an objector may hope to show that it is not rarity per 
se that is a good-making property, but rather some other property of a thing which only often 
also features the property of being rare. In other words, rarity seems valuable only when 
conditioned upon certain contexts or classes of things. Moreover, this objection informs the 
exegetical point about whether Nietzsche himself actually engages with rarity as a value in 
itself: if there are cases of rarity which make no difference, or make a negative difference, to 
something's value (e.g. low achievers, or Paul), then Nietzsche does not consider rarity value 
a genuine concept, or so the objection would go.  
        The response to this objection has two parts, which taken together reveal some 
complicated and interesting structures. Firstly, as a preliminary remark, the conditionality for 
the goodness of rarity will be the same kind of conditionality for a number of other good-
making properties. Many, for example, endorse the popular view that pleasure is good-
making in so far as it is not sadistic pleasure. In this case, the goodness of pleasure is 
conditioned upon some conception of desert. Or similarly, many agree that knowledge is 
good-making if its object is significant for the subject. For instance, the knowledge of an 
important truth of physics is plausibly a good thing, while one's knowledge that a stranger on 
the other side of the world prefers tea to coffee is not. So the conditionality in question is not 
something special to rarity, but is a common phenomenon in our understanding of value 
concepts. 
 I am yet to say precisely how Nietzsche understands this to be the case. I address the issue in 159
the next chapter.
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        The second point related to this is that something being conditionally valuable is quite 
compatible with it being finally valuable. As Kant had already pointed out, conditionality and 
final value are compatible and often go together. Kant's own example, which I have already 
mentioned above, was of happiness and virtue.  On Kant's view, the only unconditional 160
good is the 'good will'. Acts motivated by the desire for happiness are not praiseworthy, in 
Kant's view; the goodness of happiness is conditional upon acting from a good will. But this 
does not mean that happiness derives its goodness from the good will, or that goodness is 
conferred upon it by the good will. Rather, happiness is good in virtue of how it itself is, but 
on the condition of being had by someone who has a good will. In other words, the source of 
happiness' goodness resides within itself, even though the condition of its goodness is 
extrinsic. 
        The claim then, is that the fact that rarity is only valuable in some cases yet not others—
its conditional value—does not undermine the concept. Moreover, on the exegetical point, the 
conditional value of rarity is exactly what one should expect from Nietzsche given his 
general suspicion of 'unconditional value' that I outlined above. That rarity would be valuable 
in the case of high achievers such as Goethe, yet have no (or perhaps negative value) in the 
case of Paul the Apostle is fully consistent with Nietzsche's claims that goodness depends 
upon non-relational and relational properties (i.e. context); that the good is "artfully related, 
knotted and crocheted to these wicked, apparently antithetical things, perhaps even in their 
being essentially identical with them" (BGE, §2). 
        I do not have time here to fully explore all conditions which are relevant to the value of 
rarity in Nietzsche's view, but I have tried to show that he is plausibly read as valuing rarity in 
cases of high achievers or great individuals. If this is correct, then Nietzsche engages with at 
least one form of extrinsic value which is not instrumental. Consequently, Leiter's claim that 
the extrinsic is only instrumental is false. 
        Now that the distinction between intrinsic value and final value has been made explicit, 
we can see that Nietzsche values human greatness in the latter sense, that is: for its own sake 
or as an end. Although Leiter uses the term 'intrinsic value', he likely does not mean by this 
what Moore had in mind. While this terminological point might be seen to be relatively 
 See Kant, (1988), Section One.160
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minor, it helps avoid confusion about a highly complicated issue which Nietzsche himself is 
not always clear. Furthermore, by making this distinction explicit, we equip ourselves with 
the additional extrinsic concepts of value discussed above, and these will prove to aid in a 
more detailed analysis of Nietzsche's understanding of suffering and greatness. 
2. A Conceptual Analysis of Value 
2.1. Relativity 
        At this point I must provide at least part of a conceptual analysis of value: what does it 
mean to speak of the value of something, and why does it matter? I have argued above that 
Nietzsche is committed to a rejection of 'intrinsic value' in the Moorean sense, that is, the 
view that (a) what is valuable for its own sake is wholly dependent on its intrinsic properties; 
(b) what has intrinsic value is valuable unconditionally. This rejection gives us clues about 
Nietzsche's positive views on valuation, of which I will firstly identify two distinct further 
claims. 
        Firstly, Nietzsche clearly thinks some things can be more valuable than other things. He 
often talks in terms of an "order of rank [Rangordnung]" (BGE, §268; cf. GM, I, §17) among 
values.  Nietzsche is therefore in some sense committed to a second claim: that values are 161
hierarchical; they are potentially quantifiable denominations intended to organize things in 
terms of 'higher' and 'lower'. 
         My purpose for the moment is to enquire as to how Nietzsche holds this view in 
connection with his commitment to a second claim, namely: that the measurement of all 
value is relative. In other words, something can only be thought to be valuable in relation to 
something else, namely being "more or less valuable" (BGE, §194) than that thing. He writes 
in a later note that if an object or state of affairs lacks "anything against which to measure it", 
then the context in which "the word 'value' would have meaning, is lacking" (WP, §708; KSA, 
 The 'order of rank' is also used by Nietzsche to apply to drives (GS, §116; BGE, §6), and most 161
frequently to human 'types' (e.g. BGE, §62, §257, §294; A, §57). For an insightful discussion into the 
use of this concept and why Nietzsche describes it as a "problem" (HH, Preface: §6, §7; GM, I, §17; 
cf. BGE, §265), see Robert Guay, "Order of Rank" in John Richardson and Ken Gemes (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, (OUP, 2013).
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1887, 11[72]). This idea that there is no absolute standard of measuring the value of 
something is likely another view inherited from Schopenhauer, who makes this point explicit 
in On The Basis of Morals when he writes: 
any worth is the evaluation of one thing in comparison with another; thus, it is a comparative 
concept, and hence relative, and this relativity comprises the very essence of the concept of 
worth. (BM, p. 177). 
This view might helpfully be contrasted with Kant's notion of absolute worth or 'dignity' with 
regard to persons; a notion which Nietzsche fiercely attacks at least partly on these grounds. 
According to Kant, there is a distinction to be made between the intrinsic worth of human 
beings, who are capable of rational activity, and the relative value of non-human beings and 
things who lack this capacity: 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price [Preis] or a dignity [Würde]. What has a 
price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is above all 
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity.  162
For Kant, all human beings are unique and irreplaceable in a way that other things are not; 
they cannot be evaluated and given a price amongst non-human things. To do this would 
denigrate their dignity or intrinsic worth. Nietzsche, by contrast, includes persons in the 
'order of rank'. For example: 
Every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society — and 
so it will always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences 
of worth [Werthverschiedenheit] between man and man... (BGE, §257) 
men not noble enough to see the abysmal disparity of rank between men and man — it is such 
men who, with their 'equal before God', have hitherto ruled over the destiny of Europe, until 
at last a shrunken, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of good will, sickly 
and mediocre has been bred, the European of today... (BGE, §62) 
 Kant, (1988), pp. 63-64.162
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The order of castes, order of rank, only formulates the supreme law of life itself...for making 
possible higher and higher types — inequality of rights is the condition for the existence of 
rights at all. (A, §57) 
In these deliberately unsettling passages, Nietzsche not only makes a descriptive claim about 
there being significant differences between persons, and that ranks or castes tend to develop 
out of a practice of measuring the relative value of persons, but also (most controversially) 
that it is (at least instrumentally) good that this occurs. Consequently, Nietzsche rejects any 
Kantian view about inherent worth or dignity.   163
        Nietzsche sees in the Kantian notion of dignity and absolute value the same 
anthropocentric sentiment espoused by Christianity: that "everyone as an 'immortal soul' has 
equal rank with everyone else" (A, §43).  He calls this a "miserable flattery of personal 164
vanity" (A, §43), and develops his view in a later note: 
Through Christianity, the individual was made so important, so absolute, that he could no 
longer be sacrificed...—All "souls" became equal before God: but this is precisely the most 
dangerous of all possible evaluations! If one regards individuals as equal, one calls the 
species into question, one encourages a way of life that leads to the ruin of the species: 
Christianity is the counterprinciple to the principle of selection. (WP, §246; KSA, 1888, 
15[110]) 
There are a number of points being made in this critique. In this passage from the Nachlass, 
Nietzsche suggests that equality, or at least belief in the value of equality, would in some 
sense have bad effects, for example: a diminishing of the conditions needed for the cultivation 
of greatness.  In The Antichrist however, Nietzsche explains the motivation for the 165
emergence of equality as a 'good' thing. The latter is significant for the current discussion, 
 This is not to say Nietzsche has no place for some conception of dignity. Huddleston, for 163
example, argues Nietzsche retains the concept but with a radically different meaning. On his 
interpretation, while Kant conceives of dignity as equal and innate, Nietzsche considers dignity as 
inegalitarian and earned. See Andrew Huddleston, "Nietzsche on Slavery and Human Dignity" in the 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 52, Number 1, (2014), pp. 135-160. 
 Nietzsche's tracing of Kantian ideas back to Christianity—his "theologian instinct"—is expressed in 164
A, §11.
 Nietzsche makes similar claims repeatedly in his mature period, but most explicitly in BGE, §257 165
and TI, 'Skirmishes, §48.
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because it is an attempt to explain away any concept of absolute value by exposing the 
psychological need that some, the majority, have to believe in it. As Nietzsche puts it: "The 
'salvation of the soul'—in plain language: 'the world revolves around me'" (A, §43). 
        Nietzsche instead sees his task as "to translate man back into nature", by which he at 
least in part means to do away with any "vain and fanciful interpretations" (BGE, §230) of 
human value as 'dignity' or absolute. In order to bring about this "return to nature" (TI, 
'Skirmishes, §48) and avoid the anthropocentric "flattery" of Kantianism/Christianity, one 
must subject human beings to the same conception of value as non-human things—that is, as 
one of relative worth. 
2.2. Epistemic Constraints: The Frame of Reference Argument 
        In holding this view about the relativity of value, Nietzsche, in his later writings, 
recognises that there are epistemic restrictions on the evaluation of certain things: 
specifically, life 'as a whole', or the existence of the world itself. I shall refer to this as his 
'frame of reference argument'.  It runs as follows: 166
Premise 1: In order to make reasonable value judgements about 'life as a whole', one  
                 would need to be situated outside of 'life'. 
Premise 2: Human beings are always situated within 'life'. 
Conclusion: Value judgements about life as a whole cannot reasonably be made. 
The argument is an attempt to expose particular systems of thought as absurd or misguided 
by demonstrating that comprehending the value of life 'as a whole' is impossible. The first 
premise claims that evaluating life as a whole would require an exceptionally privileged 
epistemic position. The second premise claims that no human is in such a position. He makes 
this argument explicit primarily in The Gay Science and Twilight of the Idols. For instance: 
 Nietzsche, however, was not the first to make such an argument. Hans Vaihinger made a similar 166
epistemic frame of reference argument in 1876. See Hans Vaihinger, Hartmann, Dühring und Lange, 
(Baedeker, 1876), p. 126; p. 177.
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One would have to be situated outside life, and on the other hand to know it as thoroughly as 
any, as many, as all who have experienced it, to be permitted to touch on the problem of the 
value of life at all: sufficient reason for understanding that this problem is for us an 
inaccessible problem". (TI, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §5) 
We are far from claiming that the world is worth less; indeed it would seem laughable to us 
today if man were to insist on inventing values that were supposed to excel the value of the 
actual world. This is precisely what we have turned our backs on as an extravagant aberration 
of human vanity and unreason that for a long time was not recognised as such (GS, §346) 
Nietzsche's argument has multiple targets, which include Christianity, Platonism, and 
Schopenhauerianism—all of which (according to Nietzsche), postulate some form of 'better 
world', 'true world', or 'world beyond' which is (often) preferable to reality that has been 
judged to be evil or deficient. The notion that a value judgement about the world as a whole 
can be made "found its final expression in modern pessimism, and a more ancient and 
stronger expression in the teaching of the Buddha; but it is part of Christianity also" (GS, 
§346). Regarding the Socratic/Platonic dichotomy of a perfect world of forms in contrast to 
our world, he writes that "the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by a living man, because 
he is a party to the dispute, indeed its object, and not the judge of it" (TI, 'Socrates', §2). 
Hence, "We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of 'man and world', separated by 
the sublime presumption of the little word 'and'" (GS, §346). This same mistake is "ultimately 
formulated by Schopenhauer as 'denial of the will to life'" (TI, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §5). 
        While Nietzsche does present this argument as an epistemic one—he doubts the capacity 
of human judges to know, estimate, or understand the value of life, given our position within 
it—he also can plausibly be read as intending the argument to support the stronger claim that 
life or the world 'as a whole' cannot have a value, and not just that it can't be known. 
        For instance, he claims in the same passages as above that "value judgements 
concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never be true" (TI, 'Socrates', §2; 
emphasis mine), and that attempts to do so are imbued with "uselessness, illusoriness, 
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absurdity, falsity" (TI, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §5). In another passage from Twilight of the 
Idols, he writes: 
one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole — there exists nothing which could judge, 
measure, compare, condemn our being, for that would be to judge, measure, compare, 
condemn the whole...but nothing exists apart from the whole! (TI, 'Four Great Errors, §8) 
Nietzsche similarly writes in the Nachlass, in clear reference to Schopenhauer, that "the total 
value of the world cannot be evaluated: consequently philosophical pessimism belongs 
among comical things" (WP, §708; KSA, 1887, 11[72]). This second reading of the argument 
has the following form: 
Premise 1: All value is relative.  
Premise 2: For the world or life 'as a whole' to have value, there would need to be  
                 another world or life from which to compare it. 
Premise 3: There exists no such other world or life.  
Conclusion: Value judgements about the world or life 'as a whole' are always  
                   meaningless. 
On this stronger reading, Nietzsche regards the attempt to evaluate life 'as a whole' as 
unsound. The reason being that because the word 'value' loses all meaning when there is 
nothing else to compare a thing to, and because Nietzsche rejects the notion of there being 
any reality other than our own, let alone a preferable one (e.g. the Christian notion of 
heaven), 'life' cannot be evaluated, either negatively or positively. 
        The potential weakness of this argument lies with premise 3. From the claim that there 
exists no other world to compare our own to, Nietzsche (on this reading) claims that our 
world cannot be evaluated. But one might ask why another world or reality would have to 
exist in order to compare it to our own. We might, for example, abstract from the world that 
exists (W) and consider possible worlds (W1, W2, W3...) from which to evaluate it relatively.  
        The argument has its difficulties, which I will not seek to elaborate or defend against 
here, but Nietzsche makes a second and distinct point regarding value judgements about life 
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as a whole which is the primary motivation behind the argument, and that would still apply to 
the move to postulating 'possible worlds'. Nietzsche holds that while these judgements are 
either always epistemically unjustified or meaningless, when made they nevertheless act as a 
"symptom of a certain kind of life" (TI, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §5). In order to understand 
what Nietzsche means here, it must be understood as part of a broader theme which is 
pervasive in Nietzsche's work throughout the 1880's.  
        He claims that "A human being's evaluations betray something of the structure of his 
soul and where it sees its conditions of life, its real needs" (BGE, §268). In other words, one's 
value judgements are useful in as far as they are indicative of one's psychology, or what 'type' 
of person one is. The metaphor Nietzsche most frequently employs is that of a symptom one 
must diagnose [Symptom]: like the headache and dehydration that signifies a fever, one's 
values signifies the orientations of one's drives. To take just a small sample of additional 
evidence, in Daybreak, he writes “our moral judgments and evaluations...are only images and 
fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us” (D, §119). Specifically regarding 
philosophers, he claims their "morality" merely bears “decisive witness to...the innermost 
drives of his nature” (BGE, §6).  167
        Thus value judgements about life 'as a whole' are indicative of a certain type of person: a 
yes-saying life-affirmer, or a decadent nihilist. So giving a negative verdict on the value of 
existence, in Nietzsche's view, is "only a value judgement on the part of life—of what life? of 
what kind of life?—But I have already given the answer: of declining, debilitated, weary, 
condemned life". (TI, 'Morality as Anti-Nature', §5). While Nietzsche considers the 
evaluation of life as a whole as in some sense an error, it is nonetheless useful for the purpose 
of identifying 'types'. He concludes of both Socrates and Plato: "What? and all these great 
wise men -- they have not only been décadents, they have not even been wise?" (TI, 
'Socrates', §2). In other words, their value judgements about 'life' not only give away their 
décadent nature, but both are also philosophically mistaken in making such judgements. 
 Nietzsche often uses feelings [Gefühle], affects [Affekten], instincts [Instinkte] and drives 167
[Triebe] interchangeably.
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2.3. Quantifying Value 
        Given that Nietzsche holds all value to be relative, the question then becomes a matter 
of how "rank-distinguishing value judgements" (GM, I, §2) can be quantified, or be 
understood as quantifiable. In some cases, value can be determined simply in terms of the 
economic principle of supply and demand, where a product's worth is ascertained in light of 
the variables of desire and availability. For example, if the desire for P increases while the 
availability of P decreases, its price rises. Alternatively, if the availability of P increases and 
the desire for P decreases, the price falls. In these straight-forward commercial examples, the 
worth or 'value' of P is tracked by its monetary price. 
        In a number of places, Nietzsche's language appears to reflect a similar method of 
evaluation, frequently speaking in economic terms with an emphasis on price [Preis], value/
worth [Wert], and exchange [tauschen].  For instance, he writes that “To estimate what a 168
type of man is worth, one must calculate the price paid for his preservation” (EH, XIV: §4), 
and maintains, in stark contrast to Plato, that “art is worth more than truth.” (WP, §853; KSA, 
1888, 17[3]). 
        Nietzsche also gives a historical account of why we often speak in economic terms of 
price and measurement with regard to value. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche 
claims that measuring and evaluating is in some sense an essential part of being human: 
Setting prices, determining values [Werte abmessen], devising equivalences, exchanging, 
these preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that it, in a certain sense, 
constitutes thinking as such (GM, II, §8) 
He continues: 
 For a similar line of interpretation, see Edward Andrews, "The Cost of Nietzschean Values" in 168
New Nietzsche Studies, 3, (1999), p. 63.
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man designated himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates and estimates, as the 
'measuring animal' [Werte misst, wertet und misst als das ‘abschätzende Tier' an sich]. (GM, 
II, §8) 
He finds this practice in the "earliest and most primordial relationship between men", 
locating its origin in the "relationship between buyer and seller, debtor and creditor" (GM, II, 
§8). Nietzsche even later explicitly suggests that an “attempt should be made to see whether a 
scientific order of values could be constructed simply on a numerical and mensural scale of 
force” (WP, §710; KSA, 1888, 14[105]). Nietzsche never in fact provides such a scale. 
However, it is necessary to explore how one might determine the value of things like 
'greatness', achievement, and suffering, where the quantifier of 'supply and demand' is not 
appropriate.  
        One possible strategy for determining the relative value of these things is to consider 
one's experiences of them. If we come to understand a particular sensation or feeling as good, 
then we might deem the value of that feeling as quantifiable using a criterion of intensity and 
duration. This is a method of evaluation familiar to some traditions of utilitarianism. For 
example, Bentham's hedonistic account of the good regards the feeling of pleasure as 
susceptible to these criteria. According to Bentham, the value of a certain action is measured 
by the ratio between how strong a pleasure is felt in performing it (intensity), and how long 
that sensation lasts for (duration).  169
        A similar argument is sometimes made for Nietzsche's conception of evaluation, but in 
terms of power rather than pleasure.  On this view, an activity, event or object is valuable to 170
the extent it provokes an intense and persisting feeling of power, and its relative value can be 
quantified in terms of its intensity and duration. For example, take the achievement of 
running a marathon in contrast to climbing Everest. One might measure the value of these 
achievements by gauging the intensity and duration of the feeling of power that results in 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Oxford University 169
Press, 1995): 4.2. Bentham also mentions others—certainty, propinquity, fecundity and purity—but 
are not relevant to the welfare value of a pleasure.
 For example, see Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, (Routledge, 1983), esp. pp. 348-349.170
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overcoming their inherent resistances. Whichever is greater would, on this view, be the more 
valuable achievement. 
        That Nietzsche endorses a view of this nature is perhaps best suggested by passages 
such as the following: 
What is the objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organised 
power. (WP, §674; KSA, 1887, 11[83]) 
Value is the highest quantum of power that a man is able to incorporate. (WP, §713; KSA, 
1888, 14[8]) 
What determines your rank is the quantum of power you are: the rest is cowardice. (WP, 
§858; KSA, 1887, 11[36]) 
There are at least two problems with this approach. The first is an exegetical worry: where 
Nietzsche appears to suggest this type of evaluation, it occurs almost exclusively in the 
Nachlass, and at the beginning of the thesis I explicated the difficulties of solely relying on 
such passages in coming to a representative picture of Nietzsche's views. 
        The second problem is philosophical. One classic objection to the utilitarian method of 
evaluation concerns incommensurability: that two different things may produce valuable 
experiences, but cannot be qualitatively measured against each other. Consider the following 
case given by Roger Crisp.  Suppose we compare the lives of the composer Joseph Haydn 171
and an oyster that lives for an unusually long period of time. In composing, Haydn will meet 
with success and honour in his own lifetime, travel in Europe and enjoy immense popularity. 
However, Haydn will die at the age of seventy-seven. The oyster's life will consist of mild 
sensual pleasure, but it is consistent across a large period of time—say, five-hundred years. 
Which life is best? The pleasures of Haydn are certainly more intense than the oyster's, but at 
some point, if the oyster lives long enough, its welfare will outweigh Haydn's (assuming 
there is no decrease in the value of the oyster's experiences over time). The objection is that 
utilitarians in this tradition will have to say that the oyster's life is preferable, and many will 
 Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, (Routledge, 1997), pp. 22-25.171
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reasonably reject this on the grounds that the experiences of Haydn are simply in a different 
category than the experiences of the oyster, hence it might not matter how long the oyster's 
life is. 
        We might consider a variant of this case that is relevant to power. In Book Nine of The 
Iliad, Achilles recalls the prophecy given to him by his mother, Thetis: 
...destiny has left two courses open to me on my journey to the grave. If I stay here and fight 
it out round Ilium, there is no home-coming for me, but there will be eternal glory instead. If I 
go back to the land of my fathers, my heroic glory will be forfeit, but my life will be long and 
I shall be spared an early death.  172
Achilles goes on to achieve an exceptional amount on the battlefield at Troy, ensuring his 
glory for thousands of years to come, yet tragically dies there. In the language of the will to 
power, he overcomes a vast amount of resistance, the intensity of which is tremendous. 
Compare this with a possible Achilles* who returns home instead of participating in the 
Trojan War. Achilles* lives a long and healthy life but he never attains glory: his 
achievements, although perhaps numerous, provoke relatively mild feelings of power; he 
overcomes little resistance in each of them, but a large amount over time.  
        The essence of the comparison is clear enough: Achilles*, least in theory, could over 
time achieve many things of little intensity, but which eventually collectively outweigh the 
intensity in the feeling of power that Achilles experienced. But measuring the lives of 
Achilles and Achilles* in this way seems misguided, and it is unlikely that Nietzsche would 
view the two as in the same category of value. Hence, the method of measuring value in 
terms of the experience of power faces the same problem of incommensurability. 
        An alternative way one might attempt to determine the value of something is to construe 
value in terms of the 'opportunity cost' of that good or service. Consider the examples of 
museums which have no entrance fee, great natural landscapes in preservations, and historic 
architecture. Here, there is no conception of economic price because these things are free to 
experience. However, we still want to say they are valuable, and crucially, perhaps more 
valuable than other things. To determine the 'order of rank' among these valuable things 
without use of supply and demand, their 'opportunity cost' would involve the extent of one's 
 Homer, The Iliad, (Penguin Classics, 2003), Book 9, lines 410-415, p. 155.172
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willingness to give up resources, such as time, in order to participate in the activity or 
experience these phenomena. Put another way, the value of a certain thing might be measured 
by how much one would sacrifice relative to pursuing other possible goods. 
        Nietzsche can plausibly be interpreted as endorsing such a view. He claims explicitly 
that "The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays 
for it—what it costs us". (TI, 'Skirmishes', §38). Earlier in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche 
similarly writes: 
We universally honour acts of love and sacrifice for the sake of one's neighbour, wherever we 
find them. In this way we heighten the value of the things loved in that way, or for which 
sacrifices are made, even though they are in themselves not worth much. A valiant army 
convinces us about the cause for which it is fighting. (HH, §77) 
        This strategy retains two features from the supply and demand approach. Firstly, it is 
still dependent on the strength of one's desires. One's desire has to be sufficiently strong 
enough to warrant sacrificing the pursuit of some other good, which will in turn be sufficient 
to sacrifice the pursuit of a further subordinate good, and so forth, providing a hierarchical 
ranking of values. Moreover, because it adopts a counterfactual approach to cost (i.e. how 
much one would give to attain something if available), it can make sense of Nietzsche's 
mercantile terminology. Secondly, because this approach relies on desires in this way, it still 
treats the measurement of value as relative. Choosing to (a) go to a museum, for example, 
might be more valuable than (b) going hiking in a nature reserve, because one has a stronger 
desire to do (a) compared to (b). 
       There are some things, however, whose value cannot be explained in these terms of 
exchange. As I have claimed, the value of some ends—the Noble prize, a steak dinner, seeing 
a film—can be measured by how much I am willing, or would be willing, to give to attain 
them. What I can 'give' can vary: we are most familiar with monetary exchange, but value 
may also be measured using other currencies. One example is time. Another, which I have 
mentioned in connection to Nietzsche's view, is effort and struggle. However, this mechanism 
of exchange is not obviously applicable to other conceptions of value, for example: the value 
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of Goethe's life, or the value of an achievement. How might we, or Nietzsche, explain the 
value of such things, where it is not appropriate to simply use a measure of the struggle to 
obtain them? 
        One plausible explanation of this value might be in terms of admiration: Goethe's life is 
more valuable than St. Paul's, for example, because the extent of our admiration for him is 
relatively greater. Similarly, The Prose Edda is a more valuable literary achievement than The 
New Testament, for instance, because the extent of our admiration for it is relatively greater. 
Admiration—as well as contempt—is a complex emotion. We often admire the features of an 
agent that they are responsible for (e.g. certain choices), but also sometimes features they are 
not responsible for (e.g. eye colour), with perhaps some borderline cases (e.g. intellect). 
Moreover, admiration of a person, artwork, or article, can also be partial or complete: we can 
admire Mike Tyson's strength and determination, while perhaps condemning his early 
attitudes towards women. Similarly, we may admire Wagner's tremendous talent, while 
simultaneously denouncing his anti-Semitism. Additionally, admiration is frequently felt 
accompanying other emotions of a diverse variety. For instance, it could be felt as a 
component of envy, of love, and amusement. 
        This last point is particularly salient with regard to the topic of this chapter. While we 
can imagine the extent of admiration to be at least roughly quantifiable in relative terms (i.e. 
admiring X by reference to admiration for Y), one potential complication with this view is 
that there may be several forms of admiration that are incommensurable. There are two types 
of cases to consider here. Firstly, there is the admiration of different components of peoples' 
lives. It is not immediately obvious that the admiration we feel for X in virtue of their 
achievements is commensurable with the admiration we feel for Y in virtue of their beauty. 
We can't, it would seem, simply compare our admiration for each in this case to determine 
which is a more valuable life, for the criteria may vary in kind. This problem can, however, 
be largely avoided for the purposes of this thesis, for the parameters of my investigation are 
narrow: I focus upon a specific good that Nietzsche emphasises as criterial of great 
individuals—achievement. 
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        Nevertheless, there is still the second possible incommensurability problem to consider. 
Is the admiration for X's heroic achievement in battle commensurable with Y's tremendous 
literary achievement, to the extent that we can say that one is greater than the other? As I 
shall claim in the following chapter, Nietzsche does not appear to recognise this as a problem, 
and in fact provides a highly pluralistic account of admirable achievement—of 'overcoming 
resistance'—compatible with a variety of goals. While I shall argue that there must be some 
constraints on what the goal is for the activity to have value, he does not address issues of 
commensurability of noble pursuits.  173
        It is unclear how Nietzsche precisely conceives of valuation and determining the 'order 
of rank' among values. I have provided three possible ways one might attempt to do this: in 
terms of (1) intensity and duration of certain experiences; (2) opportunity cost; (3) extent of 
admiration. These methods of evaluation are not mutually exclusive: it may be that one is 
appropriate for some cases, and another for different cases. The second option—'opportunity 
cost'—will be discussed in detail with reference to the value of striving in the following 
chapter, for it fits naturally with the idea that suffering is (in some way yet to be specified) a 
'cost' for reaching one's goal. The third option—extent of admiration—will be discussed in 
detail with reference to the value of achievements considered as a whole. 
3. Greatness and its Relation to Suffering 
        I have so far argued that Nietzsche values human greatness as an end or 'for its own 
sake'. In this section I will introduce evidence for another claim I made earlier: Nietzsche 
believes suffering to be related to human greatness in some way. In doing so, we shall see 
why Nietzsche thinks suffering is valuable. The remaining chapters will then focus upon 
specifically how suffering is valuable by drawing out distinctions between different forms of 
extrinsic value, and to what extent and in which periods Nietzsche engages with them. 
 There is a third concern here that must at least be flagged, that is: admiration appears to be a 173
highly subjective measure of value. Some people admire football players no more than grass-
counters. While Nietzsche can allow a pluralism regarding the goals people pursue, it might be 
harder to interpret him as being a subjectivist about the some activities (e.g. that of Beethoven 
and Goethe). Are they really only valuable in his opinion? Nietzsche's meta-ethical position is a 
hugely contentious topic that I shall not have time to  address here. But what I claim in this thesis 
will be compatible with a reading of Nietzsche as some form of anti-realist or realist about value.
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        In a number of places throughout his corpus, Nietzsche emphasizes that suffering is in 
some (yet to be specified) way connected to human greatness. This connection becomes 
increasingly emphasised in Nietzsche's later work when his critique of morality intensifies. 
This idea is perhaps best captured from passages in Beyond Good and Evil, which, as we 
have seen, is where Nietzsche provides the most in-depth account of 'greatness' and its 
conditions. For example, he claims that "Profound suffering ennobles; it separates" (BGE, 
§270); "How deeply humans can suffer almost determines their order of rank" (BGE, §270); 
and that "The highest type, which has hitherto almost always been the type that has suffered 
most" (BGE, §62). In a later note, Nietzsche echoes this sentiment: 
To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering ... because I wish them 
the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not—that one endures. 
(WP, §910; KSA, 1887, 10[103]) 
Crucially, Nietzsche often appears to endorse the stronger claim that this relation between 
suffering and greatness is a necessary one. In other words, that there is no greatness without 
suffering. For instance: 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering — do you not know that only this discipline has 
created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which 
cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage 
in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been 
granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness — was it not granted to it 
through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? (BGE, §225; second emphasis 
mine) 
This [suffering] is the only price for which one can buy the most precious shell that the waves 
of existence have ever yet washed on the shore. (GS, §302; emphasis mine) 
Examine the lives of the best and most fruitful people and peoples and ask yourselves 
whether a tree that is supposed to grow to a proud height can dispense with bad weather and 
storms; whether misfortune and external resistance, some kinds of hatred, jealousy, 
stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, avarice, and violence do not belong among 
the favourable conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is scarcely possible. 
(GS, §19) 
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It is worth remembering the important historical fact that Nietzsche was no stranger to 
suffering. Throughout his life, he struggled with a variety of health problems which often left 
him isolated and alone. Throughout the 1880's, Nietzsche's health deteriorated to a 
particularly poor level, yet within these ten years he was at his most prolific, producing the 
vast majority and most critically acclaimed of his philosophical body of work. Nietzsche 
often draws upon his own experiences of suffering as evidence of its necessary relation to 
achievement and greatness: 
I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest years 
of my life than to any others....And as to my prolonged illness, do I not owe much more to it 
than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which grows 
stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!— To it, I owe even my 
philosophy....Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit....Only great 
suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the 
suffering that takes its time—forces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths... 
(NCW, epilogue; cf. EH, I, §1, §2) 
Reginster argues that the necessity of suffering for greatness can be explained in terms of the 
will to power. As I presented in Chapter One, he claims that suffering is defined by 
resistance, that is: dissatisfaction is inherently painful, and since the feeling of power is the 
overcoming of such resistance, power necessarily requires suffering. However, I objected that 
the 'desire implies pain' principle is implausible, and that Nietzsche is best read as claiming 
that resistance is suffering only when it persists for too long. As a result, if suffering is a 
necessary requirement of greatness as Nietzsche appears to claim—"that the creator may be, 
suffering is needed" (Z, II, §2)—then it must be on other grounds which he does not make 
explicit. 
        So suffering is valuable, on Nietzsche's view, on account of its relational properties: it is 
somehow related to human greatness, which as I concluded in earlier chapters is taken to 
have final value. But if suffering is extrinsically valuable, this can't be the end of the story. 
After establishing in section 1.2 of this chapter that there are a variety of types of extrinsic 
  127
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
value, the question remains: which species of extrinsic value does suffering have, and in what 
way? This is crucial in order to make sense of the above quotations. This question will be the 
focus of the remaining chapters of the thesis. Moreover, I shall aim to show that Nietzsche's 
increased immoralism in his later period understands the value of suffering in a potentially 
different sense to that of his early and middle periods. 
3.1. Valuable for the Few 
        Before I proceed, it is important to clarify who Nietzsche thinks suffering is valuable for. 
I argued in the first section of this chapter that, in Nietzsche's view, something's value has to 
be understood as sensitive to particular conditions or relations. I claim that one relevant 
condition or relation that Nietzsche considers the value of suffering to have is what type of 
person the subject is, namely: if one is capable of greatness. The implication of this view is 
that Nietzsche's claims about the value of suffering are restricted to a very few individuals, 
and that he does not recommend that just anyone strives towards greatness. 
        Nietzsche rejects the notion of equality because it undermines the Rangordnung. His 
rejection is comprised of two distinct components: 
(1) Equality of persons is descriptively false, because there are fundamentally 
different 'types' of people. 
(2) Any normative view that advocates equality is not conducive to the flourishing of 
at least one 'type' of human. 
The concern that Nietzsche has in mind in point (2) is the flourishing of great individuals: 
"what is right for one cannot by any means therefore be right for another...the demand for one 
morality for all is detrimental to precisely the higher men" (BGE, §228).  Nietzsche 174
repeatedly repudiates the claim—which he takes to be characteristic of particularly Christian, 
 This is not to say that Nietzsche thinks equality itself is intrinsically bad. On the contrary, he 174
claims that "'Equality for equals, inequality for unequals — that would be the true voice of 
justice" (TI, 'Skirmishes', §48).
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Utilitarian and Kantian moralities—that a value or set of values is appropriate for all. He 
clearly states: 
What serves the higher type of man as a nourishment or delectation must also be a poison for 
a very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man might signify vices and 
weakness in a philosopher. (BGE, §30) 
The idea here is that 'good for' sentences such as 'egoism is good for John' will differ 
depending on whether John is what Nietzsche refers to as a 'higher type' or 'lower type'. I 
believe that Nietzsche treats the value of suffering in the same way: that it is 'good for' higher 
types but not for members of the 'herd'. For example, Nietzsche refers to the slave revolt as 
"the prudence of the lowest order [diese Klugheit niedrigsten Ranges]", and goes on to state 
the motive for the revolt as their "instinct for self-preservation and self-affirmation" (GM, I, 
§13; emphasis mine). I take the claim to be that the values which resulted from the revolt—
humbleness, meekness, 'justice', contentment, and so forth—are in the interests of its 
instigators. Nietzsche suggests in a later note that the values of the herd are only a problem 
when they are unrestricted in their application: "the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd 
— but not reach out beyond it (WP, §287; KSA, 1886, 7[6]; emphasis mine). We might 
compare these claims with earlier comments Nietzsche made in Human All Too Human: 
All men who have no expertise with any weapon (mouth and pen counting as weapons) 
become servile: for such men religion is very useful, for here servility takes on the appearance 
of a Christian virtue and is surprisingly beautified. People who think their daily lives too 
empty and monotonous easily become religious: this is understandable and forgivable; 
however, they have no right to demand religiosity from those whose daily life does not pass in 
emptiness and monotony. (HH, §115) 
Amongst the various claims in this passage, Nietzsche holds that some things considered a 
vice can, for some people, be virtues. He makes this move explicitly with regard to striving as 
opposed to contentment or 'happiness' in the pejorative sense. For instance, he recommends 
that "one leaves happiness to the great majority" (WP, §944; KSA, 1888, 15[115]), and states 
that "The poison of which weaker natures perish strengthens the strong — nor do they call it 
poison" (GS, §19).  
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        In attempting to draw out the elements of Nietzsche's positive ethical project that can 
contribute to contemporary debates about the value of achievement, I shall show that this 
distinction between 'types' is non-essential, and can be ignored without undermining his 
axiological claims regarding suffering. 
Conclusion 
        I have explored three areas of Nietzsche's axiology in this chapter. I first assessed 
Leiter's claim that human greatness has 'intrinsic value', and addressed the terminological and 
conceptual issues of Nietzsche's engagement with it. I argued that greatness is valuable as an 
end or for its own sake, but that this is importantly not the same thing as 'intrinsic value' 
properly understood. For Nietzsche, value is not necessarily generated by something's 
intrinsic properties, but by its relational properties. I then rejected Leiter's claim that what has 
extrinsic value has value only as a means, and supported this rejection with examples of non-
instrumental extrinsic value, of which at least one form—rarity—Nietzsche plausibly engages 
with. I then gave a conceptual analysis of value in order to clarify how Nietzsche understands 
valuation and the measurement of value. In the final section I claimed that Nietzsche holds 
suffering to be necessarily related to greatness. The task of the next chapter will be to identify 
what type of value relation this is. 
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Chapter Four:  
Suffering as Having Instrumental Value 
        We now have an understanding of two important issues: (1) what Nietzsche understands 
at least one conception of suffering to be: resistance to the will; (2) why suffering is valuable 
for Nietzsche: it has a necessary relation to human greatness, which is taken to be constituted 
at least in part by significant achievement. But suffering being 'necessarily related' to 
greatness is too broad a claim to be philosophically interesting. By making use of 
contemporary debate in the theory of value, in this chapter I will investigate specifically how 
Nietzsche thinks suffering is valuable. One view, apparently defended by Leiter, is that 
Nietzsche values suffering only instrumentally; it is a means to greatness. I have so far been 
using the term 'achievement' in a conventional sense, however, by elucidating in detail the 
nature and value of achievement, I show that the instrumental view is mistaken. This 
particular chapter is not only exegetical, but it also attempts to demonstrate the independent 
plausibility of a Nietzschean account of the value of achievement in a debate that has 
traditionally been dominated by Aristotle. I shall begin by giving a brief account of 
instrumental value. 
1. Identifying Instrumental Value 
        Standard definitions of instrumental value usually start with the basic claim that it is 
properly contrasted with what I have in the last chapter presented as final value: what is 
valuable for its own sake. Objects, activities, states of affairs, or whatever, have instrumental 
value if they are a means to something that is valued for its own sake or as an end. Money, 
tools, chores, exercise, education are frequently listed as standard examples of things having 
instrumental value. For instance, money might allow me to gain entry to a museum to see 
beautiful works of art or ancient artefacts. A good education may help me get an admirable 
job. If we assume these aims to be valuable as ends, then money and education might be said 
to be valuable as a means. 
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        This account leaves a number of important questions open. There are at least three 
points that need to be explicated. First of all, it is a mistake to define instrumental value in 
terms of what we value as such. Something can have value as a means regardless of whether 
one values it in this way, or if one fails to value it at all. Similarly, whether something is 
valuable as a means is completely independent of one desiring or enjoying it. For example, I 
may not value the Volvo that is parked on my drive for the sake of anything. Furthermore, no 
one else may have considered its value either. However, (assuming that the car still works) it 
still possesses instrumental value in virtue of the fact that I might use it to get from A to B. 
        Secondly, there appear to be two distinct senses in which something can be 
'instrumentally valuable'. First of all, there might be something which is (1) good as an 
instrument or useful for achieving something. For example, a coat-hanger is good for hanging 
coats. This is the case regardless of whether hanging the coat is itself good. Similarly, the 
Volvo in my drive maybe useful in this sense, even if my destination holds no value.  
        This sense of instrumental value as 'utility' is to be distinguished from a second sense as 
a thing being (2) productive of value: a means to something else which is good. To 
demonstrate this distinction in more detail, Ramon Lemos cites an example of poisoning a 
person.  The use of poison might be instrumentally good as a means of killing a particular 175
person; it is reliable to get the job done, requires little effort and is likely to leave scarce 
evidence of the act. The poison retains these features regardless of whether killing the person 
has any value, or even if it is in fact a bad thing. But on the second reading of a means, as 
being productive of value, poisoning the person is not instrumentally valuable unless their 
death is in some way a good thing. So a condition of something having instrumental value in 
this second sense is that the consequences of employing it must produces good outcomes. 
G.E. Moore formulates this conception in the following way:       
 Ramon Lemos, The Nature of Value: Axiological Investigations, (UPF, 1995), p. 39.175
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Whenever we judge that a thing is `good as a means,' we are making a judgment with regard 
to its causal relations: we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that that 
effect will be good in itself.  176
But there is still much to be said. So far, we have established what Ben Bradley labels the 
"Naive View": 
NV: S is instrumentally good = df. S is a causal factor in the production of something 
good.    177
         As Bradley rightly states, NV requires improvement. First of all, it is unclear how 'good' 
is to be defined here. Presumably the 'production of something good' means something good 
for its own sake, or of final value. However it might be the case that something can have 
instrumental value if it acts as a means to something else of instrumental value. For example, 
suppose we are hedonists and think that the only thing that is intrinsically valuable is 
pleasure. Getting a good education, (a), may have instrumental value in virtue of gaining me 
a financially beneficial job, (b). The money I earn from this job, (c), may also have 
instrumental value in virtue of providing me with the means to buy a yacht. Moreover, the 
yacht, (d), might provide me with a means to a significant amount of pleasure. In this 
scenario, (a) (b) and (c) all act as a means to a further means of acquiring a final good, yet all 
retain instrumental value. A related point to consider is that something can be both valuable 
instrumentally and as an end. Candidates cited in discussion of this possibility most 
frequently include goods such as knowledge and virtue: they are plausibly good for their own 
sake, yet clearly can be instrumental in bringing about other goods. 
        NV also fails to account for the means of preventing things which are bad. Something 
might be instrumentally good in virtue of what has been called its 'preventative value'.  For 178
 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), §19.176
 Bradley, (1998), p. 111.177
 For example, see Fred Feldman, "Basic Intrinsic Value" in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. 178
Zimmerman, Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, (Springer Science & Business Media, 2005), pp. 
398-399.
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example, medical vaccinations may have instrumental value in virtue of their being a means 
to avoiding serious illness or death. It is plausible to suppose that vaccinations would be good 
even if those vaccinated go on to live lives with zero final value, for some of those vaccinated 
would have been much worse off had they not been vaccinated. This leads us to a qualified 
understanding of instrumental value that takes into account something's total causal 
consequence or 'overall value'. Something becomes instrumentally valuable if all things 
considered it causes things to go better than they would have otherwise gone. We can call this 
qualified understanding of instrumental value the Standard View (SV): 
SV: S is instrumentally good = df. S causally contributes to bringing about something 
overall good or preventing something overall bad. 
        This improves upon NV significantly. It takes into account preventative capacities, and 
by focusing on overall good allows something to be instrumentally valuable to a further 
means. This understanding of instrumental value is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter, 
which is to ascertain whether suffering functions this way with regard to greatness. 
2. Support for the Instrumental Interpretation 
        Brian Leiter argues that suffering does function in this way for Nietzsche: that it is a 
necessary means to greatness. I shall first present the view and Leiter's arguments for it with 
reference to the textual evidence. I will then provide two arguments which suggest this view 
should be rejected. 
2.1. Leiter's Critique of Morality 
        In Nietzsche on Morality, Leiter provides an insightful account of Nietzsche's critique of 
morality. He argues that by 'morality' Nietzsche does not mean every system of ethical 
evaluation, rather a particular family of normative views—that he calls 'morality in the 
pejorative sense' (which I shall refer to as 'herd morality' for short)—which feature two 
components: (1) The Descriptive Component; and (2) The Normative Component.  
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        Regarding (1), Leiter argues that Nietzsche rejects herd morality partly on the grounds 
that it is committed to philosophically implausible views regarding, for example, human 
agency and free will; the self; the similarity of persons. Regarding (2), Leiter argues that 
Nietzsche rejects herd morality on the grounds that its values are harmful to higher men; to 
the cultivation of human greatness. Nietzsche does not reject these components with equal 
force. I agree with Leiter that the normative component is "the core of Nietzsche's attack on 
morality".  The reason being that although his attack on the descriptive component of herd 179
morality attempts to expose its internal inconsistencies and falsehoods, the fact that a 
morality has these features does not undermine its ability to facilitate the production of great 
individuals. As Nietzsche famously claims: 
The falsity of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement...the question 
is to what extent it is life-advancing. life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even 
species-breeding...(BGE, §4) 
For my purposes here, I shall focus on Leiter's attention to (2) the normative component of 
Nietzsche's critique of morality; that herd morality is hostile to the flourishing of nascent 
Goethes who are under its influence. On Leiter's interpretation, what is common to 
Christianity, Kantianism, Utilitarianism, for example, is that they all in some way maintain 
"pro-attitudes" towards ideal-typical "pro-objects", of which Leiter lists: altruism; equality; 
pity/compassion; peacefulness. Herd morality takes these things to be valuable for their own 
sake, while simultaneously maintaining "con-attitudes" towards "con-objects"—self-interest; 
inequality; danger and risk; bodily drives—which are thought to have no value.  Leiter 
interprets Nietzsche to reject herd morality on the grounds that it fails to recognise that these 
"con-objects" are necessary conditions for the cultivation of human greatness, and that 
therefore it obscures their instrumental value. These are the grounds upon which Nietzsche 
calls for a 'revaluation of all values'. 
         Crucially, one of these values which herd morality undermines, according to Leiter's 
interpretation, is suffering. Herd morality holds that suffering is something that ought to be 
 Leiter, (2002), p. 113.179
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abolished or at least significantly reduced; it aims at its alleviation, and the ideal of a world or 
world-to-come without suffering. Leiter discusses the role that suffering plays in Nietzsche's 
ethics in some detail, and in quoting BGE, §225 in support, he writes that: 
The value of suffering, according to Nietzsche, is only extrinsic: suffering — "great" suffering 
— is a prerequisite of any great human achievement.  180
Leiter explains this claim by proposing that "what has extrinsic value has value only as a 
means to something else".  However, I argued in the last chapter that this view is 181
problematic, for there are numerous forms of extrinsic value. Nevertheless, this claim does 
tell us that Leiter understands suffering to have only instrumental value in cultivating 
greatness: if the value of suffering is only extrinsic, and extrinsic value is only instrumental, 
then suffering has only instrumental value. 
        There is an important clarification that needs to be made at this point. In Chapter One I 
claimed that Nietzsche distinguishes between different forms of suffering.  I agreed with 
Leiter on this point. He identifies suffering as potentially (1) a "human instinct towards 
cruelty"; (2) "internalizing cruelty via bad conscience"; (3) "existential angst"; (4) "brute 
facts of physiology"; (5) that humans are "endlessly striving".  However, when Leiter 182
claims that suffering has only instrumental value, he does not specify whether his view only 
pertains to the form of suffering relevant to this thesis—(5)—or possible other forms. This is 
significant because suffering might (and as I shall argue, does) have instrumental value in one 
form, but not plausibly in another. With this ambiguity in mind, I address and later reject 
Leiter's instrumentalist view only in as far as he intends it (which we must assume he does) to 
characterize the phenomenon of suffering as striving to satisfy a lack. 
        Leiter's view provides a picture of the relation between suffering and greatness in which 
suffering acts as a spur to great achievement: creative human excellence is to "grow out of 
 Leiter, (2002), p. 131.180
 Leiter, (2002), p. 128.181
 Leiter, (2002), p. 257.182
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intense suffering".  As Leiter rightly claims: "there is no shortage in the history of art and 183
literature of such cases".  For instance, we might think of Van Gogh's paintings as crucially 184
inspired by his great suffering. Indeed, other commentators agree that Nietzsche is aware of 
this sort of value associated with suffering. Alexander Nehamas, for example, claims that 
Nietzsche thinks suffering "can be tolerated; it can even be pursued if a reason for it exists, if 
it is the means to further achievement."  Similarly, David Cartwright appears to view 185
Nietzsche's interpretation of suffering in instrumental terms, claiming that it is "the vital 
motor for creativity, strength, and great accomplishment".  Further still, Peter Poellner 186
makes a comparable claim when he emphasises Nietzsche's attention to the "putative 
instrumental value of various kinds of things (for example suffering...)".  Leiter's claim is 187
distinct in that he explicitly says that suffering only has instrumental value. I shall return to 
the implications of such a claim shortly. 
2.2. The Evidence 
        What evidence is there from the primary sources to suggest that Nietzsche values 
suffering instrumentally? There are a variety of passages which would purport to sustain such 
an interpretation. For instance, in Human, All Too Human, he writes that: 
When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by 
changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, 
whose benefit may only later become clear. (HH, §108) 
And similarly: 
 Leiter, (2002), p. 132.183
 Leiter, (2002), p. 132.184
 Nehamas, (1985), p. 122 (emphasis mine).185
 David E. Cartwright, "Nietzsche's Use and Abuse of Schopenhauer's Moral Philosophy for Life" in 186
Christopher Janaway, Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator, (OUP, 1998), 
p. 136.
 Peter Poellner, "Aestheticist Ethics" in Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, Nietzsche, 187
Naturalism and Normativity, (OUP, 2012), p. 72.
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We have already mentioned that mutilation, crippling, or serious lack of an organ often causes 
another organ to develop unusually well because it has to carry out both its own function and 
another besides. From this we can divine the origin of many a splendid talent. (HH, §231) 
Later in The Gay Science, Nietzsche claims comparably that: 
A loss is a loss for barely one hour; somehow it also brings us some gift from heaven—new 
strength, for example, or at least a new opportunity for strength. (GS, §326) 
Nietzsche's terminology in these passages is highly suggestive. Presenting suffering as a 
potential “opportunity” to “bring us some gift” may appear to imply treating the misfortune 
as having positive instrumental value.  For example, suffering was valuable for Van Gogh, in 
this sense, in that he used it as a spur to creative accomplishment.   
        Nietzsche makes further claims to this effect in his treatment of the concepts of 
'health' [Gesundheit] and 'sickness' [Krankheit], in which there is a shift in focus from one's 
suffering to one's attitude towards suffering. For Nietzsche, 'health' and 'sickness' are at least 
partly to be understood as concepts which categorise how a person responds to suffering.  188
'Health' indicates an appropriate response, and 'sickness' an inappropriate response. Nietzsche 
writes that health is the disposition of "instinctively choosing the right means against 
wretched states" (EH, I, §2). The higher man, ergo the healthy man, "guesses what remedies 
avail against what is harmful; he exploits bad accidents to his advantage" (EH, I, §2). On this 
understanding—explicitly endorsed by Leiter as sufficient to account for the 
concept —'health' means something more like resilience: an ability not just to cope with 189
misfortune, but to use it to one's benefit in some way. In doing so, one 'reinterprets the 
misfortune as a good'. 
 I claim that health is only in part to be understood as resilience because Nietzsche in many 188
places treats the concept with a greater degree of complexity regarding its function. For example, 
at least one other aspect of health Nietzsche considers is convalescence. In other words, to be 
healthy is (perhaps) consistent with, revealed by, and even enhanced by illness and recovery. 
Support for this interpretation can be found in GS, §120, §382; EH, I, §2. Taking this into account, I 
disagree with Leiter, who claims that 'resilience' is sufficient to account for the concept.
 Leiter, (2002),  pp. 118-119.189
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        An exemplary 'healthy' figure may be a character such as Odysseus. In The Odyssey, 
when Odysseus plans to make the long voyage home to his native Ithaca, suspicious of 
whether the Gods will plague his journey with misfortune, he states: 
I have a heart that is inured to suffering and I shall steel it to endure that too. For in my day I 
have had many bitter and painful experiences in war and on the stormy seas. So let this new 
disaster come. It only makes one more.  190
When Nietzsche writes that "profound suffering ennobles" (BGE, §270), he may have in 
mind the "noble long-suffering Odysseus".  Exploiting Nietzsche's distinction between 191
health and sickness is an interpretative strategy Leiter uses to defend his view that Nietzsche 
considers suffering to be instrumentally valuable. Nietzsche's language and terminology in 
the passages cited certainly lend themselves to the instrumentalist reading. Nevertheless, 
there is reason to be sceptical regarding whether this textual evidence can be said to support 
the view under consideration. 
        Much of the textual evidence I have cited in support of the instrumental view is subject 
to the important conceptual distinction regarding suffering and pain that Reginster identifies, 
and that I addressed in Chapter One. Reginster makes the distinction between three forms of 
'displeasure' that Schopenhauer identifies in his account of the will, and that Nietzsche 
implicitly adopts: boredom, pain, and suffering. The distinction between the latter two is 
significant here. While suffering is the experience of displeasure at the frustration of 
unattained desired ends—striving to achieve one's goal—pain can be experienced regardless 
of what the will desires; it comes unbidden. However, these pains can spawn new desires. 
Sometimes Nietzsche offers the Schopenhauerian argument that pain can be a means of 
escaping boredom for precisely this reason: it prompts us to act by giving us something to 
strive for: 
The craving for suffering.— When I think of the craving to do something, which continually 
tickles and spurs those millions of young Europeans who cannot endure their boredom and 
themselves, then I realize that they must have a craving to suffer and to find in their suffering 
a probable reason for action, for deeds. Neediness is needed! (GS, §56) 
 Homer, The Odyssey, (Penguin Classics, 2003a), Book V: line 222, p.68.190
 Homer, (2003a), Book V: line 484, p. 75.191
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Nietzsche continues: 
These young people demand that—not happiness but unhappiness should approach from the 
outside and become ... a monster so that afterward they can fight a monster. (GS, §56) 
While I follow Reginster's method in reserving the term 'suffering' strictly to mean the 
frustration experienced in striving to attain one's goal, this is not a practice that Nietzsche 
adheres to. Although in this passage from The Gay Science Nietzsche speaks of suffering 
rather than pain, the point clearly being made is that pain can provoke action in that it 
provides a goal to strive towards, a challenge to overcome. In this way, pains, as Nietzsche 
writes of his own experiences, can "become an energetic stimulus for life, for living 
more" (EH, I, §2). 
        With this distinction in mind, there are two points to be made. Firstly, it is not obvious 
that Nietzsche is referring to suffering, understood as resistance to the will, in the passages 
mentioned above in support of the instrumental view. Rather, he appears to be referring to the 
phenomenon of pain. This is suggested by Nietzsche's choice of words: "misfortune", "bad 
accidents" and "loss", all of which seem to refer to phenomena which can affect a person 
regardless of whether they have a pre-existing desire they are striving towards. Furthermore, 
referring to these phenomena as "opportunities" suggests that Nietzsche is referring to pain, 
which in spawning new desires provide more opportunity to overcome resistances to those 
desires; a 'monster' to fight, as Nietzsche puts it. On this view, while pain is only a stimulant 
to the will to power, suffering by contrast is an ingredient of it.  As we shall see shortly, this 192
has significant consequences for the value of each concept, given that I earlier claimed that 
power is at least one standard of evaluation for Nietzsche. 
        One might still hold that suffering can and does have instrumental benefits while 
rejecting the stronger view (apparently defended by Leiter) that suffering has only 
instrumental value. For example, experiencing obstacles to a goal, or denying oneself a 
desired end, could stimulate one to work harder. Furthermore, it might be the case that 
suffering in pursuing a particular goal can be a means to cultivating certain character traits 
Nietzsche would approve of: tenacity, endurance, self-control, and so forth. 
 Reginster, (2006), pp. 234-235.192
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        One example of what Nietzsche commends can be found in his distinction between two 
forms of asceticism. On the one hand, Nietzsche clearly rejects an asceticism of self-denial 
(identified in the first chapter) whereby one takes pleasure in one's own suffering, and gives it 
meaning by interpreting it as punishment from God for being sinful. Nietzsche characterises 
this as the 'ascetic ideal',  which he interprets to be a kind of "cruelty towards one-193
self" (GM, III, §10). He says of this form of asceticism that: 
...when this master of destruction, of self destruction wounds himself — it is the wound itself 
which afterwards compels him to live...(GM, III, §13) 
However, Nietzsche distinguishes a second form of asceticism that is instrumental in nature: 
the voluntary abandonment of certain desires simply as a means to achieve some further 
creative end. Regarding this form of asceticism, Nietzsche writes that: 
. . .a hard and hearty renunciation with a good will , belongs among the 
most favourable conditions for the highest spirituality. (GM, III, §9) 
Moreover, these conditions of restraint are described as "the most proper and natural 
prerequisites for [the philosopher's] best existence and finest productivity" (GM, III, §7). One 
example Nietzsche gives to demonstrate this idea is the philosopher who denies himself 
romantic interests and marriage in order to focus on his work (GM, III, §7). 
        So Nietzsche does not and need not deny that suffering has instrumental value. The 
controversial issue is whether it is as Leiter claims that suffering has only instrumental value. 
I have claimed so far that the evidence given in support of such a view is weakened by 
Reginster's distinction between pain and suffering. But there is a further and more compelling 
reason to doubt these passages as supporting the instrumental view. This is captured by the 
following claim: 
(C) Attributing only instrumental value to suffering allows one to consistently affirm a 
goal that has been achieved yet deplore the suffering endured in achieving it, and this 
 Though, Nietzsche holds that the ideal is realised in many contexts, including secular and 193
scientific ones through 'the will to truth'. See GM, III, §23-25.
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undermines the significant value Nietzsche takes the process of striving (i.e. 
suffering) to have. 
I shall now defend this claim in an attempt to reject the instrumental view. In doing so it will 
be necessary to discuss (1) precisely what achievement consists in and how Nietzsche 
understands the concept; (2) Nietzsche's view on which aspects of achievements make them 
valuable. After settling these exegetical issues, I will then approach the question of (3) if this 
view is at all plausible. Answering the first two points will require reassessing the relevant 
aspects of the doctrine of the will to power discussed earlier. Addressing point (3) will require 
considering Nietzsche's position in light of contemporary debate surrounding the nature and 
value of achievement 
3. Reasons for Rejecting the Instrumental View: A Closer Look at 
Achievement 
        Achievement clearly plays a significant role in people's lives. We admire Nobel Prize 
winners, Olympic athletes, scientists who make groundbreaking discoveries, great novelists, 
and so forth. As I argued in chapter two, achievement is also something Nietzsche clearly 
values. But what, if anything, is common in all of the above cases? This is a question which 
has not received as much philosophical attention as, for example, the nature of knowledge, 
pleasure, autonomy, and other typical non-moral values. This should strike us as odd, given 
that achievement frequently appears alongside these values on 'objective list' or perfectionist 
accounts of what constitutes well-being or a good life for a human. 
        One possible explanation for this is that achievements can be and often are accompanied 
by, or result in, other goods such as pleasure, knowledge, or the exercise of virtue, and this 
can obscure the value that achievement may have for its own sake. When I successfully 
complete a marathon, it may bring me immense pleasure. However, this should not be taken 
as the sole reason, if it is a good reason, to value achievements. In this section I seek to draw 
attention to these questions, and a number of related ones, by exploring the nature of 
achievement within the context of the will to power. I argue that the will to power, 
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understood as 'the overcoming of resistance to our desires', is remarkably close to our 
intuitions regarding the nature of achievement. Moreover, Nietzsche's account of the value of 
achievements demonstrates that the striving for one's goals is not merely valuable as a means, 
but itself a constitutive feature of valuable achievements. 
3.1. Achievement: What is it? 
        Prior to discussing the value of achievement, we first need to sketch an idea of what an 
achievement is thought to be. This is a remarkably more complex task than might be 
presumed. Simon Keller gives a first approximation of achievements as when your goals are 
brought about "due in part to your own efforts".  Others conceive of achievement slightly 194
differently in terms of the amount one stands to gain based on how much one has 
sacrificed.  Thomas Hurka, who has discussed Nietzsche's contribution to this debate in the 195
most detail, argues that "It is when a goal is hard to bring about that doing so is an 
achievement".  Further still, Gwen Bradford has more recently viewed achievement as 196
"characterized by a difficult process which culminates competently in a product".  My task 197
here is to make explicit the subtle differences in these accounts with a view to gaining a 
specific understanding of what the intuitive conditions are for something to count as an 
achievement. It is important to note that my interest is not in how the word 'achievement' is 
often used, for its semantic function may shift in emphasising certain features: sometimes on 
an agent's efforts, and sometimes on their aim. Rather, I seek to draw out the conceptual 
parameters for a sense of achievement that fit Nietzsche's claims about suffering and struggle 
in the pursuit of one's goals. 
 Simon Keller, "Welfare and the Achievement of Goals", Philosophical Studies 121, (2004), p. 33.194
 Douglas Portmore, "Welfare, Achievement and Self-Sacrifice", Journal of Ethics and Social 195
Philosophy 2, (2007), p. 3.
 Thomas Hurka, (2006), p. 221.196
 Gwen Bradford, "The Value of Achievements", in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2013a), p. 197
205.
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        One might begin with some preliminary remarks about achievement's general structure 
or shape. A useful way of initially thinking about achievement in this way might be to 
contrast it with knowledge. Hurka puts it in the following way: 
In knowledge the world is a certain way and you make your mind match the world, by 
forming a true belief about it. In achievement you start with a goal in your mind and make the 
world match your goal.  198
In The Best Things in Life, Hurka says something similar: that when you achieve something, 
"you've mastered reality by imposing an idea on it".  This already sounds particularly 199
Nietzschean, who characterizes "life itself" in a remarkably comparable way as the 
"imposition of one's own forms" (BGE, §259).  In what follows we must iron out what this 200
description precisely involves. As a starting point, however, it gives us two initial conditions 
for something to count as an achievement: (1) achievements are essentially goal-orientated; 
(2) achievement essentially involves successful attainment of these goals. 
        I take it that (1) is uncontroversial. It is difficult to comprehend the concept of 
achievement unless there is already the idea of a goal one wants to achieve. But it will be 
useful here to remind ourselves of a distinction that was made in the first chapter between 
two concepts that ought not to be conflated, that is, between a goal and a desire. In my 
discussion of Schopenhauer's account of the will, I argued that whereas taking something as a 
goal involves intending to make an effort to realize that goal, this is not necessary of a desire. 
The example used earlier concerned the World Cup: one may have a desire for England to 
win the next World Cup, while at the same time acknowledging that nothing one does will 
affect the outcome whatsoever. Moreover, one could also have this desire without ever 
knowing the eventual outcome. This is not true of a goal, which, in virtue of simply having it, 
commits one to pursuing or intending to pursue it. So to have something as a goal is, in part, 
to desire it, but you can desire something without having it as a goal (as in the World Cup 
case). 
 Hurka, British Ethical Theorists From Sidgwick to Ewing, (Oxford University Press: 2014), Ch. 9, 198
p. 25.
 Hurka, The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters, (Oxford University Press: 2011), 199
p. 97.
 'Life' is often a term Nietzsche uses to refer to the will to power (e.g. BGE, §13, GS, §349).200
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        The truth of (2) is less obvious. Suppose Andy Murray's goal is to win Wimbledon. He 
makes it to the final, only to lose to his opponent and fail to secure his goal of winning the 
tournament. One might want to say that he has still achieved a great deal. He has faced and 
defeated a number of opponents prior to the final. Perhaps Murray broke his fastest serve 
record, or his most aces in the first set record, in the final match. Further still, we might 
imagine in addition that he has had to train extremely hard in order to overcome an injury or 
deal with a personal loss prior to the tournament. 
        However, we need not deny that these are genuine achievements. But crucially, they are 
related achievements.  Often the most spectacular failures will involve a great deal of related 
achievements that are subordinate to the ultimate goal, as in this case. These related 
achievements are only achievements because they involved the success of overcoming injury, 
breaking a record, defeating previous opponents, and so forth. In contrast, there was no 
success in winning Wimbledon, since (in this example) Murray failed to defeat the final 
opponent. Hence, Murray has not achieved his goal. If we put this into Nietzschean 
terminology, a necessary condition for the will to power to express itself is not just to have 
resistances and challenges, but to overcome those resistances and challenges. Without 
success, there can be no increase in power. 
        So a genuine achievement must essentially involve success. Even so, the successful 
attainment of a goal, while a necessary condition of achievement, is by no means a sufficient 
condition. One reason for this is that if it is true that any successful attainment of a goal 
amounts to an achievement, then acts such as successfully tying a shoelace, opening a door, 
brushing one's teeth and raising one's arm would all constitute an achievement. We 
accomplish all kinds of goals of this nature constantly throughout the day, but most would be 
reluctant to call them 'achievements', at least in the more narrow sense that merits admiration 
and respect. It is this narrow sense of achievement that is my focus here, and the sense that 
Nietzsche is concerned with. 
  145
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
        Including these everyday accomplishments in our understanding of achievement is 
highly counter-intuitive, and we might think a likely reason is that the listed acts are typically 
easy to accomplish. The implication then, is that genuine achievements are in some way 
connected to difficulty. 
3.2. Difficulty 
        The difficulty of an achievement can be understood in terms of the degree of effort 
required to attain the goal. There are good reasons to suppose that the process by which one 
attains one's goal must be difficult to some degree in order for it to count as an achievement. 
After all, if it were the case that writing numerous plays with complex story lines and themes, 
discovering ground-breaking scientific principles, or running marathons were all easy and 
required little effort, we might not hold the likes of Shakespeare, Einstein or Usain Bolt in 
such high regard for their activities as we do.  
        The first thing to say about the nature of difficulty is that some activities will be difficult 
for some and not for others, and this has consequences for how we understand achievement. 
This point requires drawing distinction between absolute and relative difficulty. To say 
something is absolutely difficult does not make sense. The concept of difficulty is always 
relative to a person or group of persons. We often think of some things as difficult full stop: 
climbing Everest, for example. However, this cannot be correct. The reason for this is that for 
any 'difficult' task given (e.g. climbing Everest), we can conceive of a genetically enhanced 
being or race of aliens for whom it is easy to perform.  So like something being tall or being 201
fast, the standard of difficulty is always relative. In the context of achievement, difficulty 
must be understood as difficulty relative to a particular class of agents, for example those 
with typical human abilities given their age, or relevant disability.  Walking across a room, 202
 I take this point from Bradford's discussion of the relativity of difficulty. Gwen Bradford, 201
Achievement, (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 27-28.
 Of course, the standard of difficulty will greatly depend on the context and the task. The more 202
variables are known about the context and agent, such as age, the further these will determine the 
relative difficulty for a class of agents. 
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for example, will be significantly difficult-for a one year old, or a severely wounded soldier, 
but not difficult-for an average 25 year old. 
        But if difficulty is a necessary condition of a genuine achievement, a number of issues 
regarding how it earns this status must be addressed. Firstly, it is certainly true that some 
activities will be experienced as difficult by some and easy by others. For example, Andy 
Murray would likely find it easy to complete a serve at around 100mph, whereas someone 
new to the game would likely struggle to come close to doing the same. Similarly, a 
magnificent pianist would likely have trouble performing a particular concerto on a flute than 
a magnificent flutist.  
        This point is relevant to the task of defining the nature of achievement for the following 
reason. If we hold that achievement is the successful attainment of a goal that necessarily 
involves overcoming significant difficulty, and also affirm that some tasks will be found 
difficult by some and not others, then it seems this will lead us to deny the validity of 
achievements which particularly skilled individuals—those with "talents far beyond their 
genius" and the "virtuosos through and through" (BGE, §256)—complete with relative ease. 
On this account, it would, for example, be less impressive if Mozart found it easy and 
effortless to compose his scores, to the extent that it would no longer be counted as an 
achievement. This seems too strong. But, conversely, if there are genuine achievements that 
are easily accomplished, then difficulty is not an essential ingredient of achievement. The 
'virtuoso argument' might be put the following way: 
P1. Mozart experiences no difficulty in composing his scores. 
P2. Mozart's compositions are genuine achievements. 
C. Therefore, difficulty is not a necessary component of achievement. 
        This argument has led Duncan Pritchard to suggest that an achievement is a success that 
is either significantly difficult to accomplish, or is accomplished because of the exercise of 
one's abilities to a significant degree (one's high level of skill).  One potential response to 203
this denial of the claim that difficulty is a necessary component of achievement might be to 
 Duncan Pritchard, "Achievements, Luck and Value", in Think, Vol. 9, Issue 25, (CUP, 2010), pp. 203
23-24.
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hold that even in cases of highly skilled individuals completing tasks with relative ease, their 
achievement isn't completely effortless. Even when Mozart composed his scores, for 
example, there was some degree of effort exerted which will be sufficient to count as an 
achievement.  204
        But I think a stronger, more plausible, response is to exploit a second distinction that is 
implicitly at work here; a distinction between achievement-for on the one hand and 
achievement simpliciter, achievement which is good more generally, on the other. That which 
is an achievement simpliciter differs from what is an achievement for X, in that being an 
achievement for X is being an achievement from a certain point of view — X's — whereas 
being an achievement simpliciter is being an achievement from a broader point of view that 
takes into account the relevant class of agents. 
        In order to elucidate this distinction and why it matters for understanding achievement, 
we must consider the relevance of what is subjectively difficult—that which the agent 
experiences as difficult—and objectively difficult—that which  is difficult for any typical 
agent of the relevant class—on the other. Consider the task of climbing a mountain: this is 
something objectively difficult relative to an average human being's limited capabilities. But 
we can imagine some hardened mountaineers will complete this task with ease, while a 
novice would probably find it extremely gruelling, or couldn't do it at all. Like its being 
objective that a typical basketball player is tall relative to average human beings, climbing a 
mountain is objectively difficult. Yet, a novice climber will probably find this task 
subjectively difficult too.  
        By recognising this distinction in difficulty, we can affirm that some activities will be 
achievements-for a particular person—those which are subjectively difficult—and some 
activities will be achievements simpliciter—those which are objectively difficult, regardless 
if they are experienced as such. To refer back to the apparently problematic Mozart example, 
the position under consideration holds that if Mozart found it so easy to compose his scores 
on account of his immense talent and skill, then they do not constitute achievements for him. 
 Bradford appears to endorse this kind of response, though only as one of many. See Bradford, 204
(2013a), p. 220.
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Yet his compositions are achievements in a more general sense that are worthy of admiration 
because they were objectively difficult relative to average human capabilities. 
        This distinction neatly accounts for such cases, and also for corresponding cases where 
an objectively easy task is accomplished by overcoming vast subjective difficulty. For 
example a poor swimmer, Nick, who manages to swim 10 yards without help: this is not an 
achievement simpliciter—it is unlikely that there will be songs and poems written about his 
activity in years to come—because it is an objectively easy task relative to average humans, 
but it is certainly an achievement for Nick, who found it extremely difficult. The problem 
with the 'virtuoso' argument' then is that it equivocates between two notions of difficulty: P1 
refers to what is subjectively experienced as difficult, whereas the conclusion seeks to 
exclude what is also objectively difficult. 
        Nietzsche's own focus is on a particular kind of achievement: those which are both 
subjectively and objectively difficult.  For Nietzsche, the will to power requires the agent to 205
experience difficulty or 'resistance' in order to manifest the feeling of power, since this simply 
is the overcoming of resistance. Hence, if Mozart found his compositions all too easy, if it 
was not a challenge, his will to power would not be satisfied and it would not count as an 
achievement-for him: "an easy prey is something contemptible for proud natures" (GS, §13; 
cf. EH, I, §7). So achievements must firstly be subjectively difficult on his view. 
        However, as we saw in Chapter Two, Nietzsche is concerned with human greatness 
above all, and is therefore also interested in those who are capable of achievements 
simpliciter: the overcoming of exceptional objective difficulty. It can't be the case that that 
those who overcome vast subjective difficulty completing objectively easy tasks (e.g. Nick 
the poor swimmer who manages a 10 yard breaststroke, or someone who finds it extremely 
hard to get out of bed in the morning) are great achievers on Nietzsche's view. Rather, what is 
important is also the amount of objective difficulty one can overcome, and the ease with 
which this is done reflects the ability of that agent. Instead of skill or ability however, 
 I agree with Reginster on this point. See Bernard Reginster, “The Will to Power and the Ethics of 205
Creativity,” in Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 45.
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Nietzsche's vocabulary tends to centre on strength and weakness: “The strength of those who 
attack can be measured in a way by the opposition they require” (EH, I, §7). 
        To be clear, there are three concepts at work here: 
Achievement simpliciter = significant objective difficulty is overcome. 
Achievement-for = subjective difficulty is overcome. 
Because Nietzsche is mostly interested in those exceptional and awe-inspiring achievements 
that distinguish individuals from the herd, but that also manifest power (with power being the 
feeling that difficulty has been overcome), he requires achievements be both objectively and 
subjectively difficult:  
N-achievement =  subjective and objective difficulty is overcome. 
These distinctions allow us to retain that difficulty is an essential feature of achievement. But 
there is an important question to raise regarding difficulty: what type of difficulty—intrinsic 
or extrinsic—is relevant to achievement and Nietzsche's understanding of it. I shall return to 
this point in detail when I shortly come to discuss the value of achievement. For now, we still 
need a descriptive account of the phenomenon. Another condition must be met before 
something can appropriately be designated as an achievement in the relevant sense. 
3.3. The Luck Condition 
        Difficulty is a strong candidate for a necessary condition of achievement. However, if 
we are to grant this, successfully attaining a goal that involves significant difficulty is still not 
sufficient to constitute an achievement. This is because the account is vulnerable to a number 
of Gettier-style counter-examples. The most obvious counter-examples centre on the role of 
luck in bringing about one's goal. 
        Often when pursuing a goal we experience luck in attaining it. This has implications for 
what is considered an achievement and what is not. Both Keller and Portmore account for 
'luck conditions', as I shall call them, when they write: 
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If someone receives a large unexpected inheritance, it would sound odd to say to him, 
"Congratulations on your achievement", even if he always had the goal of becoming rich; he 
doesn't achieve anything.  206
There is a difference, then, between achieving one’s goal and having the object of one’s goal 
realized as a windfall.  207
Luck is relevant to our understanding of achievement in at least two ways. If difficulty is a 
necessary condition for something to count as an achievement then this is why purely lucky 
accomplishments, such as winning the lottery, are not thought to constitute an achievement: 
they diminish the difficulty of a task.  
        For example, imagine an artist who has all of their paints set up, and a fresh canvas 
ready to make a portrait. The artist trips up and spills their paint all over the canvas, but upon 
viewing the consequence decides it is a fantastic piece of modern art that spectacularly 
captures all kinds of emotions and so forth. The end product might be valuable in some way, 
and it may be a related achievement that the artist had the skill to perceive something 
valuable in the split paint, but it would not be the case that the artist has really achieved 
anything creatively: it was purely a matter of luck that the paint he accidentally spilt landed 
on the canvas in such a way. Framed in terms of the will to power, this scenario would be one 
in which the resistance that is needed to be overcome (i.e. the difficulty inherent to the task of 
painting a portrait) is robbed from the agent, hence no power can be increased. 
        There is a reason why I have framed this point in terms of pure luck, and that is that luck 
might still have some role to play in achievement. One way in which this may be the case is 
the luck relevant to achieving a goal after making a tremendous effort. For example, a sports 
team may train for weeks or months in preparation for a prestigious tournament. The arduous 
training will prime the players to overcome many difficulties they will face, such as defeating 
a strong opposing team. However, it is plausible to think that the team's training, while 
increasing the chances of a win, are not sufficient for winning. Luck might play a role in a 
number of ways. For instance, our team may be lucky in that, even though they are putting in 
a great deal of effort, the opposing team's defence makes a number of tactical mistakes. In an 
 Keller, (2004), p. 33.206
 Portmore, (2007), p. 3.207
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extreme case, if the opposing team did this constantly so that our team rarely even engaged in 
the game, we would be less inclined to praise them for a great achievement. But ordinarily 
these mistakes happen rarely, assuming the teams are fairly evenly matched. This requires a 
team to have the ability and skill to be ready to capitalize on them when they do occur. As we 
saw in Chapter Two, Nietzsche explicitly recognises this particular role that luck can play in 
achievements: what "fortunate circumstances played a part" (HH, §164) in attaining a goal. 
        However, there is a second way luck can be pertinent here. Although many cases of luck 
in striving for a goal will result in the diminishing (in some degree) of the difficulty needed to 
be overcome, this is not true of all cases. Some tasks may be significantly difficult yet play 
no role as a cause of accomplishing a particular goal. The causal connection between the 
striving and the successful overcoming may purely be down to luck, and this has significant 
consequences for whether something counts as an achievement. The suggestion is that 
achievements must involve the prominent role of one's relevant abilities in causing the 
attainment of a goal. 
        Consider the following example, originally given by Keller,  but reformulated by 208
Bradford to make it relevant to difficulty: 
Joan and the politician. There is a local law prohibiting overnight parking in the town where 
Joan lives, and she has the goal of having this law changed. She has the crazy idea that 
standing on her head for three hours a day will have the effect of changing the law. She does 
this. As it happens, the law does get changed, but, of course not as a result of anything Joan 
does. Rather, a local politician buys a new car and needs a parking space.  209
In this example, Joan (1) has a clear goal: to change the parking law; (2) engages in a difficult 
activity she believes will bring about her goal: standing on her head for three hours a day; and 
(3) sees her goal realized: the law gets changed. However, the change in parking law does not 
constitute an achievement for Joan. It was a matter of luck for her that a local politician 
needed a parking space. The point here being that for something to count as an achievement, 
 Keller, (2004), pp. 27-41.208
 Bradford, (2015), p. 12.209
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there must be some specific causal connection between the difficulty endured and the goal 
that it aims at accomplishing.  Here is another example to clarify the point: 210
The healer priest. Kyle is a teenager with a terminal illness. He falls into a coma with no 
indication of when he will return to consciousness. A priest from the church in Kyle's local 
area visits him daily and prays for his recovery, often organising prayer meetings encouraging 
others to do so as well. Being from a particularly zealous sect, the priest also takes time 
translating ancient passages from his holy text which he believes ward off evil spirits and 
demons. He then recites these daily in Kyle's room in order to prevent these demons from 
frustrating his recovery. As it happens, after two weeks, Kyle awakes from his coma and 
shows signs of improvement to his health. Of course, this improvement is not at all a result of 
the priest's rituals, rather it is due to the careful monitoring and care of the hospital staff.  
Like the case of Joan, the healing of Kyle does not constitute an achievement for the priest, 
even though it involved difficulty and the attainment of a goal. This is because his efforts had 
no connection to what causes his goal of Kyle's recovery. So in order for something to count 
as an achievement, it appears that the goal has to be achieved in a certain way. Like the 
footballer's misplaced free kick which is blown into the back of the opposing team's net by a 
freak gust of wind, genuine achievements cannot be coincidental. Rather, the goal must be 
brought about by a particular means. Hurka phrases this causation in terms of realizing a goal 
"intelligently".  Pritchard frames this in terms of bringing about one's goal because of the 211
"exercise of one's relevant abilities".  Further still, Bradford states that a goal must be 212
realized "sufficiently competently".   213
        Nietzsche also alludes to this particular danger that luck can pose to one's achievement 
when he writes that "no conqueror believes in chance" (GS, §258), implying that the presence 
of luck would undermine one's strength of will or ability, and therefore the achievement. 
More precisely, luck of this nature undercuts the agent's self-efficacy—the extent of belief in 
their causal influence in reaching their goal—which is the very feeling of power; that 
 Of course, other unintended effects can also count as achievements when they are themselves 210
foreseeable effects of attaining the intended goal, as where one’s goal is to cure cancer and, as a 
result of succeeding in doing this, one achieves the associated fame.
 Hurka, (2011), p. 98.211
 Pritchard, (2010), p. 22.212
 Bradford, (2013a), pp. 205.213
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resistance has been overcome and defeated by the agent.  Instead, Nietzsche calls for "the 214
future of man as his will...so as to make an end of that gruesome dominion of 
chance..." (BGE, §203).  215
        There is much to be said about the specific content of this condition, particularly 
regarding various epistemological questions with respect to the agent. For example, whether 
the agent has justified and true beliefs that their actions will cause the desired outcome.  216
However, these are questions which Nietzsche shows little interest in, and certainly does not 
elucidate in detail. Nevertheless, the discussion up to this point gives us enough of an 
understanding about the nature of achievements for my purposes here, which is to investigate 
their value. 
        Achievements are characterised by successfully overcoming significant difficulty to 
attain a goal in a non-lucky and competently caused way.  This is an intuitive account of 217
our usage of the term to denote awe and admiration at one's triumphs. The doctrine of the will 
to power, understood as the will to the overcoming of resistance, is remarkably close to this 
intuitive account. The three conditions for power must be that (1) there must a goal; (2) there 
must be resistance to one's goal; (2) this resistance must eventually be overcome; (3) it must 
be overcome by making a demand on one's ability (or as Nietzsche frames it: strength), in a 
non (purely) lucky way.  
        Now that we have an understanding of the nature of achievement and how it 
corresponds to the will to power, we can enquire into which aspect of achievement makes it 
valuable. In doing so, I shall argue that, for Nietzsche, resistance to the will (i.e. suffering), is 
 The importance of self-efficacy has also been discussed in great detail in regard to Nietzsche's 214
subsequent conception of freedom by Manuel Dries, though not explicitly in the context of luck. 
See Manuel Dries, "Freedom, Resistance, Agency" in Dries and Kail (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and 
Nature, (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 142-162.
 To be sure, in this passage Nietzsche makes a large number of independent points. In calling for 215
"new philosophers" to revalue so called 'eternal values', Nietzsche is not specifically referring to the 
role of chance or luck in particular achievements. Rather, he derides the absence of the will and of 
"collective experiments in discipline" in the history of valuing in general. Nevertheless, the role of 
the will is used to show the value of deliberation and influence in the concept of achievement.
 Bradford devotes a chapter to discussion of competent causation, skilfully exploring these issues 216
which I will not have time for here. See Bradford, (2015), pp. 64-82.
 I discuss the possibility of a fourth condition, a constraint on the value of the goal, in the 217
following section.
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not merely instrumental in reaching a valuable goal, but is in fact a constitutive feature of a 
valuable achievement. Moreover, that Nietzsche is right to hold this view. 
4. Sources of Value: Three Competing Views 
        I will firstly present the two views which I shall argue fail both as accurate 
interpretations of Nietzsche's position and as plausible accounts of the value of achievements 
in themselves.   
4.1. The Product View 
        An ordinary way of thinking about the pursuit of goals is that the easier it is to achieve 
those goals the better. In other words, the value of an achievement is only as valuable as the 
goal it aims at realizing. For example, many people have the goal to lose weight and get in 
shape, and they understand that a process of intense exercise and strict dieting is a means of 
doing so. But many prefer quicker and easier methods of achieving this goal through dietary 
supplements, steroids, and even hypnosis. According to the view under consideration, the 
value of achieving the goal is entirely in the end (being in shape) and independent of the 
difficult process of getting there (the exercise). I shall call this the Product View. 
        On the Product View, engaging in difficult activity, or suffering in striving to achieve 
one's goal, is of merely instrumental value: it is valuable as a means of bringing about some 
finally valuable end, but it would have been better if the end was already attained without 
difficulty or suffering. In cases where a tremendous effort results in no independently 
valuable goal, then according to the product view, that effort is worthless.  
        The product view can even allow that difficulty is of negative value if the goal is not 
independently valuable: that one's effort in overcoming difficulty was a waste of time. 
Scenarios like that of Sisyphus—rolling a large boulder up a mountain, only to watch it fall 
back down to the bottom, repeating this cycle perpetually—appear to support this intuition. 
As the myth goes, Sisyphus is being punished by being made to do this task. The example is 
almost always cited as an intuitive case of difficulty being of negative value when 
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experienced in pursuit of worthless goals. As we shall see shortly, some cases provide reasons 
to challenge this view. 
        The product view appears plausible in particular cases. For example, when a team of 
scientists finds the cure for a terminal illness, we might not think that this achievement is 
made more valuable by the addition of difficulty in coming to their conclusions. Rather, the 
achievement is valuable because of what it achieves: the prevention of death, or at least an 
improvement in health, for many people. According to the product view, it would be better if 
the cures for these diseases were already known. Examples of this nature, in which the value 
of the product is particularly striking, indicate that the product view gets something right 
about the value of achievements. However, I shall argue that its plausibility is severely 
limited. 
         The important aspect of the product view to consider for my purposes here is that it 
allows one to coherently deplore the suffering endured in achieving a goal while recognising 
its instrumental value. We might hold that hardships and suffering would not exist, or at least 
be significantly reduced, in ideal circumstances, while still viewing them as a means to 
certain ends. The product view allows for this idea by placing the value of achievements 
solely in the goal. Does Nietzsche accept something like the product view? I argue that he 
does not. 
        Understanding suffering as regrettable means in this way would be perfectly compatible 
with evaluative/normative views that Nietzsche explicitly rejects. For example, a hedonist 
could accept that a great degree of suffering is needed to achieve a goal that results in a 
significantly compensating pleasure. They would argue that it would have been better if 
reaching the pleasurable end didn't involve suffering; that an alternative means was available. 
Similarly, a Christian will likely accept that suffering is a means—even a necessary means—
to certain goods. Striving to know God, for instance, might involve great sacrifice and 
suffering. However, it might have been better if they already knew God in the first place. 
Similarly, experiencing bliss in heaven is a goal which may require overcoming vast suffering 
in the real world. Yet if doing so is only instrumental, then it would have been better if one 
was already in a state of bliss, rather than struggling in striving to attain it.  
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        It may seem odd that Christianity is placed alongside hedonism in Nietzsche's campaign 
against morality. The reason being that Christian ethics traditionally opposes hedonistic 
accounts of wellbeing, instead adhering closer to a broadly perfectionist view which holds 
that there are certain values which are good regardless of the pleasure they may bring an 
agent. However, Nietzsche argues that Christianity, in postulating a 'better world beyond' or 
'perfected reality', ultimately values the same kind of happiness as the hedonist: happiness as 
the "alleviation of suffering" (GM, III, §17) that I presented in Chapter One. He writes: 
They tell me their misery means they are God’s chosen and select, after all, people beat the 
dogs they love best; perhaps this misery is just a preparation, a test, a training, it might be 
even more than that – something which will one day be balanced up and paid back with 
enormous interest in gold, no! in happiness. They call that ‘bliss’ (GM, I, §14; cf. BGE, §61) 
In a later note, Nietzsche makes explicit the idea that Christianity values suffering 
instrumentally; as something regrettable, which in ideal circumstances would not be: 
God created man happy, idle, innocent, and immortal: our actual life is a false, decayed, 
sinful existence, an existence of punishment—Suffering, struggle, work, death are considered 
as objections and question marks against life, as something that ought not to last; for which 
one requires a cure—and has a cure! 
        From the time of Adam until now, man has been in an abnormal state: God himself has 
sacrificed his son for the guilt of Adam, in order to put an end to this abnormal state: the 
natural character of life is a curse; Christ gives back the state of normality to him who 
believes in him: he makes him happy, idle and innocent. (WP, §224, KSA, 1887, 
11[262-263]) 
  
Nietzsche's interpretation of the Christian story of the fall of Adam and the redemption of 
mankind is one in which suffering might be valuable as a means of attaining a particular goal, 
but that in ideal circumstances, would not have to be endured. In the same passage, Nietzsche 
also makes a separable claim that Christianity can even discourage the value of struggle in 
freeing oneself from sin: that this struggle is dissolved and made unnecessary by the sacrifice 
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of Jesus on mankind's behalf. He refers to the "lazy Christian concepts" of "'blessedness', 
'innocence', 'immortality'", and that the Christian's goal of  freedom from sin is "not through 
his own deed, not through a stern struggle on his part, but ransomed for freedom through the 
act of redemption" (WP, §224; KSA, 1887, 11[263]).  
        If suffering has only instrumental value, then the process of striving is either worthless 
or of negative value. Herd morality endorses, or at least Nietzsche believes it to endorse, the 
instrumental view. This has significant consequences for an interpretation of Nietzsche in 
which he claims suffering is only of instrumental value. I offer the following initial argument 
(call this the "weak rebuttal"): 
Premise 1: Suffering having only instrumental value is compatible with, and even  
                affirmed by, herd morality. 
Premise 2: Nietzsche strongly rejects herd morality at least partly on the grounds that  
                it fails to appropriately value suffering. 
Conclusion: The indication is that Nietzsche values suffering in an additional, non- 
                  instrumental, sense.   
I have addressed premise 1, but regarding premise 2: it is difficult to exaggerate the 
frequency and force of Nietzsche's rejection of herd morality. In Daybreak, Nietzsche writes: 
Are we not, with this tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life, well on 
the way to turning mankind into sand? Sand! Small, soft, round, unending sand! Is that your 
ideal, you heralds of the sympathetic affections? (D, §174) 
The same sentiment only increases into Nietzsche's mature period. Herd morality, he claims 
is "a common war on all that is rare, strange privileged, the higher man, the higher 
responsibility (BGE, §212). He claims specifically of Christianity that "if anything is 
unevangelic it is the concept hero. Precisely the opposite of all contending, of all feeling 
oneself in struggle has here become instinct: the incapacity for resistance here becomes 
morality (A, §29). He continues, that Christianity has "waged a war to the death against this 
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higher type of man" (A, §5). His attack on herd morality is often explicitly framed in terms of 
the value of suffering, and rejects the claim that it is merely a regrettable means: 
If you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and as a 
defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbour another 
religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of 
comfortableness (GS, §338). 
You want if possible — and there is no more insane 'if possible' — to abolish suffering; and 
we? — it really does seem that we would rather increase it and make it worse than it has ever 
been! (BGE, §225) 
The accused in this passage are all those who define happiness in terms of the alleviation of 
suffering, as "narcotic, anaesthetic, calm, peace...passivity" (GM, I, §10), which was 
discussed in Chapter One in contrast to Nietzsche's 'new happiness', defined in terms of 
striving and actively overcoming challenges. If suffering is always seen to be something that 
should be eradicated or reduced, then it can only ever be of instrumental value: a means to 
achievement, but not what a valuable achievement consists in. Nietzsche is keen to distance 
himself from such a view, describing himself and like minds as endorsing the "opposite" 
position: 
What with all their might they would like to strive after is the universal green pasture of 
happiness of the herd, with security, safety, comfort and an easier life for all; their two most 
oft-recited doctrines and ditties are 'equality of rights' and 'sympathy for all that suffers' — 
and suffering itself they take for something that has to be abolished. We who are the opposite 
of this, and have opened our eyes and our conscience to the question where and how the plant 
'man' has hitherto grown up most vigorously, we think that this has always happened under 
the opposite conditions, that the perilousness of his situation had first to become 
tremendous...his will to life had to be intensified into unconditional will to power (BGE, §44) 
In the Nachlass, Nietzsche makes a strikingly similarly vehement rejection of herd morality 
explicitly on the grounds that it fails to appropriately value suffering. Most clearly, he writes: 
Such men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding, will be 
sought in vain today and probably for a long time to come; until, after much disappointment, 
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one must begin to comprehend why they are lacking and that nothing stands more malignantly 
in the way of their rise and evolution, today and for a long time to come, than what in Europe 
today is called simply ‘morality’—as if there were no other morality and could be no other—
the aforementioned herd-animal morality which is striving with all its power for a universal 
green-pasture happiness on earth, namely for security, absence of danger, comfort, the easy 
life...The two doctrines it preaches most often are: ‘equal rights’ and ‘sympathy with all that 
suffers’—and it takes suffering itself to be something that must absolutely be abolished. (WP, 
§957; KSA, 1885, 37[8]) 
This passage is telling: it explicitly states that the reason that great individuals are 'sought in 
vain today' is precisely because the dominant morality that exists is one in which suffering is 
considered to be something that ought to be abolished; at best a regrettable means to an end. 
My argument so far has been that (1) given herd morality is compatible with the product view
—in which suffering, in Leiter's terminology, is 'only instrumental'—and (2) given that 
Nietzsche strongly rejects herd morality and calls for a 'revaluation of all values' at least 
partly on the grounds that it fails to appropriately value suffering, Nietzsche must value 
suffering in an additional and non-instrumental way. This "weak rebuttal" argument only gets 
us so far: it aims to raise our suspicion of the instrumental interpretation in light of 
Nietzsche's other claims. But we still need to know why Nietzsche would reject it, and what 
form of non-instrumental value suffering has in his view. 
        At least one major concern that Nietzsche has is that there is value to be found in the 
process of striving, and not just the goal one strives for, and this is obscured by the 
instrumental approach of the product view. Nietzsche's complaints are not unwarranted, and 
even intuitive, for the product view faces several serious problems. I shall now address this 
issue, and the reasons which I take to be the strongest to reject the product view as a plausible 
account of the value of achievements. 
        If the product view is true, then cases where a goal is reached after much effort and 
struggle, all else being equal, are no more admirable than those achieved with significantly 
less struggle. This is highly counter-intuitive. Hard work, effort, struggle and devotion seem 
to matter in our estimations of valuable achievements. Take the following example: 
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Goethe1: in one possible world, Goethe writes Faust in a relatively short time in the comfort 
of his large house. He experienced some writers block and stress on odd days, and like any 
creative project there were more productive moments than others. Much work was done that 
was later discarded, nevertheless, writing Faust was enjoyable for him. 
Goethe2: in a second possible world, Goethe writes Faust while enduring the same hardships. 
However, it takes him years longer due to a number of additional obstacles and setbacks. 
Being significantly poorer, he has to work ten hours a day at a mundane job to support 
himself, and therefore can only afford to allocate a short time each evening to developing 
Faust, which he does in a particularly unsuitable workspace. His wife leaves him, and he also 
experiences the loss of two close family members while carrying out his project. His health 
deteriorates, likely due to his depression over the loss, and so on. Despite this, Goethe 
completes Faust after much toil and struggle. 
In this example, each Goethe produces an identical Faust. Both are great achievements 
(assuming they satisfy the conditions outlined in the previous section), yet there is a very 
strong intuition that Goethe2's achievement is worthy of more admiration for being a greater 
achievement. The reason being that Goethe2 has overcome significantly more difficulty in 
attaining his goal. Likewise with the case of Beethoven, argues Reginster, our admiration for 
him "grows deeper when we learn of his deafness of loneliness".   218
        But the product view simply does not allow for this possibility. For the product view, 
what makes an achievement valuable is purely the final value of the goal held independently 
of the process. Hence, what is admirable about both Goethe's achievements is the final value 
of Faust, and the difficulty both faced in completing it is merely instrumental. The 
consequence of the product view seems to be that Goethe1 and Goethe2's achievements are of 
identical value. But in clashing with a strong contrary intuition, this gives us reason to be 
sceptical of the product view's plausibility.  
        There are two potential responses that defenders of the product view can make at this 
point. Firstly, one might defend the claim that Goethe1 and Goethe2's achievements of writing 
Faust are equally valuable, but the reason there is a strong intuition that Goethe2 is worthy of 
more admiration is because, on top of writing Faust, he also had to face adversity at his job, 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 180.218
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overcome poverty, and so forth. The thought being that in the case of Goethe2, there is not 
one achievement, but at least two independent achievements, and so all things considered his 
activity is more valuable. 
        But this type of response does not do the work required in order show that the value of 
an achievement resides purely in its product. If Goethe2 is worthy of more admiration in 
virtue of having overcome adversity in not one achievement but two, this still recognises 
overcoming adversity either as an achievement itself or as a constitutive feature of an 
achievement. If it is itself a valuable achievement to have overcome adversity, then this is 
surely because it was difficult to do so, which is indicated by the thought experiment. 
Consequently, this argument would already account for the value of overcoming difficulty. If, 
on the other hand, it is not overcoming difficulty which is itself an achievement, but the goals 
he attained at his mundane job, for example, which constitute the second achievement, then 
this leaves the product view upon to a further objection: that it cannot account for genuinely 
valuable achievements where the product is of zero (or perhaps negative) value. I return to 
this type of case in detail shortly. 
        A second counter-argument would be to distinguish between admiration for the 
achievement and admiration for the achiever. With this strategy, what we are additionally 
admiring in Goethe2 is not his achievement per say, but rather in dealing with the additional 
obstacles to his goal, we admire his exercising of relevant executive virtues which are 
themselves independently valuable. This response would seemingly allow defenders of the 
product view to affirm that purely the excellence of Faust is what makes each achievement 
valuable, while simultaneously satisfying our more positive intuitions regarding Goethe2 by 
differentiating between the value of the work and assessment of the strength of character it 
required. Consequently, all things considered Goethe2's activity would be more valuable 
because of the excellence of Faust plus the presence of virtue. 
        Yet this response also fails to be convincing insofar as it aims to provide the best 
explanation for all of the value in question. This argument that defenders of the product view 
could make would only allow overcoming difficulty to indicate an admirable character. While 
I do not deny that the exercise of (for example) discipline, perseverance, tenacity, endurance, 
and so forth, is an additionally valuable feature of the activity, that this is only why Goethe2's 
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activity is more valuable is an odd view to take. The reason being that as we saw in the last 
section, it is not the case that difficulty is merely a contingent feature of achievements, it is 
essential to them: something cannot be an achievement in the relevant sense unless it is 
significantly difficult. With this in mind, there is no real pressure to adopt a purely character-
centred evaluation rather than the more natural reading of the example in terms of 
overcoming difficulty. On this view, Goethe2's achievement is 'attaining X under 
circumstances Y'. 
        The Faust thought experiment is a variation of a case given by both Reginster and 
Bradford to demonstrate the intuitive pull of this idea that the process of achieving one's goal 
contributes to the value of an achievement, and not solely the product.  Nietzsche clearly 219
shares this positive intuition, which he expresses plainly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the 
section entitled 'Of the One Thousand and One Goals', Nietzsche writes that: 
A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings; 
behold, it is the voice of their will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a 
people; whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good; and whatever liberates 
even out of the deepest need, the rarest, the most difficult — that they call holy. (Z, I: §15) 
Although there are a number of different points being made in this passage, I take this to 
show part of Nietzsche's commitment to the view under consideration: that the process of 
striving and overcoming obstacles is a valuable feature of achievements. Hence Nietzsche's 
great admiration for Goethe being at least partly in virtue of his belief that he "was not 
fainthearted but took as much as possible upon himself, over himself, into himself" (TI, 
'Skirmishes', §49). On Nietzsche's view, although Goethe had a clear aim (to complete Faust) 
this was not his sole aim. Goethe also aimed at bringing about the completion of Faust in a 
way that gave him a challenge: he aimed at difficulty, for "proud natures" are excited "only at 
the sight of all possessions that are hard to come by" (GS, §13). 
        As I argued in Chapter One, the will to power can only manifest itself through the 
process of striving. Power can only be experienced by overcoming difficulty—resistance to 
 Reginster's version of this case involves two scientists: one who makes a great discovery after a 219
lifetime of effort, and the other stumbles upon the same discovery by chance. However, 
introducing the variable of luck makes this example more complicated than it needs to be for the 
purpose of comparing the value of each scenario. I have altered the example with the Goethe case 
so luck is not a factor. For Bradford's version, see Bradford, (2013a), p. 208. 
  163
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
the will—and difficulty can only be experienced in striving to realize a goal; a goal which 
according to Nietzsche, when achieved, will be overshadowed by a subsequent new goal 
which provides more resistance. In this sense the agent in part desires difficulty; for 
resistance to provide them with a challenge. Difficulty, of which suffering is a form, is 
therefore a constitutive feature of the good rather than a mere means to it. 
        The Faust thought experiment given above strongly suggests Nietzsche to be on to 
something; that the process of overcoming resistance to our goals matters for the value of that 
achievement, and is not merely instrumental. The argument I have offered—call this the 
"strong rebuttal"—is a reductio ad absurdum, which I take Nietzsche to endorse. 
Premise 1: The Product View holds that the value of an achievement resides solely in  
                  the goal. 
Premise 2: On this view, the process of struggle in achieving the goal is worthless or  
                  disvaluable. 
Premise 3: The process of struggle in achieving is valuable. 
Conclusion: The Product View is false. 
Bradford derives from this conclusion that "the value of achievement increases as difficulty 
increases".  But although this may be true as a rule of thumb, this move is too quick, for 220
there is an important distinction to be made that Bradford does not directly explore, namely, 
the distinction between different types of difficulty: the intrinsic and extrinsic. 
        Intrinsic difficulty can be understood as the difficulty, or 'resistance', essential to a task, 
that anyone in pursuit of its goal will have to surmount. For example, the rules of tennis will 
require a player to overcome the intrinsic difficulties of energy preservation, calculated and 
precise racket-motions, acute depth perception, anticipating the opponents strategy, and so 
forth. Extrinsic difficulty can be understood as that which is not specifically demanded by the 
task, but nonetheless provides obstacles to the realization of a goal. For instance, if the tennis 
match was being played on a run-down court, in total darkness, or the rackets being used 
were of an extremely low quality 
 Bradford, (2013a), p. 211.220
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        If we affirm plainly that the more difficult something is the better the achievement will 
be, provide it is overcome, then this rests on the assumption that both types of difficulty 
contribute equal value to an achievement. But this is far from obvious. In order to strengthen 
the view that difficulty does add value to an achievement, it will be helpful to disentangle 
these two concepts.  
        Consider again the Faust example. Goethe1 overcomes all the intrinsic difficulties in 
writing Faust but encounters little if any extrinsic difficulty. On the other hand, Goethe2 
experiences all the same intrinsic difficulty, but in addition overcomes vast extrinsic 
difficulty. On my view, and plausibly Nietzsche's, Goethe2 has a greater achievement; he has 
'overcome more resistance'. However, if we alter the case given and suppose that Goethe2's 
Faust was of much lower quality, then the intuition that his achievement is a better one than 
Goethe1's is significantly weakened, even if his extrinsic difficulties remained. This indicates 
that overcoming intrinsic difficulty somehow counts for more than overcoming extrinsic 
difficulty. 
        To take another example that addresses this distinction, we might consider athletic 
pursuits such as weight lifting or pole-vaulting. Typically, we do not see these athletes 
removing fingers or limbs in order to make their task more difficult. Rather, we do see them 
adding weight to the bar, or raising the height to be jumped: they increase the intrinsic 
difficulty of their task and not the extrinsic difficulty. Similarly, marathon runners tend not to 
put stones in their shoes when competing. Rather, they increase the intrinsic difficulty by 
attempting to run a longer distance in a shorter time. I take this to indicate at least part of an 
explanation regarding the different contributions of value that these two types of difficulty 
make to an achievement. Of course, one reason why athletes do not remove limbs even 
though it adds difficulty to their task is that achievement is not the only good thing in life. 
Removing limbs would cause significant harm to other aspects of their well-being, or at the 
very least be instrumentally bad for other activities. However, the point here is that even if it 
didn't (perhaps the weightlifter temporarily numbed some of his fingers), it is not obvious 
that the achievement would be of more or equal value to the same task with but with the 
equivalent intrinsic difficulty instead. 
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        Nietzsche does not address this distinction explicitly; only using a broader terminology 
of 'resistance' to the will. However, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche implicitly associates the 
will to the overcoming of resistance with intrinsic difficulties. He distinguishes two claims:  
(A) Whenever we act, we aim to encounter and overcome resistance of any and all 
kinds. 
(B) Whenever we act, we aim to encounter and overcome resistances that are related 
to the activity that we are performing.  221
Katsafanas interprets Nietzsche to endorse (B), for claim (A) has absurd implications, which I 
shall discuss in the final section of this chapter. Katsafanas argues that the will to power 
motivates one to express one's drives in a way that gives them resistance to overcome, and 
that one only aims to encounter and overcome resistances that give that drive the relevant 
opportunity for expression. Katsafanas writes that: 
...our actions are motivated by drives; drives aim at continuous expression of their characteristic 
forms of activity; thus, drives motivate the agent continuously to seek resistances upon which to 
vent their form of activity. The particular types of resistance that the agent is motivated to seek 
will depend upon the drive in question.  222
Put another way, the determinate goal that one pursues will ascertain what form the resistance 
to its attainment will take. For example, if my goal is to compose a brilliant and original 
score, the resistance essential to the task will involve creating harmonies and interesting 
musical expressions, engaging with and developing existing genres, innovating new 
techniques, blending a variety of instruments, and so forth. The implication of Katsafanas' 
view is that the will to power aims at intrinsic difficulty rather than extrinsic difficulty. 
        However there is an ambiguity regarding Katsafanas use of "related to" in formulation 
(B). It seems that at least some forms of extrinsic difficulty can be 'related to' the activity one 
is performing too. When one composes, the presence of an irritating noise will make the task 
harder. When one runs a marathon, it will be harder to complete during a storm, or with a 
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 176.221
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 177.222
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stone in one's shoe. It is unclear how drives cannot be relevantly expressed through these 
difficulties. Moreover, it is likely Nietzsche does indeed value the overcoming of extrinsic 
resistance as well: for example triumphing in one's achievement while living in a society 
whose norms seek to thwart that excellence. Or alternatively, when individuals are victorious 
against all the odds, perhaps due to ill health (as in Nietzsche's own case). I agree with 
Katsafanas that the will to power likely motivates one to seek intrinsic resistance, but the 
value of extrinsic resistance cannot be ignored altogether when evaluating a particular 
achievement, and the appeal to Nietzsche's conception of drives does not seem to help in 
determining the relative value of each form of resistance. 
        We have seen so far that the product view is implausible, both as an interpretation of 
Nietzsche as well as an exhaustive account of the value of achievements itself. At least one 
reason for this is that the product view fails to be able to account for the value of the process 
of attaining a goal: a feature that Nietzsche clearly values. But at this point we must ask 
whether Nietzsche values the overcoming of resistance unconditionally, that is, even if the 
goal strived for is worthless, or of negative value. This will allow us to gain further clarity on 
how Nietzsche thinks achievements are valuable, and under what conditions. I shall now 
discuss this possibility and its complexities. 
4.2. The Process View 
        Some genuine achievements have goals which appear to be completely worthless when 
considered independently of the process of achieving them. For example, many undertake 
various challenges, such as mountain climbing or marathon running, not because of the what 
they result in: being on top of a mountain, or being 26 miles away from a previous location—
these states appear to have no intrinsic value—but they partake in these activities purely 
because of the value of the process of achieving them. These people do not get helicopters to 
the top of the mountain, or catch a taxi to the finish line, but choose to engage in their activity 
precisely because it is difficult to achieve the goal. On one understanding of the value of 
achievement—call this the process view—the striving to attain a goal and overcoming 
difficulty is entirely what makes achievements valuable, regardless of whether the goal is 
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itself independently valuable. Independently valuable goals may add to the total value of an 
achievement all things considered, but are by no means necessary for a valuable achievement. 
        There may be an intermediate position here which could explain such cases without 
reference to difficulty. One, for example, might eschew getting to the top of the mountain via 
helicopter, but deny that this is because getting to the top under one's own steam is difficult; 
one might just value getting to the top under one’s own steam, whether it is difficult or not. 
This might account for some cases, but it is unlikely to account for all cases. It is most 
intuitive when the goal, or the effects of achieving it, is something independently worthwhile. 
It would be odd if the only reason one climbed a mountain, or ran a marathon, was because 
they valued self-sufficiency. But my purpose here is to explain what makes struggling to 
obtain worthless goals valuable achievements in-themselves, regardless of their effects. Many 
people do climb mountains explicitly to overcome difficulty, and it is these cases which are 
relevant to this discussion. 
        Paradigm cases of this understanding of the value of achievements can be found in 
games. Contra Wittgenstein, Bernard Suits attempted to define what it means to play a game, 
and Hurka has recently discussed the merits of Suits' view in relation to what he takes to 
constitute the value of achievement.  Suits argued that "playing a game is the voluntary 223
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles",  and proposed three conditions that, taken 224
together, constituent a sufficient definition: 
(1) the prelusory goal: one always aims at a goal that can be described independently 
of the game (e.g. in football, the goal is to get the ball in the back of a particular net). 
(2) the constitutive rules: the function of these rules is to forbid the most efficient 
means to the prelusory goal. (according the rules of football, you cannot pick up the 
ball and run it into the net;  you cannot pass the ball to a player who is standing past 
 Hurka, (2006), "Games and the Good", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 223
Volumes, Vol. 80, pp. 217-235.
 Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 224
1978) p. 41. Hastings Rashdall made a similar claim about sport: "Sport has been well defined as the 
overcoming of difficulties simply for the sake of overcoming them". See Hastings Rashdall, The 
Theory of Good and Evil, (London: OUP, 1907), p. 105.
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the opposing team's final defender; there is a time limit; there are constraints on 
appropriate tackling, substitutions and so forth). 
(3) the lusory attitude: a person's willingly accepting the constitutive rules. In other 
words, wanting there to be difficulty to overcome. 
The prelusory goal and constitutive rules together give game playing an important feature, 
namely difficulty, and the lusory attitude chooses it because of this feature. Suits' full 
definition is that: 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only 
means permitted by the rules...where the rules prohibit the use of more efficient in favour of 
less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they 
make possible such activity [lusory attitude].  225
When one engages in a football match, does a crossword, plays computer games, and so 
forth, one does so not with the aim of enduring their associated difficulties as a mere means 
to achieve the valuable goal: it would not have been better if the goal was achieved without 
the difficulty. Rather, the difficulty is precisely what makes the activity valuable.   
        The first thing to say about Suits' definition of a game is that it is highly inclusive. The 
three conditions allow for a number of activities that are not generally considered games, for 
instance; mountain climbing, to be designated as such. In this sense, Suits' definition is highly 
stipulative. A second point is that not all games seem to have a 'prelusory' goal (i.e. a goal 
that can be described independently of the game itself) as Suits claims. For example, in chess 
or ice-skating, the rules which govern the game have to be referred to in order to make sense 
of the goal. Nonetheless, the crucial aspect of his view for my purposes, regardless of 
whether his definition is consistent with all games, is that some activities are valuable not 
because of the goal they aim at achieving, but because of the difficulty involved in doing so.  
        The question arises whether Nietzsche thinks the overcoming of resistance is valuable in 
this sense as well; that suffering to achieve one's goal makes for a valuable achievement even 
if the goal one pursues is completely worthless. In support of this view, an analogy between 
game playing and Nietzsche's position regarding the value of striving is not as far-fetched as 
 Suits, (1978), pp. 54-55; additional brackets taken from Hurka, (2006).225
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one might think. The general tone of Nietzsche's remarks on the pursuit of one's goals is 
comparable to a game, more specifically the Greek concept of 'Agon', usually translated as 
contest or competition (see HH, §158, §170; D, §431; TI, 'Socrates', §8, 'Skirmishes', §23). 
        One example to draw out this theme is Nietzsche's claims regarding the need for 
enemies, for they create a struggle. So for example, it was in a sense bad for Achilles to slay 
his enemy Hector, for although he achieved his goal, he deprived himself of the only worthy 
opponent that could potentially defeat him and give him a real challenge. Nietzsche 
recognises the "value of having enemies" (TI, 'Morality as Anti Nature', §3) for precisely this 
agonistic reason; they provide resistance to overcome; for the continuation of significant 
struggle in competition (Z, I, §10; III, §12; GM, I, §10; EH, I, §7). 
        Nietzsche further emphasises the value of struggle and process in the following passage 
from Human all too Human on war:  
When the Romans of the imperial era had grown a little tired of war they tried to gain new 
energy through animal-baiting, gladiatorial combats and the persecution of Christians. 
Present-day Englishmen, who seem also on the whole to have renounced war, seize on a 
different means of again engendering their fading energies: those perilous journeys of 
discovery, navigations, mountain-climbings...so as to bring home with them superfluous 
energy acquired through adventures and perils of all kinds (HH, §477) 
Nietzsche aims to make a number of separable points in this passage, but the relevant point 
here is that there is supposedly a strong intuitive admiration for the process of striving—war 
for the sake of war (e.g. Z, I, §10)—to the extent that perhaps it matters not what the goal is, 
as in the case of games. 
        The structure of the will to power that I have presented is also remarkably similar to 
Suits' definition of a game. Consider again Suits' three point analysis. According to him, 
when we take part in a game we start with a prelusory goal, which as stated above is an 
objective which can be described independently of the game. The same is true of the will to 
power as I have defined it: since resistance to the will is always defined in relation to desired 
determinate ends, resistance cannot be made intelligible, and cannot be overcome, unless the 
agent desires a particular end. 
  170
Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering 
        The second element Suits identifies are the constitutive rules, whose function is to forbid 
the most efficient means of achieving the prelusory goal. Again, the will to power, 
understood as the process of overcoming resistance, reflects this aspect of game playing: 
given that power can only be experienced as a result of overcoming resistance to the will, 
activities worthy of increasing one's power must be sufficiently difficult: "Ah, whoever 
guesses what is my will should also guess on what crooked paths it must proceed" (Z, II, §12; 
emphasis mine). 
        The third element, the lusory attitude, is perhaps the most relevant to why suffering 
cannot have merely instrumental value in Nietzsche's view. This is the aspect which requires 
a person to willingly accept the constitutive rules that make a game difficult. In the language 
of the will to power, this translates as desiring there to be difficulty so that it can be 
overcome. Nietzsche, as we have seen, repeatedly emphasises this feature: "the poison of 
which weaker natures perish strengthens the strong – nor do they call it poison" (GS, §19; 
emphasis mine). 
       
        Hurka has defended the process view about the value of achievements, and also 
interprets Nietzsche to endorse it. He writes: 
...for both Marx and Nietzsche a central human good was activity that on the one side is 
necessarily directed to a goal but on the other derives its value entirely from aspects of the 
process of achieving it. This is why the type of value they affirm is paradigmatically 
illustrated by playing in games; when one's goal is trivial, the only value can be that of 
process.  226
One immediate problem with interpreting Nietzsche in this way, and as a view about 
achievements more generally, is that it will implausibly allow certain mundane activities to 
be valuable achievements. For instance, if we again imagine Sisyphus rolling his boulder up a 
mountain for all eternity, his process of doing so will involve much resistance to be 
overcome. According to the process view, it would be seem as though Sisyphus' activity is 
exceedingly valuable. This is not only extremely counter-intuitive, but also highly 
 Hurka, (2006), p. 231.226
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improbable as a case of genuine achievement in Nietzsche's view. This point has been 
emphasised recently by Poellner. He writes: 
What intrinsically matters about an activity, according to him [Nietzsche], is not just the 
quantity of resistance it overcomes, whatever that resistance may be. Not every overcoming 
of obstacles, however great, is necessarily significant or worthwhile. Evaluative judgements 
are also possible and required about the worth of an overcoming in terms of what it is an 
overcoming of and what it is an overcoming towards; that is, what our first-order desires aim 
at.  227
Similarly, Reginster makes precisely this objection, writing that: 
...if the nature of the determinate end did not matter, then we would no longer be able to rule 
out as frivolous, disgusting, or simply ridiculous achievements such as that of eating twenty-
five pies in one sitting.  228
        Reginster takes this to indicate that Nietzsche must implicitly hold some substantive 
constraints on the determinate goal in order for something to count as a valuable 
achievement. Nietzsche does not indicate what these constraints are, only that they are not 
necessarily moral constraints.          229
        However, Hurka is well aware that the process view, as it stands, is vulnerable to this 
objection. Consequently, he develops a process-account of Nietzsche's understanding of the 
value of achievements which aims to accommodate these worries. Hurka interprets Nietzsche 
not to posit substantive goals which make an achievement valuable, but rather he "evaluates 
goals in terms of formal qualities, ones that are compatible with many different substantive 
contents”.  Hurka cites two such properties that Nietzsche identifies, with the differing 230
value of achievements, on this view, corresponding to the degree they are realized. 
        The first formal property Hurka identifies is how far one's goal is integrated amongst a 
number of diverse others, so "they form a system in which many different ends are pursued as 
 Poellner, (2012), p. 54.227
 Reginster, (2006), p. 183.228
 Reginster, (2006), p. 181.229
 Hurka, "Nietzsche: Perfectionist" in Leiter and Sinhabubu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality, 230
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 23.
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means to a single overriding one".  Hurka calls this unity-in-diversity, or what is more 231
commonly known as organic unity: what one needs is not just a large number of diverse 
goals, but to have them unified by a single taste.  The textual evidence for this notion is 232
plentiful, and is present in Nietzsche's work as early as Schopenhauer as Educator, where he 
states that riches, honours, and even great wisdom cannot "lift the individual out of the 
profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence", but how "striving after 
these valued things acquires meaning only through an exalted and transfiguring overall 
goal" (UM, III, §3). In contrast, Nietzsche expresses disdain at "specialists" and the "jobbing 
workman" (BGE, §204) who only focus their unified efforts in one discipline. Instead, he 
writes in a much quoted passage: 
One thing is needful. -- To “give style” to one’s character -- a great and rare art!... In the end, 
when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed 
and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important 
than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!” (GS, §290; cf. cf. BGE, §188; GM, II, 
§17; TI, 'Skirmishes', §49) 
Like his conception of strong and varied drives that was discussed in chapter two, Nietzsche 
holds that a great achiever's value lies not in a particular goal, but in his “range and 
multiplicity, in his wholeness in diversity” (BGE, §212). Hurka concludes from this textual 
evidence that Nietzsche "deemed activities good if they involve organizing one's aims around 
a single goal whatever that goal is".  233
        The second formal property is what Hurka calls the goal's extent, both in (1) time; and in 
(2) the number of people or objects it involves.  With regard to (1), Nietzsche derides “all 234
more short-willed and unreliable creatures” (GM, II, §2), in favour of he who can “extend his 
will across great stretches of his life” (WP, §962; KSA, 1885, 34[96]). He shows in a later 
note his hope for: 
 Hurka, (2007), p. 22.231
 I discuss organic unity as a principle in detail in the next chapter.232
 Hurka, (2006), p. 231.233
 Hurka, (2007), p. 23.234
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...a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in which the will of 
philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be made to endure for millennia. (WP, 
§960; KSA, 1885, 2[57]) 
  
In addition, I argued in Chapter Two that Nietzsche is interested in the extent to which one's 
achievements affect the lives of people, yet it is ambiguous as to whether Nietzsche takes this 
to be merely a result of a great achievement or what a great achievement at least partly 
consists in. Hurka defends the latter thesis, drawing attention to passages GM, II, §17-18 
where Nietzsche venerates a heroic people who “unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a 
populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad” (GM, II, 
§17), and those “artists of violence and organizers who build states” and who exercise their 
force on “some other man, other men” (GM, II, §18). 
        To take an example which Hurka uses in his Perfectionism to support this intuition, we 
might consider the task of a politician who fights to get an important and influential social 
bill passed in contrast to someone tying a shoelace. According to Hurka, the reason why the 
politicians achievement is a greater one is firstly because they had a number of goals 
subordinate to their goal of passing the bill, and secondly due to the fact that their 
achievement is more extended, both in time and across persons: "It includes everyone in his 
society for the foreseeable future, whereas the lace-tier's involves just one person and a 
shoelace now".  235
        Taken together, Hurka holds these two properties as sufficient to account for how 
Nietzsche values achievements; that he "values process independently of product".  Hurka 236
concludes: 
Nietzsche wanted people to have both extended goals and ones that unify their lives...he didn't 
care what this goal was, so long as it was extended and unifying—you could organise your 
life around anything.   237
 Hurka, (1993), pp. 115-116.235
 Hurka, (2011), p. 115.236
 Hurka, (2011), p. 115.237
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There are significant merits to Hurka's interpretation. One such merit is that it captures 
Nietzsche's highly pluralistic account of the good life. If we again consider Nietzsche's 
paradigm list of great achievers, they include people as diverse in their projects as 
Shakespeare, Cesare Borgia, Da Vinci, Julius Caesar, and Beethoven. Hurka's formal 
approach to the value of achievements can account for this plurality by explaining their value 
not in terms of each of their substantive goals, but in terms of qualities common to each 
individual's striving.  
        Hurka's interpretation is also effective in defending against the Sisyphus objection raised 
earlier. Hurka provides two reasons why Sisyphus' achievement is not a valuable one without 
appealing to the value of his goal independently of the process of achieving it. First of all, 
Sisyphus does not have any other goals; he is doomed to repeat his single activity for eternity. 
As a result, he cannot pursue a range of diverse projects with a unified will. Secondly, rolling 
his boulder up a mountain has little to no extent in time or across persons. His activity effects 
him and him alone, and only in his temporal existence. On these grounds, Hurka can dismiss 
Sisyphus as a genuine achiever and retain the integrity of the process view.  This strategy is 238
also effective in defending against Reginster-style examples like that of the person who 
overcomes vast difficulty in eating twenty-five pies in one sitting. This activity, and variants 
of it, are unlikely to be highly unifying and influential across time and persons in history. 
        It must be said that Hurka's account does not directly deal with difficulty. Rather, it is 
implied that the two formal conditions proposed, a complex interrelation of subordinate goals 
and one that has a far-reaching extent, make for suitably difficult activities. Hurka presents 
this argument in his book Perfectionism, where he outlines his own, very similar account of 
the value of achievements. He writes that "difficult activities usually involve a more complex 
 There is also a third argument for why Sisyphus cannot be a great achiever which appeals to the 238
will to power. The will to power manifests itself in overcoming obstacles to one's goal which provide 
challenge. But as Nietzsche writes: "Every growth betrays itself in the search for a mightier 
opponent or problem (EH, II, §7), and that “whoever reaches his ideal transcends it eo ipso.” (BGE, 
§73). In other words, when one has overcome a goal, one can no longer find (at least as much) 
value in conquering it again. Instead, one looks for new challenges. Consequently, Sisyphus is 
unlikely to manifest his will to power to a high degree. It is also significant that Sisyphus is being 
forced by the gods to do this activity; he has no choice whether to continue or not. I am unsure 
whether forced activities completely shut off any hope for describing them as valuable 
achievements. Given Nietzsche's emphasis on 'self-legislation', he may endorse such a view.  
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subordination of ends, and therefore more dominance".  Similarly, he states that difficult 239
activities are also "often accompanied by greater (non-temporal) extent".  240
        It is worth emphasising that Hurka understands that while it may be true that this is often 
or usually the case that achievements involve these features, it is not necessarily the case. 
Complexity and extent are only contingently related to difficulty. For example, lifting heavy 
objects is extremely difficult, but it is not very complex: it might just require brute strength. 
Another example might be threading a needle or drawing a ten metre long near-perfect 
straight line without the aid of a ruler. These are not complex actions, they are also actions 
which have no necessary connection to extent whatsoever, yet they are still difficult. 
Similarly, we can conceive of cases where someone's activity does have a huge impact in the 
world but is not difficult. For example, a pilot's releasing of a nuclear warhead from his 
aircraft onto a city.  241
        While extension and complexity are not necessarily connected to difficulty, they will in 
some cases make for a more difficult activity, and therefore make a contribution to the overall 
value of an achievement in certain cases. The most plausible way of interpreting Hurka's 
position regarding the current discussion then, is to consider it within the context of, and as a 
possible supplement to, Reginster's conception of the will to power as the overcoming of 
resistance. 
        I agree with Hurka that these formal properties are very important to Nietzsche. 
However, while his account accommodates worries about Sisyphus, it cannot deal with other 
cases that can satisfy these formal properties yet likely still fail to count as valuable 
achievements for Nietzsche.  Let us remind ourselves of Hurka's claim: 242
 Hurka, (1993), p. 123.239
 Hurka, (1993), p. 123.240
 Of course, developing a nuclear weapon and the means of transporting it through the air are 241
complex, but the using of the weapon, particularly for the pilot, is at the push of a button.
 To be clear, Hurka's aim is to give an accurate account of human greatness on Nietzsche's view. 242
He does this by exclusively focusing on achievements. However, I argued in chapter two that 
greatness is a matter of both achievements and character. Consequently, I do not take Hurka here 
to be discussing greatness, but only a part of greatness: valuable achievements. 
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In an early work he [Nietzsche] said the one thing 'needful' is to 'give style to one's character', 
so its elements are unified by 'a single taste', and that it matters less whether this taste is good 
or bad than whether it is a single taste.  243
Hurka's interpretation heavily draws upon section 290 of The Gay Science for support, 
specifically where Nietzsche notes that "Whether this taste was good or bad is less important 
than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste” (GS, §290). The idea here being that, 
supposedly, there is no standard of correctness in matters of taste, but value is to be found in 
organising one's single taste to govern one's variety of diverse projects. While it is certainly 
true that Nietzsche's higher men are driven towards the completion of a unifying project 
(what Hurka rightly identifies Nietzsche to mean by 'style'), it is highly unlikely, and the 
above passage does not obviously demonstrate, that Nietzsche thinks that the goals one 
directs oneself towards do not matter at all. 
        Consider again Hurka's example of the politician and shoelace-tier, which aims to 
demonstrate the intuitive pull of a process orientated and formal approach to the value of 
achievements. In a sense, this is not the strongest example Hurka could give, for it is 
plausible that an 'important social bill' has consequences that are valuable as a product, 
independently of the process of achieving it. Nevertheless, we might imagine the same case 
but where the bill passed has little importance. For instance, if the politician managed to pass 
a bill requiring a large number of people to partake in grass-counting activities for an hour a 
day, or to flick a light switch off and on constantly between 12.00 and 12.05. Although this 
might involve overcoming vast difficulty, and would satisfy both formal properties, it is far 
from obvious that Nietzsche would count this as a valuable achievement. 
        We might imagine similar activities which satisfy these formal conditions yet still appear 
ludicrous, and again not obviously acceptable for Nietzsche as genuinely valuable 
achievements. For example, there exist a number of immensely successful reality TV 
programmes which feature people performing a wide range of different dangerous, crude, or 
self-injuring stunts and pranks. These programmes are designed to be deliberately shocking 
and often revolting, yet they are popular globally and have increased in their scale since 
 Hurka, (2006), p. 230.243
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breaking into film. It appears that in this case, the makers of these programmes satisfy the 
formal properties Hurka proposes, and overcome many difficulties in doing so. Even so, it is 
once again not clear that Nietzsche would praise this as a valuable achievement.   
         
         These counterexamples are supported by the fact that, as I suggested in Chapter Two, in 
many places Nietzsche indicates that tastes can be ranked in terms of their value. For 
example, he clearly thinks that many people have bad taste: “One must,” as Nietzsche says, 
“shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many” (BGE, §43). Moreover, in asking "what 
makes a person 'noble'?", he explicitly claims that it is "Certainly not following some passion, 
for there are contemptible passions" (GS, §55). 
        With this in mind, it is significant that a purely formal account such as Hurka's, while 
deflecting some implausible cases, cannot deflect all ludicrous and frivolous 
accomplishments that satisfy its conditions. But there is a further problem here. So far I have 
considered counterexamples which involve seemingly trivial or worthless activities. 
However, Hurka's position entails a much stronger claim: that for Nietzsche, valuable 
achievements can be attained even when these formal properties are realized through goals 
which are not merely trivial, but independently negative. This has serious implications. 
        If only the process of overcoming difficulty and scoring high degrees of unity-in-
diversity and extent make for valuable achievements, then it seems that Nietzsche will have 
to allow that the slave revolt in which 'morality' came to prominence is an extremely valuable 
achievement. It is, after all, a historical event that shaped the lives of millions and required 
immense skill in overcoming its inherent difficulties. But presumably Nietzsche does not take 
this to be a very valuable event. Hurka recognises the seriousness of this objection to his 
view,  and although he does not commit to either, he proposes two possible responses.  244
        The first response Hurka suggests as an option is to make the value of an activity depend 
not just on its current properties but also on what motivated the activity. As Hurka phrases 
this suggestion: 
 Hurka, (2007), p. 25.244
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If an integrated activity with far-reaching goals issues from strength and self confidence, as it 
presumably will in Nietzsche’s hoped-for creators of values, it has immense worth. But if it is 
a product of weakness and resentment, it does not.  245
The idea being that if, for example, Goethe had completed Faust because of a deep-seated 
urge to get back at someone who wronged him, or because his peers pressured him into doing 
so, then Nietzsche would not count this a valuable achievement. This manoeuvre would 
supposedly allow one to retain a formal and process-orientated account of the value of 
achievements while consistently denying that the slave revolt was immensely valuable, for 
the priests in Nietzsche's account acted from ressentiment. 
        While this type of response is plausible in the case of what Nietzsche considers 
greatness to consist in, we saw in Chapter Two that achievement is only one element of 
greatness. Consequently, it would be a mistake to equate these two concepts. What is most 
important here are the examples I gave in Chapter Two, such as Wagner's Parsifal and the 
Lutheran Bible, that Nietzsche does count as valuable achievements, yet in which the 
achievers do not act from virtue or strength. Taking this into account, one cannot deny the 
value of the slave revolt as an achievement by simply appealing to the character of its 
instigators. 
        The second response Hurka gives is to hold that the value of an achievement does 
depend upon the value of the goal, but crucially, the goal is evaluated using formal rather 
than substantive measures.  For example, if the goal is such that its realisation would be 246
instrumental in preventing capable individuals realising the formal properties of further 
achievements, then that goal, and hence the activity, is not a valuable one. On this view, 
although the slave revolt was difficult to bring about; included a number of subordinate 
achievements; and had a profound influence across time and persons, it  is not a valuable 
achievement according to Nietzsche on the grounds that it was designed to prohibit the 
conditions for further achievement.  
 Hurka, (2007), p. 26.245
 Hurka, (2007), p. 26.246
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        Yet the force of this move is weakened by once again reminding ourselves of the 
distinction between greatness on the one hand and achievement on the other. As Chapter Two 
sought to demonstrate, achievement is but one element of greatness, which is a more complex 
concept that requires a valuable character as well as significant achievements. Because 
Nietzsche can and does allow that certain individuals who do not have an admirable character 
can still make valuable achievements (e.g. Wagner, Luther), it is not clear that the slave revolt 
has prevented the further realization of simply unified and extended activities. Rather, it is 
more plausible that the revolt has prevented the realization of the right kinds of unified and 
extended activities, namely substantive achievements. For this reason, the second response 
Hurka provides is does not quite hit its target. It seems that although Nietzsche does think the 
slave revolt was instrumentally bad, he likely also thinks it intrinsically bad. 
          
        Although Hurka is right to emphasise the importance of these formal properties to 
Nietzsche's conception of valuable achievements, it is not clear that they can do all the work 
necessary to account for a plausible interpretation of his position on the matter.  
4.3. Hybrid View 
        A more tenable interpretation of Nietzsche's views then is one that recognises the value 
of the process of achieving one's goal, yet allows room for constraints on what those goals 
are. This view would be partly formal and partly substantive. Reginster defends a rather 
strong version of this view. He writes that "an achievement can be great only if it is valuable 
in respect to its determinate content",  and continues that "the determinate content of the 247
achievement must itself be valuable".  However, this would rule out many valuable 248
activities which aim at value neutral goals, for example games and athletic endeavours.  
        The most plausible view of the value of achievements will aim to account for these cases 
yet also exclude trivial or frivolous activities that Reginster is rightly concerned that the will 
to power thesis risks including. A weaker version of the hybrid view is therefore preferable, 
 Bernard Reginster, (2007), p. 42.247
 Reginster, (2007), p. 43.248
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whereby achievements are valuable in part due to the process, but that some substantive goals 
are fairly obviously not worthy in Nietzsche's view. 
        However the details of such a view are complex. It might be thought that this hybrid 
view commits Nietzsche to holding that overcoming difficulty is only valuable when the 
activity aims at certain goals. But there is reason to doubt the truth of this implication. To see 
why, we must enquire as to what happens to the value of overcoming difficulty when it is 
done in pursuit of goals that are trivial or independently bad. Nietzsche gives no explicit view 
on this matter, and it is likely he did not have a fully worked out theory regarding it. 
Consequently, a lack of explicit textual support for either view makes what follows at least 
partly reconstructive. 
        There are at least three options on the table to consider as plausible interpretations of 
Nietzsche's view: 
(1) The value of overcoming resistance is conditional upon the determinate goal being 
independently valuable.  
(2) The value of overcoming resistance is conditional upon the determinate goal being 
either independently valuable or neutral. 
(3) The value of overcoming resistance is unconditional in the sense that it always 
adds value to an activity even if it is directed at neutral or independently negative 
goals.  
        Let us first consider option (1), which is to attribute to Nietzsche a type of broadly 
Aristotelian  principle of the following form: 249
(a) If x is intrinsically good, loving x for itself is also intrinsically good, and hating x 
for itself is intrinsically bad.  250
 For evidence of Aristotle's engagement with this idea, see in particular Nicomachean Ethics, 249
1175b25-30.
 This is an account of the principle taken and adapted from Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and 250
Value, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 11-20.
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We can interpret at least one form of 'loving' the good here as pursuing the good. On strong 
versions of this principle, sometimes called the 'principle of recursion', there is also a 
corresponding commitment: 
(b) If x is intrinsically bad, loving x for itself is also intrinsically bad, and hating x for 
itself is intrinsically good. 
In other words, overcoming difficulty in pursuing a goal that is of independently negative 
value not only adds nothing to the value of an achievement, but actually makes things worse 
than they would otherwise be.  
        Consider the case of an evil genius: a particularly clever and capable Machiavellian with 
an evil plan. In order to do achieve his evil goal, the evil genius had to overcome a vast 
amount of obstacles, which involved a high degree of complexity, careful timing, and 
elaborate planning. In such cases, there is an intuition that their striving is not to be regarded 
as a good thing. There is understandable revulsion at the idea that activities such as this, and 
comparable historical events like Stalin's purges, the Crusades (at least the 'successful' ones), 
and so forth, were 'achievements'. In these cases, it is plausible to suppose that it isn't just 
having sinister goals that is of disvalue, but also the effort to realize these goals. 
        But this Aristotelian principle advocated by (1) seems far too restrictive. Activities 
which might have mildly negative goals seem to intuitively still involve some value in the 
process of achieving them. This point has been defended by Bradford,  who gives the 251
following examples to refute this strong principle of recursion. Art heists and bank robberies, 
assuming for the sake of argument have negative goals, can still be plausibly admired for 
being particularly elaborate and cleverly planned and executed.  If there is at least some 252
value to be found in these cases, the principle of recursion cannot account for it, and instead 
finds the overcoming of difficulty in this instance to be intrinsically bad. For this reason, the 
principle seems too strong. 
 Gwen Bradford, “Evil Achievements and the Principle of Recursion” in Oxford Studies in 251
Normative Ethics Volume III, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013b), pp. 79-97.
 Examples of this admiration that spring to mind might be found in the films The Italian Job or 252
Ocean's Eleven.
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        There is reason to think that Nietzsche would find the principle to be indefensible for 
this reason as well. As Hurka rightly observes, Nietzsche suggests that the slave revolt in 
values was not devoid of any desirable features. For example, Nietzsche recognises that the 
slave revolt manifested immense power and creativity (GM, I, §10). After all, a project as 
extensive, elaborate, yet subtle as the slave revolt requires a high degree of devious 
cleverness [Klugheit] to overcome its inherent difficulty. As Nietzsche writes in On the 
Genealogy of Morals:  
...but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human 
existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the 
human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil–and these are the two basic 
respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts (GM, I, §6). 
If there is at least some value in striving for goals which are independently negative, it might 
be thought that Nietzsche values overcoming resistance unconditionally. But this would be 
compatible with the Hybrid view of achievements that Nietzsche likely accepts. For instance, 
it might be that there is still value to be found in pursuing bad goals, though the reason these 
activities do not intuitively qualify as 'achievements' is that the value of the process is just 
outweighed by the negative value (both intrinsically and also instrumentally) of the goal, all 
things considered.  
        To use a different terminology, rather than overcoming difficulty being prima facie 
valuable, this view regards it as being pro tanto valuable: overcoming difficulty retains its 
value valence regardless of the content of the goal, but can be overridden by other values. To 
continue with the example of the slave revolt, this view holds that the priests' pursuit of their 
goal had a value of A. The goal of the revolt itself had a value of B, and the consequences of 
it which were instrumental in discouraging human greatness have a value of C. The reason 
this is not a valuable achievement considered as a whole, even though overcoming resistance 
is pro tanto valuable, is that the negative value of B and C vastly outweighs that of A. 
Drawing upon the discussion of value in Chapter Three, we can explain this in less crude 
terms: one can plausibly admire the priests creativity and cleverness, but hold the goal and its 
effects collectively in greater contempt. 
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        This could plausibly be Nietzsche's position. However, two problematic cases face this 
interpretation. The first is that because it calculates the value of an achievement summatively, 
it can at least in principle (if a conception of value that allows commensurability is granted) 
allow for cases where the positive value of an elaborate and grand process can exactly equal 
the negative value of its particular product. In other words, the product cancels out the value 
of the process. The result being that a catastrophic and objectionable event, all things 
considered, could in theory be value neutral; comparable to the blink of an eye. Cases of this 
variety would highly conflict with our intuitions regarding achievement, and a plausible 
account of the value of achievements will aim to avoid this kind of scenario. 
        This objection may rely on an inappropriate conception of value for the phenomenon in 
question. I argued in this last chapter that a mercantile conception of value in terms of 
exchange and cost is less applicable to achievements than one of admiration. If, for example, 
I am broke but then given twenty pounds, and I then lose twenty pounds: I now have zero. 
Are the good and bad aspects of an evil achievement like this? More plausibly, is that I 
admire the difficulty overcome, and hold in contempt the goal and its effects. If they are felt 
in equal degrees, the value of the achievement is not zero, nor do I not feel anything. Rather, 
the case is simply more complex, to the extent that it may not make sense to give the 
achievement as a whole a determinate value. 
        But a second problem facing the view that overcoming resistance is pro tanto valuable 
concerns how to exclude elaborate activities with worthless goals which Nietzsche would 
likely reject. While valuing the overcoming of resistance in this way would account for 
athletic and sporting activities as valuable achievements, it would deprive itself of the means 
of condemning other more problematic activities, like that of elaborate grass-counters, or 
reality TV-type cases mentioned in the last section. The reason being that because these 
activities aim at value neutral goals, these goals cannot outweigh the supposed value of the 
process of achieving them. 
        There are two more responses that could be made to these problems in order to defend 
the view under consideration. One response would be to concede that some ludicrous 
activities of a nature described in the first and second objections might risk inclusion under 
the category of valuable achievements, yet these will be extremely rare and exceptional cases. 
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Perhaps there could at least in principle be such cases which prove counterintuitive, but 
Nietzsche is simply not interested in robust ethical theories which can eliminate every counter 
example, no matter how unlikely. Rather, Nietzsche pragmatically aims to draw attention to a 
valuable component of achievements which, he perceives, is all too often overshadowed by 
the object of one's striving: a view exacerbated in modernity by a 'morality' of comfort and 
timidity. 
        I think this view is representative of Nietzsche's position. But to make a stronger 
defence, another issue with the objections is that they rely on the assumption that something 
only counts as an achievement when the activity's balance of positive value outweighs its 
negative value all things considered; that achievements are always finally valuable. This 
points to a much deeper problem with its attempt to assess the value of achievements. 
Namely, that there is an ambiguity regarding the use of the term 'achievement' between its 
descriptive and evaluative components. One the one hand, there are certain conditions that 
need to be met before we can appropriately call something an achievement. But achievement 
is also in a sense a value-laden term; it is usually reserved to refer to those activities worthy 
of admiration and veneration. As a result, we tend to assume achievements always bring 
value into the world.  
          But we might challenge this assumption. While it is in the nature of achievements to be 
finally valuable overall, this is consistent with the fact that not all achievements are finally 
valuable overall. Some achievements, for example ones with significantly negative goals that 
outweigh the value of its process, may lack final value. Pritchard presents a similar argument, 
and in order to show that this is not as bizarre a view as it might first appear, he proposes the 
following analogy: 
Consider, for example, a claim such as that tigers are fierce. This statement seems true. 
Moreover, notice that this claim does not seem to be at all undermined by the fact that there 
are tame tigers in the world who are not fierce at all. In particular, in saying that tigers are 
fierce we are not making a claim about all tigers but rather making a claim about the nature of 
tigers – a fortiori, we are making a claim about how tigers would behave in normal 
circumstances.  253
 Pritchard, (2010), p. 25.253
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The point being made is that although achievements usually involve a greater balance of 
positive value, the fact that this is not always the case does not undermine arguments 
defending the final value of achievements generally.  
        To conclude this section, Nietzsche likely adopts a hybrid view, according to which 
achievements are valuable in virtue of their process, but with significant substantive 
constraints on some of the goals that process is directed at. However, I agree with Reginster 
that Nietzsche does not provide an explicit account of what these substantive constraints 
might be. But the hybrid view which I have defended does not necessarily commit one to an 
interpretation of Nietzsche in which he holds a strictly codifiable standard of taste (i.e. a 
strong account of precisely which substantive achievements are excellent). Rather, I agree 
with Nehamas in sensibly holding that Nietzsche has no codifiable standard of correctness in 
this respect, but that there are nevertheless some things which Nietzsche fairly obviously 
does not think exhibit good taste or excellence (e.g. blade-counter cases). Furthermore, the 
hybrid view does not commit Nietzsche to holding that the value of overcoming resistance is 
conditional upon pursuing a valuable or neutral goal. Rather, it is compatible with the view 
that overcoming resistance is pro tanto valuable — a view that I have argued Nietzsche likely 
accepts. 
5. Implications 
        The position I am attributing to Nietzsche may appear implausible in an important way. 
For instance, a reasonable thought is that we ought to pursue the good. Let us assume for the 
moment that this is true. If overcoming resistance to your will, or surmounting difficulty, is 
valuable in the way Nietzsche and I propose (i.e. non-instrumentally), it seems this will lead 
to absurd normative implications. For example, seeking to add value to every action, such as 
reading a newspaper, eating lunch, driving to work, and so forth, by deliberately making it as 
difficult as possible. But there are a number of reasons why this objection is not a compelling 
one. 
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        First of all and as a preliminary point, I have made no normative claims so far. Up to this 
point in the discussion my concern has been purely evaluative, focusing on what kinds of 
activities have a certain kind of value, and under what circumstances. I have made no claims 
about the right way to act in light of this particular value.  
        Nevertheless, the objection can be met head on. Katsafanas has recently provided a 
counter argument for effectively defending against it. He claims that making everything as 
difficult as it can be, which the objection implies is a result of the view under consideration, 
would very likely be instrumentally bad in hindering the realization of greater projects. For 
example, imagine Beethoven sets out to realize his musical ambitions but looks for anything 
that can provide him resistance: he only writes in the dark; he only uses instruments in the 
worst condition he can find; he places his hand in an open flame every few minutes; and so 
forth. This would indeed make Beethoven's task significantly more difficult, and if he 
somehow managed to produce his compositions to the same standard as he did, his 
achievement on my view would be significantly greater. However, adding all of these 
difficulties and countless more would at some point make a demand on his strength and 
ability that even he could not surmount. Thus, these difficulties would be instrumentally bad 
in preventing him from achieving his goal. 
        Katsafanas own example is that of a writer who goes to write a sentence. It is absurd, 
Katsafanas writes, that this person would or should aim to encounter resistance in moving his 
pen across the page. The reason being that writing a sentence is typically a part or means to a 
larger project, such as writing a paper or book. If the writer ought to create resistance on this 
micro-scale—that of moving the pen across the page—this would likely stifle his grander 
project. The claim is then, that this objection is "looking for resistance in the wrong place".  254
Many seek intellectual challenges in their writing, but resistances of all and any such kinds 
would likely thwart the attaining of one's goals. 
        Nietzsche explicitly recognises this point in his acknowledgement that even the highest 
and strongest individuals have their human limits, and so advises prudence in picking one's 
battles: 
 Katsafanas, (2013), p. 179.254
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I love the valiant; but it is not enough to wield a broadsword, one must also know against 
whom. And often there is more valour when one refrains and passes by, in order to save 
oneself for the worthier enemy (Z, III, §12) 
        A second response to the objection is available to those who agree with Nietzsche that 
achievement is an important final good in life, but are willing to accommodate various other 
goods that Nietzsche would perhaps not allow for (for example pleasure; knowledge). If this 
is the case, then achievement might have to be balanced and weighed against the pursuit of 
these other goods. The best life may well involve satisfying as many of these goods as 
possible to significant degrees, and only focusing on achievements would likely overshadow 
them. The point being made is that it is not just the final value of achievements that needs to 
be taken into consideration, but also the instrumental effects of spending time and effort on 
them. 
Conclusion 
        This chapter has defended a number of separable claims. I first presented a basic account 
of instrumental value, whereby something that retains it is good as a means. I then surveyed 
this evidence for attributing this type of value to Nietzsche's conception of suffering in the 
pursuit of one's goals. However, while it may be a sustainable interpretation of Nietzsche's 
early to middle works, the position that this is all the value Nietzsche takes suffering to have 
in his mature and developed writings cannot be sustained. The reason being that this would 
locate the value of an achievement purely in the goal one strives towards, where it perhaps 
would have been better if it was achieved without a struggle. But, from The Gay Science 
onwards, Nietzsche clearly does think that there is value in the process of striving for one's 
goal, and that this is undermined by herd morality. The implication is that Nietzsche must 
value suffering in some non-instrumental way—as part of a valuable whole. Moreover, 
Nietzsche is right to defend this view, for this is an independently plausible position. Contra 
Hurka, there must however be some substantive constraints on what the goals one strives 
towards are for something to be a valuable achievement.  
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Chapter Five:  
Suffering as Part of a Valuable Whole  
        If suffering does not have merely instrumental value then it must have some additional 
form of extrinsic value. I have used the term 'part of a valuable whole' throughout the last 
chapter in contrast to the instrumental. In what follows I will assess what this precisely 
entails, and the different ways one might interpret the concept. I intend to do this by 
defending and building upon aspects of Reginster's claim that suffering, in Nietzsche's view 
has 'contributory value'. In particular, I assess the relevance of the principle of organic unities 
to the debate, and how the value of suffering within the context of achievement is informed 
by Nietzsche's radical aestheticism. I conclude that Reginster's claim that suffering has value 
as part of a valuable whole does not tell the complete story. If Nietzsche is to value suffering 
in such a way that it can't be a regrettable feature of an achievement, it must form part of a 
valuable whole in a particular way. 
1. Reginster on the Value of Suffering 
1.1. Suffering and "Contributory Value"     
        Reginster claims that Nietzsche intends the doctrine of the will to power to serve not 
only as an accurate account of human motivation and action, but as "the principle of 
revaluation” in his wider ethical project.  Even if one endorses a weaker claim that power is 255
but one standard of value for Nietzsche, this has implications for the value of suffering. These 
implications, according to Reginster, are precisely what distinguish a Nietzschean ethics of 
creativity from 'morality': 
It is precisely insofar as it implies a radical revaluation of suffering that Nietzsche’s ethics of 
creativity underwrites his famed attack on morality. As Nietzsche understands it, morality, 
 Reginster, (2006), p. 150.255
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paradigmatically the ‘morality of compassion', is predicated upon a wholesale condemnation 
of suffering. As such, it fosters an ethical climate that is essentially inimical to creativity.  256
I similarly argued in the last chapter that at least part of Nietzsche's rejection of herd morality 
is that it fails to appropriately value suffering. Reginster also defends the second claim I 
presented: that suffering having instrumental value is perfectly compatible with moralities, 
such as Christianity, that Nietzsche rejects.  Reginster argues that because Nietzsche is 257
committed to "a radical revaluation of the role and significance of suffering in human 
existence", he must have a different evaluation of suffering, namely: one which is "grounded 
in the claim that the difficulty of an achievement, or the fact that it requires overcoming of 
resistance, is an essential part of what makes it a great achievement.  Reginster draws this 258
distinction in the following way: 
Suffering, in contemporary parlance, has contributory value. Contributory value is typically 
distinguished from instrumental value through the observation that activities can have 
contributory value when they are part of an intrinsically valuable life, and contribute to its 
value, even though they are not a means to it...Suffering has only contributory value, 
however, insofar as it does not suffice to make a life valuable.   259
A number of points need unpacking here. Firstly, Reginster sometimes talks of the value 
suffering has as an ingredient of a valuable life, and at other times as an ingredient of a 
valuable achievement. This apparent similarity between a valuable achievement and a 
valuable life is explained in terms of his account of the role of the will to power as a measure 
of how well one's life is going, making them structurally identical. A good life simply is, at 
least in part, one in which a great deal is achieved. Since my focus in this thesis is on 
suffering and specifically achievement, I shall continue to talk in these terms. 
        Secondly, while Reginster here talks of "activities" having contributory value, we need 
not restrict the concept in this way. Many things might plausibly have contributory value 
 Reginster, (2007), p. 45.256
 Reginster, (2007), p.44.257
 Reginster, (2007), p. 45.258
 Reginster, (2006), p. 297.259
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which are not activities—for instance, a particular stone which forms part of a beautiful 
mosaic. Moreover, 'activity' does not appear to be the right term to describe suffering. While 
suffering, in some degree, necessarily forms a part of striving, which is an activity, it is itself 
a passive feeling in the sense that it happens to you: it is not performed. 
        I agree with Reginster that contributory value is distinct from instrumental value. We 
have already seen that what has instrumental value is valuable as a means to an end. What is 
crucial is that if these things are valuable only as a means, then it yields no loss in value all 
things considered if the end was achieved via a different means. Furthermore, on this view it 
might be better if a particular end was achieved without enduring the process of achieving it. 
        Contributory value, on the other hand, is usually understood to mean the value 
something has in virtue of being 'part' of a finally valuable 'whole'.  Robert Nozick expands 260
upon this definition and describes an object or state of affairs as having contributory value 
when it can "make a value difference", and continues: 
...not merely that value can be produced via them, but that they be necessary for that 
production: the slack of their absence would not be taken up by other factors so that the same 
value got produced anyway. Let us term this value difference something makes — the value 
(amount) that wouldn't be there if it weren't — its contributory value.  261
An example to illustrate what might be meant by a 'value difference' here might be found by 
considering the concept of courage. Courage can be understood conceptually as the 
overcoming of fear. In this sense, fear is not merely a means to courage, rather it is a 
necessary component of the concept. If we assume for the sake of argument that courage is 
indeed a valuable disposition, then fear is necessary for the production of that value, not as a 
means, but as a part. In this way, fear has contributory value and makes what Nozick refers to 
as a 'value difference'. 
 The concept of being 'valuable as a part' is traditionally a terminological minefield: terms such 260
as 'contributory value', 'constitutive value', 'intrinsicalism' and 'variabilism', 'holism' and 
'conditionality', pervade the literature, often used by philosophers to mean quite different things. 
Some have reserved the term 'contributory value' for a particular way in which something forms a 
part of a valuable whole. I shall come on to the distinction later, but for the sake of argument, I 
shall continue to use this phrase as to not confuse my claims against those of Reginster, who uses 
this term for the same concept.
 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, (Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 313. A similar 261
description of contributory value is given by G.E. Moore, (1993), §19.
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        I also agree with Reginster that suffering is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition 
of great achievement. Reginster continues to emphasize that suffering "is not valued by 
itself", but rather "only as an ingredient of the good".  But more needs to be said about what 262
he is committed to. Precisely how suffering acts as an 'ingredient', or 'contributes value' to a 
whole, requires explanation. 
        Reginster apparently understands suffering to contribute value in the following way: 
If we value the overcoming of resistance, then we must also value the resistance that is an 
ingredient of it. Since suffering is defined by resistance, we must also value suffering.  263
  
From the standpoint of the ethics of power, suffering cannot be coherently deplored...because 
it is an essential constituent of the good.  264
These passages are crucial, because they seem to depend on the assumption that the value of 
the whole must be a function of the value of its parts. However, this is precisely the view 
which is called into question by the principle of organic unities.  
1.2. Organic Unity 
        We commonly understand there to be cases in which otherwise valueless parts can be 
considered valuable when they are related within a whole in some way. We might think, for 
example, that a particular mosaic has great value, yet when the stones which form it are 
jumbled or removed and placed in an unorganised heap, have no value at all. Implicit in this 
kind of understanding is what is known as the 'principle of organic unities', which G.E. 
Moore formulated in the following way: 
The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its 
parts.  265
 Reginster, (2006), p. 234.262
 Reginster, (2006), p. 177.263
 Reginster, (2006), p. 233.264
 Moore, (1993), §18.265
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The principle holds that if two or more states or objects enter into the relations that constitute 
a given whole, the resulting value may be either more or less than those states had when 
apart. According to Moore, one can't simply view the goodness of a particular state of affairs 
by assigning a value to each part and adding them together. Rather, the total value of any 
state of affairs is often generated by the relations between its parts, and not by the value they 
may hold independently. 
        Moore's primary example to demonstrate the force of the principle is that of 
experiencing a beautiful object.  Being conscious of a beautiful object, Moore argues, is of 266
great intrinsic value. However, the same object when experienced by no one, and existing in 
isolation, is of comparatively little value, or perhaps none at all. Similarly, consciousness 
itself doesn't appear to be necessarily valuable. In Moore's example, beautiful objects and 
consciousness are not particularly valuable things. They may have some value, but when we 
consider the total value of a consciousness experiencing a beautiful object, it seems to exceed 
the simple sum of these values. 
        Putting aside for now (1) the particular elements of Moore's example involving the value 
of beauty; (2) the issue of the practical difficulty in measuring the precise value of an object 
or state, the essential claim of the principle might be presented formally in the following way: 
The principle can also be used to explain cases where a bad thing and an indifferent thing 
may form a whole much worse than the sum of the badness of its parts: 
        Since my focus here is on the positive value that Nietzsche appears to attribute to 
suffering, I shall primarily talk of forming organic unities which are productive of value. 
 Moore, (1993), §18.266
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    a     = 0 units of value 
    b     = 5 units of value 
(a+b)  = 10 units of value
    c     = 0 units of value 
    d     = -5 units of value 
(c+d)  = -10 units of value
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        Reginster does not directly engage with the principle or its implications for the value of 
suffering. This omission potentially leaves his position vulnerable to the following objection. 
One may grant that suffering is an 'essential ingredient' of great achievement, and one may 
also grant following from this, "he who wants to be creative must welcome resistance, and 
therefore suffering".  But from the claim that suffering is an essential ingredient of the 267
good, to then claim that "Suffering is no longer a necessary evil to which the creative 
individual must somehow accommodate himself" would be too quick.  Taking advantage of 268
the principle of organic unities, we might ask why it is the case that someone couldn’t hold 
that suffering is always bad, always regrettable, even when it is recognised as an essential 
part of a good whole? In other words, there seems to be nothing incoherent about supposing 
that there are wholes containing something bad and deplorable, which are, nevertheless, of 
great positive value all things considered. To continue with the example of courage: that the 
overcoming of fear is a positive disposition seems to essentially involve fear being something 
negative, even when considered as part of the valuable concept of courage. 
        The relevant point to be taken from these examples is that accepting the principle of 
organic unities allows one to coherently deplore certain constituents of the good, even if they 
are essential. This is because if the value of a whole is not equal to the sum of the value of its 
parts, then certain parts of a whole may have negative value, yet within a whole help produce 
a value that outweighs its negative component. Translated into a more pertinent example, the 
manifestation of power through a particular determinate end, say the composing of a great 
symphony, might be of tremendous value. However, the suffering the composer may have felt 
in completing his task may still be regrettable, even if he recognises it as an essential part of 
his achievement. This is at odds with Reginster's interpretation of a Nietzschean radical 
revaluation in which suffering "cannot coherently be deplored".  269
        This point is exploited by Simon May, who argues that a broader Nietzschean 
affirmation of life is of the whole, and not necessarily the individual parts which constitute 
 Reginster, (2007), p. 45.267
 Reginster, (2007), p. 45.268
 Reginster, (2006), p. 177.269
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it.  May argues that for this reason, Nietzsche is 'still in the morality game'. However, I 270
think Reginster is right to hold that for Nietzsche, existence (or in this case achievement) 
must be affirmed not merely in spite of suffering, but (at least in part) because of it. Indeed, 
this is a significant feature of his rejection of Christian morality. My proposition is that 
Reginster does not provide the tools to avoid May's claim that Nietzsche's revaluation is, to 
an extent, not as radical as he proposes. Nevertheless, I shall argue shortly, that one can 
provide a defence of Reginster's position by drawing upon Nietzsche's aestheticism. 
        Before I get to that however, further clarity is required on the concept of parts, wholes, 
and the notion of the bad being an essential feature of the good. I have made two claims 
regarding contributory value so far: 
(1) Contributory value is distinct from instrumental value. 
(2) The constitutive parts of valuable wholes do not always work in a summative 
way: the value of the whole is not necessarily the sum of the value of its parts. 
Reginster endorses (1), and I agree. However he does not address (2), and this creates a 
tension with his claims about the value of suffering. I shall now provide detail on how 
constitutive parts which vary in goodness may relate to a valuable whole, and how Nietzsche 
understands this concept. I shall then move on to how exploiting this phenomenon may 
provide a defence to the objection raised.  
1.3. The Bad as Part of the Good 
        There is a distinction to make at this point between two different views relating to the 
idea that the good somehow requires the bad: 
(A) Good is always understood relative to a corresponding bad that provides contrast. 
(B) Good necessarily requires bad as an element in itself. 
 See Simon May, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, (Cambridge 270
University Press, 2011).
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Claim (A) holds that the positive relation between good and bad is one of contrast: we value 
health all the more because of awareness of terrible diseases; or we value a nice summer's 
day in contrast to a miserable rainy and grey one. In these cases, we are thought to value 
goods against the backdrop of corresponding ills, the absence of which would render the 
good incomprehensible.  
        This perhaps more familiar view should be distinguished from the much stronger claim 
(B). The idea in (B) being that the bad is not just necessary to appreciate the good, but to 
overcome the bad is precisely what goodness is. Without the bad as an element, the good 
cannot exist. For example, in order to have a war hero, there must first be a war. While 
Nietzsche may endorse (A), what is relevant to the current discussion is his endorsement of 
(B), at least with regard to the goodness of achievement, and the suffering experienced in 
striving to achieve. I shall restrict the scope of (B) to this context for the purposes of 
simplicity. 
        On this point I agree with Richardson, who makes precisely this distinction and arrives 
at the same conclusion. He writes: 
...good requires bad not just for contrast, but as an element in itself: good is always an 
overcoming of a bad. One particular way he [Nietzsche] often argues this is with respect to 
suffering.  271
Nietzsche's endorsement of (B) would be consistent with the doctrine of the will to power 
which I have presented so far: power is one standard of value, and power consists in the 
overcoming of resistance and difficulty. Hence, goodness is partly constituted by the bad. But 
Nietzsche sometimes claims that herd morality typically fails to acknowledge (B), and 
instead: 
it takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another (not as complementary value 
concepts, which would be the truth), it advises taking the side of the good, it desires that the 
good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots-it therewith actually 
 John Richardson, "Nietzsche's Value Monism: Saying Yes to Everything" in Nietzsche on Mind and 271
Nature, eds. Manuel Dries and Peter Kail, (Oxford: OUP, 2015), p. 106.
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denies life, which has in all its instincts both Yes and No.  (WP, §351; KSA, 1888, 15[113]; 
BGE, §2)  272
But the details of (B) need to be made explicit. In what way does goodness depend on the 
overcoming of the bad? What happens to the value of the bad once it has been overcome? In 
other words, when one suffers in striving to reach one's goal, does that suffering retain its 
badness once it is overcome, or does it become good upon entering the whole? 
        The distinction at work here is between two different ways a 'part' can be valuable in 
virtue of its relation to a whole. The first is as an enabling condition, and the second is as a 
contributor.  An enabling condition retains its badness but in certain contexts allows for a 273
whole of greater value to outweigh it (i.e. X enables Y, which has value). In contrast, a 
contributor changes its value depending on the context. A particular thing, X, may be of 
negative value in one context, but upon forming a whole in another context can increase in 
value (i.e. X contributes value to Y). 
        If, as Reginster claims, suffering has contributory value and therefore cannot be 
coherently deplored, then suffering must act as a part of valuable whole in a particular way, 
namely as a contributor. In order to defend his view, I shall argue that by comprehending 
Nietzsche's aestheticism, one can see how Nietzsche juxtaposes and rejects the 'moral' 
evaluation of suffering precisely because it is compatible with treating it as an enabling 
condition, and hence can be 'coherently deplored'. 
2. Struggle as Art: Nietzsche's Aestheticism 
        In this section, I claim that for Nietzsche, the process of striving to achieve one's goal—
of agonistic struggle—can itself be something beautiful or artistic; as a way in which we can 
'turn ourselves into a work of art' (GS, §107). The value Nietzsche finds in one's striving to 
achieve goals, I argue, is best understood in a way that depends upon the principle of organic 
 Nietzsche repeatedly takes 'Life' to be synonymous with the will to power (e.g. GS, §349; cf. Z, 272
II, §12, BGE, §259).
 I adopt this terminology from Jonathan Dancy's discussion of organic unities in Dancy, (2003), 273
pp. 629-650.
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unities, and this is due to his attempt to strengthen the relationship between the ethical and 
aesthetic. In this section I elucidate these claims and their consequences for the value of 
suffering. 
2.1. Aestheticism 
        There is vast disagreement about the precise content, target, and extent of Nietzsche's 
'aestheticism'. Alexander Nehamas, for example, defends a particularly strong conception in 
which he claims that Nietzsche:  
...looks at [the world] as if it were a literary text. And he arrives at many of his views of 
human beings by generalizing to them ideas and principles that apply almost intuitively to the 
literary situation, to the creation and interpretation of literary texts and characters.  274
Nehamas' view that Nietzsche takes a literary text to be the "overarching metaphor"  for life 275
is similarly defended by Allan Megill, who describes aestheticism as "an attempt to expand 
the aesthetic to embrace the whole of reality" and a "tendency to see 'art' or 'language' or 
'discourse' or 'text' as constituting the primary realm of human experience".  More recently, 276
Daniel Came has refined these claims and treats Nietzsche's aestheticism as consisting in an 
attempt to seek a "rapprochement" between the two fields of aesthetics and ethics in a 
particular direction, that is, to temper the margin of the aesthetic/ethical terrain in such a way 
that gives preference to the former.  In Came's words, Nietzsche intends in his project of 277
revaluation:    
 Nehamas, (1985), p. 3. Leiter provides an in-depth critique of this interpretation in Brian Leiter, 274
"Nietzsche and Aestheticism", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 275, (1992).
 Nehamas, (1985), p. 164.275
 Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, (Berkeley: 276
University of California Press, 1985), p. 2.
 Peter Poellner has given a similar account, in which he writes that Nietzsche’s aestheticism "is 277
not a doctrine of substantive value, but a view about the grounds of such comparative value 
judgements, a view according to which these grounds, in both ethical and what are conventionally 
labelled ‘aesthetic’ contexts, are ultimately located in experiences which are aesthetic" (See 
Poellner, 2012, p. 62).
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...to extend the structure of aesthetic judgment into the ethical domain, and, indeed, to effect 
the substitution of aesthetic for moral concepts when dealing with such typically ethical 
domains as action, motivation and character, and their adoption as the predominant terms in 
practical reasoning.  278
Came's claim is much more abstract that Nehamas' and Megill's in the sense that it needn't 
make strict analogies to literary texts, which require a strong case for how such analogies 
would work. Came rather draws attention to a broader issue of how aesthetic values can or do 
function. It is this sense of 'aestheticism'—the view that aesthetic values can guide and 
inform one's behaviour as much as typically moral values can, and should—that is relevant to 
the concerns of this chapter, and so I follow Came's (at least partial) definition of the concept 
here.   279
        The application of aestheticism persists (though to varying degrees) throughout 
Nietzsche's texts, and at least partly what motivates his claim, from a later note, that 
preference for higher and lower modes of life "is at bottom a question of taste and aesthetics" 
(WP, §353; KSA, 1887, 11[325).  
        Aestheticism, as a matter of coherence, requires it to be true that aesthetic values are 
independent from moral values, in other words, that something can be beautiful even if it is 
(a) morally neutral, or perhaps (b) morally vicious.  Nietzsche is eager to affirm this point. 280
Regarding the Greek myths, he writes that those "seeking elevated morals...charity and 
benevolence, will quickly be...discouraged and disappointed" (BT, §3). Instead of 
"asceticism, spirituality or duty", everything about these myths "speaks of a rich and 
triumphant existence, in which everything is defied, whether it be good or evil" (BT, §3). 
 Daniel Came, "Nietzsche on the Aesthetics of Character and Virtue" in Nietzsche on Art and Life, 278
(Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 127.
 Of course, aestheticism is not as black and white as I am presenting it here. There may plausibly 279
be middle ground versions which seek to simply strengthen aesthetic concepts in typically moral 
domains and not replace them completely. Nietzsche endorses the stronger view in as far as he 
attempts to confront broader existential concerns, which I will not address here. As he often 
states: "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally 
justified” (BT, §5; cf. §24; BT, 'Attempt', §5).
 The opposing tradition of seeking a rapprochement between in aesthetics and morality in a way 280
that favours the latter stretches back as far as Plato.
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Nietzsche also hints at this view in his genealogy when describing "the contradiction posed 
by the magnificent but likewise so gruesome, so violent world of Homer" (GM, I, §11; 
emphasis mine). 'Magnificent' or 'splendid' [die herrliche]—both with aesthetic connotations
—are terms Nietzsche often provocatively places alongside "hideous" and "appalling" to 
describe the violent nature of the nobles prior to the slave revolt (GM, I, §11). Nietzsche 
makes explicit this distinction between aesthetic and moral value earlier on in Daybreak. In a 
passage entitled "The realm of beauty is bigger", he writes that: 
...hitherto we have been permitted to seek beauty only in the morally good — a fact which 
sufficiently accounts for our having found so little of it and having had to seek about for 
imaginary beauties without backbone! — As surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of 
happiness of which the virtuous have no inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of 
beauty; and many of them have not yet been discovered. (D, §468; cf. D, §499) 
        Nietzsche also holds that aesthetic values have no necessary relation to something 
having epistemic value; that is to say, aesthetic concepts need not tell us any truth about the 
world.  On the contrary, Nietzsche's consistent view is that aesthetic concepts do precisely 281
the opposite: they provide a "healing balm of illusion" (BT, §19) that mask the terrible 
existential truths of descriptive pessimism, thus making life bearable (see BT, §3; GS, §107; 
GM, III, §25). The way in which they 'mask' or 'conceal' these terrible truths will shortly 
prove to be crucial for my purposes here, and I discuss it shortly. 
        I will now consider how aestheticism is relevant to Nietzsche's project with respect to 
suffering in the pursuit of one's goals, or striving—an idea which is expressed through the 
concept of the 'heroic' as opposed to the moral. However, it will be useful first to present 
some of the numerous instances of Nietzsche's aestheticism which explicitly evoke the 
principle of organic unities—a point which makes Reginster's omission of the principle from 
his argument more troubling. 
 Nietzsche broadly attributes this view to the Socratic-Platonic conception of the function of 281
aesthetics: what he calls "aesthetic Socratism" (BT, §12, cf. GM, III, §25). As we shall shortly see, 
this is in addition a significant point of departure from Kantian-Schopenhauerian aesthetic theory. 
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2.2. Nietzsche on Organic Unity and Beauty   
        Although Nietzsche never talked directly of organic unities using the formal terminology 
familiar from Moore and contemporary value theory, and should not in any way be thought of 
as a precursor to Moore, the principle is very much implicit in a number of areas of his 
philosophy. Nehamas, for example, frequently employs the principle of organic unities in his 
interpretation of Nietzsche's ethics, though never labelling it as such. He writes that for 
Nietzsche: "traits of character and actions can only be evaluated in light of their contribution 
to a complete person, a complete life, or...a complete work".  I agree with this claim, and 282
support for it can be found in two representative examples: organic unity with regard to (1) 
drives; (2) character traits. 
        Nietzsche's higher men are repeatedly described as having not only "powerful and 
irreconcilable instincts", but also the "proper mastery" (BGE, §200) to control and guide 
them. In other words, Nietzsche values not necessarily certain drives and instincts 
themselves, but a particular kind of relation between them which includes how numerous and 
diverse yet unified they are. He speaks of a 'spirit' which "has the will of a multiplicity for a 
simplicity, a binding, taming, imperious, and essentially ruling will" (BGE, §230; emphasis 
mine). 
        The reason this is a form of organic unity is that Nietzsche emphasises the value to be 
found in a particular relation between drives and not necessarily just the drives themselves. 
Hence, the value of the whole is not necessarily the sum of the value of its parts when 
considered apart. Moreover, the value to be found in the relation between these three features 
above appears to be at least in part aesthetic: there is a harmony between competing and 
strong drives which Nietzsche suggests is aesthetically pleasing.  283
 Nehamas, (1985), p. 229. 282
 Came suggests (I think rightly) that the Nietzschean conception of the self in terms of a 283
harmony of constitutive drives is, as an aesthetically pleasing phenomenon, not far from Plato's 
(particularly Plato, The Republic, Book 4, Section 443d). See Daniel Came, (2013), p. 218.
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        A second example of Nietzsche's engagement with the principle of organic unity, and 
perhaps most obviously indicative of his aestheticism, concerns his treatment of one's 
character in aesthetic terms of 'style'. Nietzsche's higher men have diverse character traits, 
some of which may be undesirable when considered in isolation, yet as a conscious part of 
one's nature or disposition are "reinterpreted and made sublime" (GS, §290). To have unity-
in-diversity is precisely what it means to "give style to one's character" (GS, §290; cf. GS, 
§79) according to Nietzsche. He calls this: 
...a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of 
their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and 
reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. (GS, §290) 
An example to demonstrate what is meant here might be found in Achilles. Achilles is brave 
and exceptionally strong, yet also deeply stubborn and arrogant. Being stubborn or arrogant 
considered by themselves may have either negative value or no value at all. However, we 
admire Achilles' character not in spite of his stubbornness and arrogance, but in virtue of 
them as part of his unified personality. Nietzsche makes this point about character explicit: he 
speaks of those who are "more attractive by virtue of his imperfections" (GS, §79). In this 
way, we might value Achilles' character as a whole greater than that of the sum of his traits 
considered apart. Nietzsche writes of such characters and their activities as: 
...a living structure of domination, in which parts and functions are demarcated and 
articulated, where only that which has been given a 'meaning' with respect to the whole finds 
a place. (GM, II, §17; second emphasis added)    
That Nietzsche finds some aesthetic value in "style" (GS, §290) in at least some instances of 
organic unity has important implications for how he understands the value of parts and 
wholes to work. But more must be said regarding what constitutes a genuine aesthetic 
experience for Nietzsche, and how this differs from merely finding something to have beauty 
or "charm". What is going on when one finds something genuinely beautiful in Nietzsche's 
view? 
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        On this question Nietzsche profoundly disagrees with both the Kantian and 
Schopenhauerian account of aesthetic experience as, broadly conceived, one of 
'disinterestedness'.  For Kant, this amounts to the view that an object is beautiful when one 284
takes pleasure in it detached from any sort of desire satisfaction in mind; one's attention is 
solely on the object 'in itself' and not to any relations (i.e. to well being) it might have.  285
Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic experience is similar to Kant's in a number of important 
ways, but involves a particularly strong version of disinterestedness in which the perceiver 
briefly loses self-consciousness. One has an aesthetic experience when one enters a state of 
contemplation of an object that provides brief respite from the will's tormenting striving. 
Because it "lifts us out of real existence, and transforms us into disinterested spectators of it", 
aesthetic contemplation "remains foreign to all willing" (WWR, I, §57, p. 314) and thereby 
results in a brief transcendence of the self. 
        Nietzsche argues that aesthetic experience as 'disinterested', and especially as 'will-
lessness' characteristic of the ascetic, is profoundly mistaken, and defends what he takes to be 
the antithetical position. There are two major disagreements. Firstly and as I stated above, 
Nietzsche does not think aesthetic experience necessarily provides any experience of 'true' 
reality or knowledge of the world. Rather, it is characteristic of aesthetic experiences to do 
precisely the opposite. Secondly, Nietzsche broadly rejects the idea of aesthetic experience as 
what "pleases without interest", rather it consists in the "arousal of the will" (GM, III, §6).  286
One metaphor Nietzsche uses to present this idea is that of "intoxication" [Rausch], which he 
describes in terms of “the feeling of fullness and increasing strength” (TI, "Skirmishes", §8). 
When a painting, for example, excites desires in and of itself in a pleasurable way, then that 
painting is beautiful. As Richardson claims in his discussion of 'intoxication': “something is 
beautiful if and only if it can (or does) produce Rausch”.  In this way, pleasure in beauty is 287
'interested'; that "art is the great stimulus to life" (TI, "Skirmishes", §24). 
 The literature on this important topic is vast. I shall only attempt to give a brief account of the 284
main differences for the purpose of how suffering might be understood in aesthetic terms.
 Kant's views on aesthetic contemplation appear in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful 285
and Sublime (1764), and are developed in the Critique of Judgement (1790).
 Nietzsche often draws an analogy between aesthetic experience and sexual excitement to 286
emphasise this point (GM, III, §8; TI, "Ancients, §4).
 John Richardson, Nietzsche's New Darwinism, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 230.287
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        This is an overly brief account of the main distinctions between a Nietzschean 
conception of aesthetic experience and the Kantian-Schopenhauerian account. However, my 
purpose is only to provide a minimal understanding of how Nietzsche thinks of aesthetic 
value so it may be soon applied to suffering. I make no claims about which is more plausible 
here. I now turn to how the notion of beauty in organic unity is particularly pertinent with 
regard to his view of suffering's value by considering his concept of the 'heroic'. 
2.3. The Heroic  
        Nietzsche's claims regarding heroism and the value of a heroic disposition occur as early 
as The Birth of Tragedy, but reach their pinnacle in The Gay Science. I shall draw heavily, but 
not exclusively, upon this text in elucidating the concept of the heroic, before identifying it 
with subsequent Nietzschean claims regarding aesthetic value and suffering. 
          
        Nietzsche defines heroes in terms of striving, suffering, and sacrifice, and appeals to the 
interrelation of these components to tempt his readers into considering the great value which 
has been disregarded, and even discouraged, since the historical triumph of herd morality. 
Nietzsche clearly presents himself as a defender of this kind of value; as one who will 
"welcome all the signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore 
honour to courage above all" (GS, §283).  288
        For Nietzsche, heroes are those who suffer greatly in relentlessly striving for their goals. 
Moreover, heroism is construed at least partly by one's joyfully facing great and potentially 
fatal challenges. He states plainly: "What makes one heroic?—Going out to meet at the same 
time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope" (GS, §268). Put in Reginster's terms, 
 It is important to distance Nietzsche's positive evaluation of heroism from the claim that he was 288
engaged in a kind of 'hero worship' or veneration of certain individuals as role-models that ought to 
be emulated. It is true that Nietzsche lamented the decrease in the importance of the hero, and 
repeatedly expresses approval for figures such as Goethe, Beethoven, Caesar, and so forth. In light 
of this, Arthur Danto claims that "Nietzsche was an inveterate worshiper of heroes" (Arthur Danto, 
Nietzsche as Philosopher, (McMillan, 1965), p. 198). However, this mistakenly overlooks Nietzsche's 
clear aversion to, and denouncing of, such a practice. See D, §298; EH, III, §1. Nietzsche venerates 
the formal properties that 'great' figures share, and not their particular personas.
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heroes inherently exercise their will to power to a high degree; to such an exceptional extent 
that their striving involves great risk and sacrifice. Nietzsche warns that identifying true 
heroism as opposed to merely "apparent heroism" can however be difficult, for there are 
epistemological constraints on knowing peoples' real motivations: "To throw oneself into the 
thick of battle can be a sign of cowardice" (D, §299). But Nietzsche is keen to emphasise the 
importance of risk and sacrifice, to the extent that he thinks of himself to manifest the heroic 
for these very reasons. Though not a fighter in the context of war, where we might 
traditionally place 'heroic' deeds, Nietzsche applies the value of heroic struggle to other 
aspects of life; one of his own being his battle with ill-health: 
What constitutes the value and result of life for me, lies elsewhere...I know more about life 
because I have been so often on the verge of losing it; and precisely for that reason I get more 
out of life than any of you! (GS, §303; TI, 'Skirmishes', §17) 
Nietzschean heroes thrive in situations where their necessary conditions—turmoil and danger
—are present. He writes of the heroic type that their  "expression is never prouder, more 
warlike, and happier than it is when a storm comes up; indeed, pain itself gives them their 
greatest moments!" (GS, §318). Though Nietzsche presents this point in provocative terms, it 
is by no means new, or indeed that radical. The idea of heroic deeds requiring risk and 
sacrifice is (unsurprisingly) embedded in the work of Homer. To take  but one example from 
The Iliad that may help make Nietzsche's point in this passage explicit, the Lycian hero 
Sarpedon answers his friend Glaucus regarding the question of why they are honoured back 
in Lycia with "the best of everything" by saying: 
All this now obliges us to take our places in the front ranks of the Lycians and fling ourselves 
into the flames of battle. Only then will our Lycian men-at-arms say of us: "Well! These are 
no dishonourable lords of Lycia that rule over us and eat fat sheep and drink the best sweet 
wine: they are indomitable and fight in the forefront of the Lycians.  289
 Homer, The Iliad, (Penguin Classics, 2003b), p. 211, 12.316-330.289
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The point that Sarpedon makes is that in the front lines lies the greatest risk to their lives, and 
therefore "where men win glory".  Heroism consequently depends on one's mortality. 290
Lawrence Hatab captures this point in claiming that: 
...in a world where no one died, the need for protection and the subsequent rewards for heroic 
risk would be absent. All people would be on a common footing and noble privilege would 
disappear.  291
In her detailed assessment of the role of Agon in Nietzsche's philosophy, Christa Davis 
Acampora draws upon an early essay of Nietzsche's—Homer's Contest—to make a similar 
point. She argues that Nietzsche views the lives of the human protagonists in the work of 
Homer as "potentially surpassing that of the gods—the gods cannot achieve the status of the 
heroes because they cannot risk their lives".  The idea being that the very greatest 292
achievements are often those so difficult that the agent's striving involves a high risk for the 
achiever; they, like Sarpedon and Glaucus, could potentially lose their lives in the struggle 
(UM, II, §9; TI, 'Skirmishes', §38). Although the gods can reach their ends with ease, this 
heroic struggle is something they are not able to do, the significance of which being that they 
are deprived of tremendous value.  293
        Nietzsche holds that in opposition to an existence of "smug ease", these few and rare 
individuals "are the heroic type, the great pain-bringers of humanity" (GS, §318; cf. §377). 
The same sentiment persists in later work: 
Like a rider on a charging steed we let fall the reins before the infinite, we modern men, like 
semi-barbarians—and attain our state of bliss only when we are most—in danger. (BGE, 
§224) 
 Homer, (2003b), p. 211, 12.325.290
 Lawrence Hatab, Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths, (Open Court, 1990), p. 74. 291
 Christa Davis Acampora, Contesting Nietzsche, (University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 43.292
 I agree with Acampora that Nietzsche's interpretation of Homer in this way is why he ultimately 293
takes Homer's worldview to be a life-affirming one: it places great value in this world and not in 
some other realm. 
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The important point for my purposes here is to acknowledge that Nietzsche considers 
heroism to be at least partly an aesthetic concept. As a philologist, Nietzsche would have 
been particularly sensitive to the choice of terminology in Homer's texts. Consider again 
Sarpedon and Glaucus' conversation in The Iliad: by risking their lives in the frontlines of 
battle they win glory [kleos], the opposite concept being shame or disgrace [aischros]. While 
shameful actions were judged to be bad, they were not considered immoral or wrong. Rather, 
they were considered 'ugly', which is another meaning of aischros. The opposite concept of 
kalos, 'beauty', therefore corresponds with kleos: glory. A defining feature of Nietzsche's 
positive ethics is his acceptance of this Homeric evaluation of the good in close connection to 
the beautiful. For instance, Nietzsche describes these rare individuals as “uniquely himself to 
every last movement of his muscles, more, that in being thus strictly consistent in uniqueness 
he is beautiful, and worth regarding" (UM, III, §1). Much later, Nietzsche draws a parallel 
between power and "magnificence" or "splendour" [Pracht] (GM, Preface, §6) that is found 
in great individuals; a quality which has significant aesthetic connotations. Furthermore, in 
the same work Nietzsche later presents to his readers an "aristocratic value equation" as 
follows: 
good = noble = powerful = beautiful = fortunate = loved by god (GM, I, §7; emphasis added) 
        Heroic activity is clearly a good thing in Nietzsche's view, and because his aestheticism 
treats ethical concepts like aesthetic ones, at least in this context, heroic activity (i.e. striving) 
is also beautiful. This has consequences for the aestheticization of suffering, which heroic 
beauty is in part constituted by. I shall now turn to this point and why it is relevant to the 
value of suffering and organic unity, in turn showing how Reginster can best defend his view. 
3. Suffering as a Contributor 
3.1. Can Suffering be Beautiful? 
        Striving for one's noble goals has aesthetic value in Nietzsche's view. The importance of 
the aesthetic value tied to heroic struggle culminates in tragedy, whereby the heroic 
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protagonist leads himself to annihilation because of his ambition and drive to achieve his 
goals. Thus, when Achilles is overcome with rage at the death of Patroclus, the grandeur of 
his vengeful rampage that ends with his death is supposedly aesthetically pleasing in some 
way. Nietzsche praises Macbeth in similar terms in a passage from Daybreak titled "The 
Morality of the Stage", arguing that to think the actions of Macbeth are presented as evil and 
to be shunned would be a mistake. Rather, "if the hero perishes by his passion this precisely 
is the sharpest spice in the hot draught of this joy" (D, §240). It is precisely this element of 
tragic heroes, such as Macbeth and Achilles, which has "demonic attraction" (D, §240) in 
Nietzsche's view. This attraction, we are told, is entirely lost in the modern man: he is no 
longer "the centre and tragic hero of existence in general" (WP, §18; KSA, 1886, 7[3]). 
        But while Nietzsche finds beauty in striving, whether this means that all constitutive 
features of that striving are themselves beautiful in such a context remains unclear. At first 
glance, the idea that suffering can be beautiful seems abhorrent. Claims about the suffering of 
victims of natural disasters or wars whose entire families are lost; of leukaemia; of child 
abuse; suicidal depression; and other such horrors, being beautiful appear deeply superficial. 
Importantly, Nietzsche certainly does intend his claims about the value of suffering to be 
shocking, after all, they are made as part of an attempt at a radical 'revaluation of all values' 
aimed at curing a diagnosed problem with contemporary culture. However, it is important not 
to attribute to Nietzsche a more radical position than he actually defends, thereby dismissing 
his distinctive view wholesale. 
        The possibility that Nietzsche defends the notion that all suffering, including the 
examples above, can be found beautiful is unlikely. However, it matters little for my purposes 
here because there are two crucial constraints on the thread of argument in this thesis. The 
first constraint is that I only discuss Nietzsche's suffering of a particular kind: that of 
resistance to the will in striving to reach one's goals (as defined in Chapter One). This 
significantly limits the scope of Nietzsche's claims about suffering to that experienced in 
certain activities, namely great achievements. The second constraint is that, as I argued in 
Chapter Three, Nietzsche does not think this type of activity is valuable for everyone, or 
should be attempted by everyone. Rather, the value of suffering in pursuit of noble goals is 
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considerably limited to a small number of individuals: those capable of 'greatness'. Taking 
these constraints into account, the issue of superficiality is at once less compelling. 
        Nevertheless, there may still be a lingering worry of this nature in holding that suffering 
is able (at least in some contexts) to be beautiful. There is certainly one intuition that seeing 
heroes suffer in their epic struggles is glorious, but that suffering itself can be anything other 
than negative will be objectionable to many. Nietzsche is aware of this clash of intuitions, and 
in The Birth of Tragedy asks: "How can ugliness and discord, the content of the tragic myth, 
produce aesthetic pleasure?" (BT, §24). He continues: 
The content of the tragic myth at first seems to be an epic event that glorifies the struggling 
hero. But what is the origin of that mysterious feature whereby the hero's suffering, the most 
painful victories, the most agonising oppositions of motives—in short, the exemplification of 
the wisdom of Silenus, or to put it in aesthetic terms, ugly and discordant elements—are 
repeatedly portrayed with such love and in such countless forms, precisely in the most 
voluptuous and youthful era of people, unless a higher pleasure was perceived in it? (BT, §24) 
There are two ways we might understand the relation between suffering and beautiful wholes. 
Both of these make use of the principle of organic unity, but each in different ways by turning 
on the notions of enabling conditions and contributors that I presented earlier. 
        The first way one might understanding suffering's relation to beauty would be to regard 
suffering as an aesthetic defect or imperfection that nevertheless increases the value of a 
whole. To give an analogy, it might be that just as a small mole or birth mark may add beauty 
to a face, or a poor quality recording may make a song sound more authentic, suffering is 
necessary for the greater beauty of heroic striving. On this view, suffering is an enabling 
condition for a valuable whole that outweighs its badness. 
        Came rejects this view as unrepresentative of Nietzsche's position. I agree with Came, 
but for slightly different reasons. Came writes that in order for an aesthetic imperfection to 
plausibly act as an enabling condition for a valuable aesthetic whole, the value of that whole 
must significantly outweigh the ugliness of the imperfection. However, suffering seems to 
'top trump' anything it appears with. Came argues: 
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...suffering seems not only to cancel out but to engulf what ostensibly has positive aesthetic 
value in the world. Suffering is not like the ugliness of a small patch of colour in a painting 
that is defeated or cancelled out by the positive aesthetic value of the whole.    294
However, while this point about the nature of suffering is an insightful one,  and carries 295
weight for his purposes—to address Nietzsche's attempt at a justification of existence in the 
face of immense suffering in the world—it loses its force when the two restrictions I made 
above are taken into account: that my focus in this thesis is on (1) a particular kind of 
suffering: resistance to the will in striving; (2) what Nietzsche takes to be valuable for 
particular types of people, namely exceptional and potentially 'great' individuals. In the 
context of heroism in which Nietzsche approaches the aesthetic value related to suffering, it 
is less clear that suffering of this kind must "engulf" the value in great achievements.  
       Nevertheless, I agree with Came that for Nietzsche suffering was not merely an enabling 
condition. I now turn to whether there are adequate grounds to consider suffering as a 
contributor. Let us take stock of what has been discussed so far: I have up to this point 
attributed three major claims to Nietzsche: 
(a) The endorsement of the principle of organic unities. 
(b) The aestheticization of ethics.  
(c) The veneration of the 'heroic' over the 'moral'. 
But what are the logical relations between them? Nietzsche's opponents—proponents of herd 
morality—implicitly accept (a) when they hold that compassion is a virtue, which (logically) 
presupposes suffering, since compassion simply is the disposition to want to alleviate 
suffering. They might also endorse (b). For instance, Both Hume and Hutcheson thought that 
compassion is a beautiful character trait, and that it is a virtue because we are pleased by the 
 Came, (2005), p. 54. 294
 This echoes a similar sentiment expressed by Schopenhauer in his defence of pessimism—that 295
there is a severe imbalance between suffering and pleasure in terms of value and affect (WWR, II, 
p. 576; P2, §149, p. 292.
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contemplation of it. However, neither they nor the Christian, for example, would endorse (c). 
The reason for this is that they do not think suffering is made into a 'good' thing by the 
compassion. Rather, the suffering is a regrettable enabling condition of a good (the 
compassion) that is (sometimes) greater than the suffering. This indicates that Nietzsche's 
conception of (b) must differ radically from Humean/Christian conception of (b): while the 
latter tempers the margin of the ethical/aesthetic domain in favour the ethical (or 'moral'), 
Nietzsche does the opposite.  296
        Nietzsche gives a strong indication that he understands suffering to be beautiful in this 
second way, that is: as a contributor rather than as an enabling condition. On this view, 
suffering itself is construable as beautiful in certain contexts: when suffering in pursuit of 
one's goal, the extra value to be found in heroic striving comes from suffering increasing in 
value upon entering the whole. An analogous example might be the case of the mosaic 
mentioned earlier. The stones which make up a beautiful mosaic, let us imagine, are of little 
worth before the prospect of a mosaic was pondered. However, upon entering as a part of the 
beautiful mosaic, each part acquires beauty and can be admired for their qualities (e.g. of 
their particular shade of blue) and what it 'brings' to the whole. 
        In the same passage from The Birth of Tragedy quoted above with regard to heroic 
struggle, Nietzsche importantly draws his own telling analogy between suffering and 
"musical dissonance" (BT, §24) to elucidate this concept. He writes that "the pleasure 
engendered by the tragic myth comes from the same native soil as our pleasurable sensation 
 An interesting comparison might be made here between Nietzsche and Hume's views about the 296
pleasure to be found in suffering in tragedies. Some interpretations of Hume's On Tragedy have him 
claim that we experience pleasure in the sorrow and suffering itself, and not merely in virtue of 
further goods it may enable. This is often referred to as his emotional conversion theory. This 
particular interpretation of the theory looks remarkably close to the view I attribute Nietzsche 
here. However, the crucial difference is that Hume, unlike Nietzsche, does not think this theory can 
be plausible or desirable outside the realm of fiction. On Hume's view, we take comfort in knowing 
these instances of suffering are "nothing but a fiction" (OT, p. 217) . Therefore, Hume cannot be 
said to endorse Nietzsche's form of aestheticism.
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of dissonance in music" (BT, §24).  In other words, just as we find dissonance in chords and 297
harmonies to be aesthetically pleasing, not as enabling conditions but as contributors, the 
same is true, Nietzsche thinks, of suffering in the case of the tragic hero. This relationship 
between pleasure and suffering, Nietzsche writes, is "the great pantheistic sharing of joy and 
sorrow that sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life" 
(WP, §1050; KSA, 1888, 14[14]; emphasis added). Similarly, he claims that "It is the heroic 
spirits who say Yes to themselves in tragic cruelty: they are hard enough to experience 
suffering as a pleasure" (WP, §852; KSA, 1887, 10[168]). These comments are supported in 
Nietzsche's broader claims about the nature of value that I discussed in Chapter Three. For 
example: 
It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and honoured things 
resides precisely in their being artfully related, knotted and crocheted to these wicked, 
apparently antithetical things, perhaps even in their being essentially identical with them. 
(BGE, §2) 
The claim that something can be "good and honoured" and "essentially identical" with 
negative values implies that Nietzsche understands things as being able (at least) to be 
valuable in one context but not in another. This further supports the interpretation that when 
Nietzsche claims that "only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed 
in the whole" (TI, 'Skirmishes', §49), bad/ugly parts are "redeemed" in virtue of being 
contributors and not enabling conditions. Moreover, that where "weaknesses delight the 
eye" (GS, §290), one perceives parts, such as suffering, as beautiful, and not regrettable 
features of valuable wholes. 
        It will be useful to compare these important remarks to a later aphorism from The Gay 
Science, where Nietzsche again asks how 'ugly' things can be considered beautiful: 
 Nietzscheans will likely not find this observation particularly surprising or controversial given 297
Nietzsche's views about the human psychological tendency to feel pleasure in another's suffering, 
be that through (1) cruelty (where that pleasure comes from inflicting suffering, either upon 
another agent, or in the case of the ascetic, upon oneself), (2) schadenfreude (where that pleasure 
comes from perceiving suffering in another), or cases of (3) revenge. Indeed, this idea is the basis 
of Nietzsche's account of the origins of punishment: one is paid back the debt one is owed by a 
transgressor in pleasure at their being punished, with varying practices more subtly expressing this 
urge to cruelty in various cultures across history than others (GM, II).
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What one should Learn from Artists. How can we make things beautiful, attractive, and 
desirable, when they are not? And I rather think that in themselves they never are. Here we 
could learn something from physicians, when for example they dilute what is bitter or add 
wine and sugar to a mixture—but even more from artists who are really continually trying to 
bring off such inventions and feats. Moving away from things until there is a good deal that 
one no longer sees and there is much that our eye has to add if we are still to see them at all; 
or seeing things around a corner and as cut out and framed; or to place them so that they 
partially conceal each other and grant us only glimpses of architectural perspectives; or 
looking at them through tinted glass or in the light of the sunset; or giving them a surface and 
skin that is not fully transparent—all this we should learn from artists while being wiser than 
they are in other matters. For with them this subtle power usually comes to an end where art 
ends and life begins; but we want to be the poets of our life—first of all in the smallest, most 
everyday matters. (GS, §299)   
There are a number of interrelated points being made in this passage; those of relevance to 
my purposes here are threefold:  
(1) Things are never beautiful "in-themselves". 
(2) Rather, they become so when considered in relation to other things. 
(3) This principle of art should be applied to the ethical domain (aestheticism). 
Point (2) is especially relevant given Nietzsche's earlier claims in The Birth of Tragedy 
regarding the beauty of suffering and the analogy with musical dissonance. But Nietzsche's 
description of point (2) in this passage is especially interesting. He implies that one ought to 
"withdraw from things" of negative value in order to see them through a variety of diluting 
"perspective views" that "disguise" their nature as ugly. Nietzsche's strategy for viewing 
suffering as beautiful when a part of a valuable whole seems to therefore depend upon what 
he considers a form of illusion or falsification of the phenomena. In other words, suffering's 
badness is made tolerable by giving it a certain perspective—that of heroic struggle—that 
makes it an object of aesthetic pleasure.  Nietzsche is able to make such a move because of 
his commitment to the claim that the relationship between aesthetic value and epistemic value 
is asymmetrical: what has value does not necessarily correspond to what is true. 
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3.2 Suffering Experienced vs. Suffering Perceived  
        At this point we must draw a distinction between two different phenomena, that is: 
between the suffering one experiences in one's own striving, on the one hand, and the 
suffering one perceives in others', striving on the other. Nietzsche's position so far might be 
thought to be more appropriate for the perception of suffering in another's struggle; that 
aesthetic value is found in suffering as a spectator witnessing an agonistic struggle. Yet 
Nietzsche is ambiguous about which form he is concerned with, and could plausibly be 
interpreted as attempting to address both.  
        Came holds that "the general tenor of his descriptions of suffering", at least in The Birth 
of Tragedy, "suggests that it is the pain of others, rather than one's own pain, that is most 
problematic".  This may be the case, but I wish to remain open to whether Nietzsche's 298
claims regarding the beauty of suffering can be applied to oneself for two reasons. Firstly, 
while the suffering of others in general may be "most problematic", it is unlikely that 
Nietzsche, who later refers to his own great suffering on numerous occasions (e.g. GS, §303; 
EH, I, §1, §2), thinks one's own suffering isn't problematic at all.  
        Secondly, Nietzsche does in at least one place explicitly attempt to draw a connection 
between the perception and experience of suffering as beautiful by arguing that perceiving 
the struggle of the tragic hero in an aesthetic context allows one to reflect upon one's own 
striving in the same terms. In a telling passage, he writes:    
Only artists, and especially those of the theatre, have given men eyes and ears to see and hear 
with some pleasure what each man is himself, experiences himself, desires himself; only they 
have taught us to esteem the hero that is concealed in everyday characters; only they have 
taught us the art of viewing ourselves as heroes—from a distance and, as it were, simplified 
and transfigured—the art of staging and watching ourselves. (GS, §78) 
 Came, (2005), p. 53.298
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The idea being conveyed here is that art has the capacity to act as a heuristic device in that it 
can give perspective on one's life in a way that provides a third person view of one's first 
person experiences. By 'putting ourselves on the stage', we treat the way we live as a kind of 
performance. If we apply this to the problem at hand, because we perceive the beauty of the 
hero's suffering, we can apply that experience to our own striving to some degree. In this way 
Nietzsche appears to attempt to addresses both the suffering of others and one's own suffering 
as instances of beauty. 
        Nietzsche later again advises that "we must discover the hero", and appears to commit to 
a stronger claim that only art gives this capacity for perspective: "art furnishes us with eyes 
and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves into such a 
[aesthetic] phenomenon (GS, §107). This, to put it modestly, is an ambitious expectation for 
someone to be able to effectively do. But again, Nietzsche does not expect just anyone to be 
able to do so, but only those rare and exceptional individuals capable of it. 
Conclusion 
        To conclude, Reginster is right to claim that suffering, in Nietzsche's view, has value in 
virtue of being part of a valuable whole (i.e. contributory value). However, by making use of 
the principle of organic unities—a principle that heavily underpins Nietzsche's wider positive 
ethical project—we can understand that suffering contributes value to a whole in a particular 
way. This is as a contributor which bridges the ethical with the aesthetic (understood through 
the concept of the heroic), and not merely as an enabling condition (typically understood in 
the moral case of compassion). On this view, suffering is not itself good, but can be construed 
as good in aesthetic terms in virtue of its overcoming. It is on these grounds that, as Reginster 
claims, suffering "cannot be coherently deplored" in the context of striving, and not simply in 
virtue of the fact that suffering is an essential feature of the good. Furthermore, it is precisely 
this treatment of suffering as a contributor and not an enabling condition that sharply 
distinguishes Nietzsche's ethics of heroism from his moral opponents. 
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        My arguments here are limited in important ways, and can therefore only take us so far. 
First of all, I have drawn heavily upon claims from the period up and including to The Gay 
Science in order to support my interpretation. While I see no reason to suggest Nietzsche 
changed his view after this, the strongest evidence for the claims I have made reside in this 
work and the works that preceded it. Secondly, my claims pertain only to the suffering 
experienced in the pursuit of one's goals. The broader project of trying to reconcile all 
suffering in the world with an affirmation of life—of fundamental 'yes-saying' [Jasagen]—
may have been partly answered in the process, but my arguments should not be taken as 
sufficient to address this larger Nietzschean theme. 
        Nietzsche's aestheticism is radical, and when considered in a wider sense to apply to the 
whole of existence as a type of performance or theatre, in which all suffering contributes 
beauty to an agonistic spectacle of greatness, it is implausible. However, whether Nietzsche is 
actually committed to such a view is controversial, and far from what I have attempted to 
interpret him as defending here. Rather, his aestheticism considered in a narrower sense 
pertaining to a certain kind of activity by certain people—the striving of the heroic—while 
still radical, has interesting implications. The intuition that he is latching on to—that the 
utilitarian mission to minimize suffering as much as possible does away with any need or 
possibility for the heroic—is a powerful one. Morality, in Nietzsche's view, comes at the 
expense of abandoning opportunities for great individuals to flourish, and it is at the very 
least not obvious that this is a preferable state of affairs. Nietzsche is prompting his readers—
which I have argued is in some way justifiable—into casting doubt upon the tacit assumption 
of modernity that suffering is always to be abolished. 
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